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INTRODUCTION “SHE HAD POWER IN HER PURITY”: FEMINIST 
POTENTIAL AND INTERTEXTUALITY IN 18951 
 
In 1939, Virginia Woolf describes her battles “with a certain phantom,” with 
shadows like those that suppressed female sexuality in 1895 (58).  She explains that she 
has finally killed The Angel of the House2, the ghost whose shadow is reminiscent of the 
“chief beauty” of womanhood: Purity (59). Woolf realizes that she must catch this 
phantom “by the throat” if she wants to express “the truth about human relations, 
morality, sex” because “all these questions, according to the Angel of the House, cannot 
                                                 
1
 In The Woman Who Did, the narrator describes Herminia’s mission: “She had power in her purity to raise 
his nature [Alan’s] for a time to something approached her own high level” (32). See page 45 for an 
analysis of this quotation. 
2In referencing “The Angel in the House,” I am referring most generally to the iconic Victorian image of 
femininity as featured in Coventry Patmore’s 1854 narrative poem.  In Victorian literature and art, the 
woman who embodied this “Angelic” feminine ideal is stereotyped as a saintly, passive, selfless, 
submissive, pure, and sexless wife and mother. This is the depiction of ideal womanhood that Richard 
Altick explores in the foundational text of Victorian studies Victorian People and Ideas: A Companion for 
the Modern Reader of Victorian Literature (1973). Altick argues that “convention dictated a rigorously 
stereotyped personality” for the middle-class woman: “she was The Angel in the House, to borrow from the 
title of Coventry Patmore’s hugely popular versified praise of domestic sainthood and the mystical, non-
fleshly institution of marriage” (53). Altick acknowledges that many “leading novels” of the period 
challenged this womanly ideal through literary images of “the nonconforming woman”; nonetheless, this 
“revered cluster of Victorian domestic virtues served as a norm” for which “writers frequently mounted an 
outright or covert attack on the unrealities and perversions of the prevailing womanly ideal, the myth of 
domestic accommodation and tranquility” (56). In Woman and the Demon: The Life of a Victorian Myth 
(1982), Nina Auerbach notes that the Victorian Angel is much different from the “traditional” masculine 
angel of the Romantic Period:  “As heir to this tradition, the Victorian angel in the house seems a bizarre 
object of worship, both in her virtuous femininity with its inherent limitations—she can exist only within 
the family, while masculine angels existed everywhere—in the immobilization that the phrase suggests” 
(70). The Angel of the House that resonates in the Victorian period “is defined by her boundaries,” and it is 
within the domestic sphere that she becomes “the source of order” (Auerbach 71). As Auerbach points out, 
the mythical Angel has many guises (much like the literary figure of the New Woman), and this construct 
can be both empowering and oppressive. In “Nobody's Angels: Domestic Ideology and Middle-Class 
Women in the Victorian Novel” (1992), Elizabeth Langland further develops this nuanced perception of 
The Angel by focusing on “the intersection of class and gender ideologies in a Victorian icon—the ‘Angel 
in the House,’” in order to argue that “the wife, the presiding hearth angel of Victorian social myth, actually 
performed a more significant and extensive economic and political function than is usually perceived” 
(290-291). Langland also argues that “the portrait of middle class women” in the Victorian period is 
complex and that many Victorian writers challenged the monolithic image of The Angel through 
representations of femininity that were “less constrained, imprisoned, and passive than the victim discerned 
in conventional gender-inflected interpretations” (303).  Building on these studies which recognize the 
complex perceptions of the Victorian Angel, I identify the first-wave feminist projection of ideal 
womanhood as “the angel,” a designator which suggests that the late-nineteenth century feminine construct 
is still very much rooted in the moral and sexual standards of The Angel but that it has undergone some 
revisions.   
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be dealt with freely and openly by women” (59-60). The Victorian purity ideologies that 
maintained the vitality of The Angel were also instrumental in facilitating the possibility 
of this murder in that they exposed the limitations of The Angel’s wings. Near the end of 
the nineteenth century, social-purity feminism and the New Woman fiction under its 
influence attempted to revise or reinvent The Angel in order to promote or present 
feminist goals through a reinvented construct of collective femininity, which I refer to as 
the angel3. Although social purity relied on rather traditional views of sexuality and 
gender—views which feminists today would label outdated and embarrassing—such 
ideas and strategies served as feminist tactics at the turn of the nineteenth century. The 
countless efforts to depict new womanhood shaped by old theories of purity and virtue 
reveal a key moment in feminist history because they called for a transition in feminist 
thought. Before the death of the Angel, women had to recognize that she was there and 
that her presence was tyrannical, and the purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate 
how the intertextual New Woman novel participated in this process of exposing the angel 
and was therefore integral in redirecting feminist thought.  
In New Women, New Novels (1990), Ann Ardis points out that the conventions of 
New Woman fiction which “previously have been taken as signs of its aesthetic 
deficiency” point to the author’s scheme of purposely joining the cultural, political, and 
literary conversation of The Woman Question (3).  She explains, “They [the authors of 
New Woman novels] do not want to be read singly or separately; moreover, they choose 
not to be silent about the intertextual debate in which they participate” (4).  One example 
                                                 
3
 At the end of this chapter, I provide a more in-depth description of how I differentiate between “The 
Angel” that constructed Victorian ideals of femininity and the image of “the angel” that pervaded first-
wave feminist discourse and New Woman fiction at the turn of the century. 
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of this intertextual dialogue is clearly illustrated in the direct literary responses to Grant 
Allen’s popular New Woman Novel The Woman Who Did (1895), most notably through 
Victoria Cross’s (Annie Sophie Cory) The Woman Who Didn’t (also published in 1895 in 
Lane’s Keynotes Series) and Lucas Cleeve’s (Adelina G. I. Kingscote) The Woman Who 
Wouldn’t (1895). The intertextuality of these three New Woman novels is historically and 
culturally contextualized in social-purity feminism, the marriage debate, and the reticent 
sexual politics of the late-nineteenth century, and to date no scholar has examined in 
depth and detail the formal commonalities of these three texts or their interdiscursive and 
intertextual relationship with first-wave feminism. Building on Ardis’s premise that New 
Woman texts are founded on intertextuality, this study explores the “intertextual debate” 
that develops as a result of the textual, discursive, and ideological exchanges among 
Allen’s The Woman Who Did, its explicit literary rejoinders of 1895, and first-wave 
feminist thought (4). Thus, I will situate these texts in a fresh historical context, and I will 
develop a critical intertextual project not hitherto undertaken. My exploration of 
intertextuality among New Woman writers and other socio-political rivalries for the 
discourse of liberation will derive from my analysis of these three 1895 novels; however, 
in order to analyze thoroughly the interdiscursivity of these texts, this study is also 
informed by a multitude of late-nineteenth century contributions to “The Woman 
Question,” the marriage debate, and social-purity feminism.  
 In an 1895 review of The Woman Who Did published in Liberty (Not the 
Daughter but the Mother of Order) Herman Kuehn writes, “The book has great merit as a 
stimulus to thought on a question that cries for solution, and such a book as “The Woman 
Who Did” is not written in vain. It is an integral part of the Insurgent Literature of our 
4 
 
 
times, and in the ranks of the rebel troop it is not important that each volunteer be full six 
feet tall” (6). Kuehn’s description here is significant because it introduces an initial 
framework for understanding the intertextual structure of the texts in this study: The 
Woman Who Did can be viewed as an implicit intertext of “Insurgent Literature,” and it 
also serves as an intertextual point of reference in that it will stimulate more “thought” in 
the form of both the explicit and implicit intertexts that follow (6). Although, as Kuehn 
anticipates, The Woman Who Did encouraged many responses which could be identified 
as intertexts, I am interested in how it incited the immediate and explicit literary 
responses of Lucas Cleeve and Victoria Cross. The Woman Who Did was published in 
February of 1895, and by October, Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co. had 
published Cleeve’s The Woman Who Wouldn’t, and John Lane published Cross’s The 
Woman Who Didn’t in Volume 18 of Keynotes Series4—two more pieces that join the 
ranks of “Insurgent Literature” in their attempts to tackle the Woman Question through 
unconventional critiques of marriage.  
 The Woman Who Did elicited other direct responses such as Punch’s “The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t Do,” and numerous other indirect responses,5 yet I have limited 
the scope of my project to these three novels. John Frow argues that unless a text directly 
calls attention to its origin, “the identification of an intertext is an act of interpretation” 
(46). My identification of The Woman Who Wouldn’t and The Woman Who Didn’t as 
                                                 
4
 John Lane (The Bodley Head) had also published The Woman Who Did in the February of 1895 (Volume 
VIII) issue of the Keynotes Series.  It instantly became a popular bestseller and was printed in nineteen 
editions in 1895 and four more in 1896. 
5
 Many New Woman Novels published after Allen’s could fit into this intertextual web based on their 
classification in the New Woman genre.  See page 4 in Ann Ardis’s New Women New Novels and 
Appendix E in Ruddik’s 2004 edition of The Woman Who Did. See “The Man Who Wrote a New Woman 
Novel: Grant Allen’s The Woman Who Did and the Gendering of New Woman Authorship” (2005) by 
Vanessa Warne and Colette Colligan for a thorough analysis of “The Woman Who Wouldn’t Do” and other 
related parodies of Allen’s text. 
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intertexts derives from both of these approaches as some of the cross-textual references 
are literary and overt and others are discursive and interpretative. The repetition of the 
phrase “The Woman Who” followed by the transformation of the verb (Would, 
Wouldn’t, Didn’t), reference each other in obvious ways and thus illustrate intertextuality 
in the most general sense of the term. The syntactic title paradigm “The Woman Who” 
harks back to Allen’s text, and critics of Cleeve’s and Cross’s novels repeatedly made 
this connection in their reviews. Wolfgang Karrer posits that “intertextuality in titles and 
mottoes thus not only reproduces bits of earlier texts, but also conflicting systems of title 
codes, carrying different social and cultural capital” (130). In a series of related titles, 
“intertextuality itself,” he argues, “thus becomes a product and tool of social 
reproduction, reflecting hierarchies in society and reproducing them at the same time” 
(130).  
 In this way, Karrer suggests that even seemingly overt examples of intertextual 
devices are subject to various degrees of interpretation. Karrer points out that intertextual 
titles often reveal a hierarchical relationship between the first title and the subsequent 
titles which reproduce or transform the original. Although his framework does not take 
authorship and gender into account, it is apparent that in this hierarchical ranking of 
intertextual titles, the canonical texts which occupy the higher positions are patriarchal, 
male-authored texts. Karrer’s methodology of locating intertextuality as way to examine 
“questions of ranking, authority, ideological reproduction and hierarchical overcoding” is 
useful in my analysis, which traces the title sequence from Allen to Cleeve and to Cross 
(123). The application of Karrer’s concept to the three texts in this study creates what 
Karrer refers to as a “top-down tree” organizational chart in which The Woman Who Did 
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occupies the highest position, followed by The Woman Who Wouldn’t and The Woman 
Who Didn’t equally positioned as second-rank texts “entitled to overcode certain assigned 
areas” of the first text (125).  
 In the 1890s, assenting and negative reviewers of these texts reiterated this top-
down model in the way that they evaluated how well The Woman Who Wouldn’t and The 
Woman Who Didn’t responded to The Woman Who Did. Some literary commentators 
approached Cleeve’s and Cross’s novels as successors of Allen’s and assessed to what 
extent either of these texts successfully overwrote or replaced their precursor. Most 
critics agreed that The Woman Who Did was poorly written, that it was no literary 
masterpiece, yet they were little concerned with the literary merit of The Woman Who 
Wouldn’t or The Woman Who Didn’t.  The titles The Woman Who Wouldn’t and The 
Woman Who Didn’t served to classify each work as descendants of Allen’s popular 
novel, and therefore critics explored whether these rejoinders offered “a use value” that 
was lacking in The Woman Who Did (Karrer 133). These second-rank, female-authored 
novels were legitimized through ties to a second-rate, but first-rank father text. Contrary 
to Kuehn’s prediction that The Woman Who Did would cultivate a productive intertextual 
conversation—one that would encourage more “stimulus to thought on a question that 
cries for solution”—critics often overlooked the potentially transformative intertextual 
relationship of the texts (6). Whereas Kuehn encouraged open and unrestricted 
membership to “the ranks of the rebel troop”6 because more “volunteers” meant a more 
diverse and forceful discussion, many critics manipulated intertextuality as a means of 
ranking and of asserting the authority of the original text (6).  
                                                 
6
 I use “open” and “unrestricted” here because when Kuehn writes, “and in the ranks of the rebel troop it is 
not important that each volunteer be full six feet tall” (6), he implies that individuals do not need to meet 
any requirements to enter the debate and that all contributions are productive in some way.  
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 In “Silly or Shocking,” published in The Literary World on September 20, 1895, 
the review of The Woman Who Wouldn’t and The Woman Who Didn’t begins with a 
tribute to Allen: “It is not at all likely that Mr. Grant Allen, when he issued to an 
expectant world ‘The Woman Who Did,’ can have foreseen the mutilated versions of his 
capital title” (200). The descriptor “capital” finds its origin in the Latin word for head, 
and according to the OED, the first meaning of the word “had to do with the head or top 
of something.” Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, the adjective “capital” was also 
used to mean “excellent,” a definition of the word which the OED now describes as “old-
fashioned.”  Regardless of its exact use here, “capital title,” positions The Woman Who 
Did above the “mutilated” titles that follow. At the very least, if “capital” only designates 
The Woman Who Did as the primary title (not as a first-rate or excellent one), it is clear 
by the use of the word “mutilated” that The Woman Who Wouldn’t and The Woman Who 
Didn’t have damaged the integrity of the original title. In this review from The Literary 
World, the author notes, “To secure a good title is a very valuable help to a book. A 
phrase that the tongue takes kindly to is often the means of stimulating the sale of a work 
that is, as a matter of fact, fit for little else than the wrapping up of butter” (200). Before 
the reviewer delves into an actual review of either of the texts, he concludes that The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t and The Woman Who Didn’t offer no literary or social “use value” 
in comparison with the “the most successful member of the ‘Keynote Series’” (referring 
to The Woman Who Did) (200).  The Woman Who Did is not only referred to as the 
“parent” text, but its second-rank children (or should I say daughters), even by way of 
their intertextual titles, are unauthorized responses.  
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 In order to appeal to pathos, the writer of this review (which I believe we can 
assume is male), continues: “The chivalry that is due from a male to a female prevents us 
from dismissing The Woman Who Didn’t as so much paper proper for the menial uses of 
the shopkeeper, though we feel compelled to say that, in our opinion, it is a record of 
wasted time. It is the most feeble counterblast that ever came from an antagonist. It is not 
able enough to command attention” (200).  The review then continues with a two- 
sentence synopsis of the text and concludes by reiterating that “creatures of this sort” 
(like the heroine of Cross’s The Woman Who Didn’t) are “not worth three and sixpence” 
(200). Since the author of The Woman Who Didn’t is female, the reviewer makes a half-
hearted attempt at politeness, but his overly condensed and simplified discussion of the 
text (devoid of character names or narrative details) suggests that it is not only a waste of 
time to read The Woman Who Didn’t but that it is also a waste of time to thoroughly or 
fairly review it.  
The commentator’s opinion of Lucas Cleeve’s The Woman Who Wouldn’t follows 
the same line as his opinion of The Woman Who Didn’t: he concludes by warning readers 
that “Opalia also is not worth three shillings and sixpence” (200). Although he presents 
the same negative view of both texts, he privileges his discussion of The Woman Who 
Wouldn’t by offering a fuller discussion of the text, complete with the names of the main 
characters. Furthermore, his analysis of The Woman Who Wouldn’t reveals that he objects 
to each text for different reasons. The Woman Who Didn’t is a “feeble” response—a weak 
attempt of a woman writer without the authority to “command attention” (200). In 
differentiating between the two offences, he writes: “Worse and Worse. In Miss Victoria 
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Crosse’s7 ‘The Woman Who Didn’t’ there was more of a folly than of viciousness, but in 
The Woman Who Wouldn’t the order of these unattractive qualities must be reversed” 
(200). The Woman Who Didn’t is foolish and nonsensical, but The Woman Who Wouldn’t 
is malicious and immoral and therefore “worse.” He continues, “Surely there is no 
beyond for the incapable and the dirty after this performance on the part of Lucas Cleeve, 
into whose sex it will not be profitable to inquire. It is rumoured that a lady has done this 
thing. That is impossible” (200). Although he states that it is unimportant to determine 
the author’s gender, we see that authorial gender influences both of these reviews. He is 
able to easily dismiss The Woman Who Didn’t because he classifies it as feminine—a 
powerless and delicate response that he expects from a woman writer. Yet, a “lady” 
writer is incapable of such a strong attack, and the only way he can contextualize the 
potential threat posed by The Woman Who Wouldn’t, its viciousness or frank discussion 
of sexual relations, is by discounting the “rumours.” The Woman Who Didn’t is rubbish 
because it is not an aggressive response and, The Woman Who Wouldn’t does not 
measure up to Allen’s original because it is too aggressive. According to this reviewer, 
nothing would serve as an adequate response to The Woman Who Did, and any attempt 
that openly challenges traditional views about marriage and sexuality is waste of time. 
Through its emphasis on intertextual titles, the review in The Literary World 
reiterates a hierarchal ranking between the three texts, but it also serves to challenge the 
basis of such a system wherein the top-ranked text undeservedly occupies a privileged 
                                                 
7
 The review in The Literary World  uses “Crosse” rather than “Cross.” The spelling of Cross’s name varied  
from publication to publication. Shoshana Milgram Knapp notes that “even her given name has been 
difficult to determine” because “biographical information on Cross is sparse” (“Victoria Cross” 80). Knapp 
suggests that Cory’s pseudonym served as a “complicated joke” intended to reference “the Victoria Cross,  
a medal awarded for military heroism, for her value in defying mores of the day” (81).  Knapp, who has 
extensively published on Cross and her works,  uses “Cross” rather than “Crosse,” and throughout this 
project, I also use this spelling except for when I include direct quotations that include the ‘e’ in the 
original text.  
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position. The review in The Literary World designates The Woman Who Did as an 
unanswerable and superior “original” text: 
Signs are not wanting that Mr. Grant Allen’s ‘The Woman Who Did’ is 
ephemeral; his characters have been described as puppets, his arguments 
as inconclusive. However these things may be, one thing is quite certain; 
the original that has set so many foolish tongues clacking deserves a better 
fate than to be the cause of such unpleasant stuff as is contained in this 
book by Lucas Cleeve. It is not unlikely that this volume will kill the 
whole controversy. We hope so, for it is plain that if each of those who are 
trying to make a few pence out of Mr. Grant Allen’s title decides to outdo 
his or her forerunner, we shall have to employ a waste-paper basket 
instead of a reviewer. (200) 
 
The reviewer fails to justify why The Woman Who Did “deserves a better fate” and 
instead gives the impression that Cleeve’s text has done more than defame the original 
title. Ultimately, he argues that no connection exists between The Woman Who Did and 
the “unpleasant stuff” of The Woman Who Wouldn’t.  That the original could prompt a 
response so threatening is as “impossible” as the rumor that a woman authored such a 
response. Although it would seem that the purpose of a literary review would be to 
evaluate the literary merit of the texts, “Silly or Shocking?” attempts to dissuade the 
audience from reading The Woman Who Wouldn’t and The Woman Who Didn’t not 
because they contain literary shortcomings (after all, so does The Woman Who Did), but 
because they do not logically follow Allen’s lead. The purpose of this so-called review is 
not to disparage bad literature but to delegitimize the intertextuality of these 
misunderstood or threatening intertexts.  
 Other publications tended to follow this trend in their treatment of Cross’s and 
Cleeve’s texts.  For example, “Our London Letter About Books” published in November 
of 1895 The Review of Reviews, explains:  
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It is a testimony to the success “The Woman Who Did” has had that “The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t” heads the list, for it is written with the direct 
object of controverting Mr. Allen’s novel. But although it has not the 
particular faults which made Miss Cross’ “The Woman Who Didn’t” so 
unwelcome, it isn’t good enough to be commended to your attention. And 
after all, you agree with me, Mr. Allen’s story is its own best antidote. 
(626) 
 
Here, the reviewer recognizes The Woman Who Wouldn’t as a calculated response to The 
Woman Who Did, but reiterates the opinion of The Literary World by denouncing its 
worth and reestablishing the supremacy of the original title. Evidently, The Woman Who 
Did had satiated literary and cultural conversations, and publications articulated that they 
had enough of the hype. In The Athenaeum’s brief review (September 21, 1895) of The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t, the commentator begins, “’The ‘Ohe, jam satis!’ of the wearied 
reviewer does not seem to make much impression on writers and publishers of 
nympholeptic stories” (382)8. The review continues by explaining that in the “first one or 
two romantic expositions of the sex-problem in its sharpest form there was something 
like an adequate reason. Almost every human problem may, at least once, demand 
literary expression as a right, or may obtain it without very serious protest” (382). In 
classifying Cleeve’s The Woman Who Wouldn’t as one of the many novels guilty of 
“indefinite repetition of the same thing,” the reviewer suggests that the controversies 
regarding marriage and sex have already been fully explored—that the subject has been 
exhausted (382).  
The reviews that I have discussed illustrate the approaches literary publications 
used to sever The Woman Who Didn’t and The Woman Who Wouldn’t from their parent 
                                                 
8
 According to E.H. Michelsen in A Manual of Quotations from the Ancient, Modern, and Oriental (1856), 
the Latin phrase “Ohe, jam satis!” from Horace translates to “Oh! There is now more than enough” and 
denotes satiety and disgust (193). 
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text. These reviews recognized intertextuality among the titles in order to condemn The 
Woman Who Didn’t and The Woman Who Wouldn’t as inferior or inconsequential texts, 
but they discounted or obscured the thematic intertextuality of these three texts. By 
showcasing these texts as deficient and meaningless, critics concealed the dynamics of 
interrelations and evaded how the intertextual dynamics functioned in connection to their 
societal and cultural context. In situating the critical responses to Woman Who Didn’t and 
The Woman Who Wouldn’t as products of and responses to the larger cultural debates on 
marriage and femininity, we can read these reviews as an ongoing effort to stifle the 
many controversies sparked by the New Woman and to contain her threatening potential. 
Literary critics in the 1890s tended to highlight the conventional characteristics of 
the New Woman heroine in an attempt to present her as a consistent and recognizable 
character type, but, at the same time, they also suggested that literary representations of 
the New Woman were very diverse. This taxonomy is best described in Hugh E. M. 
Stutfield’s “The Psychology of Feminism” (1897).  Insomuch as critics were fairly 
unified in their views that the New Woman or “The Modern Heroine” or “The Woman of 
Today” is not the woman of the “olden days” (for Stutfield, the woman of the past “was 
less troubled about the nature of her soul” and hardly interested in “baring,” “dissecting” 
or “probing into the innermost crannies of her nature” (105), critics also distinguished 
among New Woman types to further classify these heroines.  Stutfield, for example, 
suggests that the modern woman is a “sort of walking enigma”—that New Woman 
novels thematically share their “neverending delight” in investigating feminine 
psychology but do so by offering contrasting psychological sketches of women (104). 
Stutfield offers three variations of new womanhood in the heroines of the “Grandian 
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school” (after Sarah Grand), the “neurotic school,” and “the Woman’s Rights woman.”  
Stutfield describes writers of the Grandian school as those who present “the moral and 
mental perfection of the modern incarnation of the modern spirit” (107). He associates 
the neurotic school with George Egerton and identifies these New Woman novelists as 
more artistic but overcome with “modern nervousness” (110). For Stutfield, the neurotic-
school writers are wild, purely subjective or overly general and tend to “make a study of 
incomprehensibility, and raise mystification to the level of a fine art” (110). Stutfield 
continues to allude to Max Nordau’s theories as he aligns the neurotic New Woman type 
with an “intense and morbid consciousness of the ego in woman” (110). Unlike the 
Grandian writers, those of the neurotic school find self-sacrifice “out of fashion” and look 
to self-development instead. The last of Stutfield’s sketches, the Woman’s Rights 
woman, is identified as a heroine who is overly interested in “all the isms”—the woman 
who makes it her business to discuss politics and Parliament with her lover (111). 
Surprisingly, Stutfield’s New Woman taxonomy still flourishes in current 
criticism to some extent9. In “The ‘New Woman Fiction’ of the 1890’s” (1973), A.R. 
                                                 
9
 Although current scholars still delineate New Woman types much like Stutfield did, they have also 
revised the definition of the New Woman genre and re-classified New Woman novels in terms of current 
feminist thought. In The Woman Who Did and The Woman Who Wouldn’t, Allen and Cleeve depicted their 
heroines as New Women; they created recognizable female characters and didactic narratives that were 
associated with the popular genre of the 1890s. Therefore, in 1895, these two novels were received as New 
Woman novels.  The Woman Who Didn’t, on the other hand, lacks the hard-hitting polemics and the 
recognizable New Woman heroine that contemporary audiences associated with the New Woman genre. 
Knapp notes that various late nineteenth-century critics “typically ignored Eurydice’s distinctive qualities 
and displaced her from the center of attention” (“Victoria Cross” 82), which suggests that it did not exactly 
fit the qualifications to be considered a New Woman novel.  Today, we can draw on the discursive methods 
and gendered perception of the male narrator in order to position the novel as both New Woman and 
feminist, yet when it was published in 1895, the absence of the predictable New Woman heroine and 
conventions served to disentangle it from other New Woman novels.  Thus, we have seemed to revise and 
refigure the qualifications of the genre in order to make New Woman fiction synonymous with feminism 
today. In current literary criticism, the novels of the purity school (which actually represented the first wave 
New Woman novel) are deemed inferior New Woman texts because they are far afield from modern 
feminist agendas. The novels of the Neurotic School are exemplar New Woman (feminist) novels (even 
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Cunningham distinguishes between two types of the New Woman novel and accredits 
Stutfield with the coinage of the “less radical” of the two—that of the purity school (179).  
The other New Woman representation, according to Cunningham, is more radical, more 
sexual, and more psychological, much like Thomas Hardy’s “bachelor girl” Sue 
Bridehead (179). In this New Woman novel, the heroine is still a “bundle of nerves,” like 
Stutfield’s neurotic heroine, but “provide[s] a far greater contribution to the expanding 
knowledge of feminine psychology” than those of the purity school (A.R. Cunningham 
182). Grant Allen, along with Sarah Grand and “Iota,” are typical novelists of the purity 
school, and Cunningham suggests that the “successful” novels of this school (The Woman 
Who Did, The Heavenly Twins and A Yellow Aster) “were included in the New Woman 
fiction because they said new things about what women could and should do rather than 
about what women were” [emphasis in original] (181). 
Cunningham’s reasoning—that such works feature a nontraditional heroine with 
“the same ideas of fulfillment”—echoes much of the criticism that surfaced after the 
publication of The Woman Who Did and much of the criticism that surrounds the novel 
today (182). Ann Ardis, Sally Ledger, Kate Flint, and Jane Eldridge Miller all 
acknowledge the novel’s popularity, success, and wide readership, but they also agree 
that The Woman Who Did has been inaccurately classified as a New Woman novel. 
Elaine Showalter perceives Allen’s representation of the New Woman as a fulfillment of 
male sexual fantasies, as “a heroine made notorious to feminists’ disgust” (Literature 
184), and Kate Flint argues that the novel’s plot “calls into question its right to be 
considered in the same terms as feminist works” (295). Although all of these critics 
                                                                                                                                                 
though in a letter to Ernst Foerster, Egerton admits she has never met or written about a New Woman) 
(Egerton 1). 
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recognize the many guises of the New Woman, Sally Ledger is most aware of the New 
Woman’s “multiple identity”: “Textual representations of the New Woman (particularly 
unsympathetic representations) did not always coincide at all exactly with contemporary 
feminist beliefs and practices” (1).  Yet, Ledger also argues that the “textual 
configurations of the New Woman at the fin de siècle are as significant historically as the 
day-to-day lived experience of the feminists of the late Victorian women’s movement” 
because “the relationship between textual configurations of the New Woman and the 
beliefs and practices of feminist women, was, undoubtedly, dialectical” (3, 4).  
To say that Herminia Barton or Opalia Woodgate or Eurydice Williamson fully 
encompasses the ideals and practices of first-wave feminism would mean that there was a 
single school of feminist thought at the end of the nineteenth century, which as the 
aforementioned scholars have explored, is not the case. In this study, I venture away from 
the binary model that most recent scholars use to classify New Woman texts as either 
feminist or anti-feminist and examine the ways in which The Woman Who heroines 
discursively and thematically engage with first-wave feminism. By focusing on this 
dialectical exchange of feminist ideas and practices as they were manifested in feminist 
publications and campaigns at the turn of the century, this approach allows us to reshape 
our current critical position and reexamine how the anti-feminist elements and 
“unsympathetic representations” in the texts often do coincide with the “feminisms” of 
the late-nineteenth century (Ledger 1). This is a feminist project that looks to better 
understand first-wave feminist ideology through popular intertextual representations of 
the New Woman, and in order to investigate the feminist potential of these texts—to see 
how they cultivate a transition in the history of feminist thought—I assert that we must 
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also transition to a new critical approach, one in which literary debates about titling, or 
ranking, or classification do not regulate  the “use value” and analysis of  these intertexts 
(Karrer 133).   
 In the 1890s, despite critics’ allegations that The Woman Who Didn’t and The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t “ranked” as nugatory and unrelated texts, the sales of both of 
these novels suggest that British and American consumers were still invested in the 
intertextuality of these texts and in discovering the “use value” of  The Woman Who 
titles10.  Although specific details regarding the sales of these two novels are scarce, a 
few sources indicate that The Woman Who Didn’t and The Woman Who Wouldn’t were 
popular and widely read.  In “English Notes,” The Bookman lists The Woman Who 
Wouldn’t and The Woman Who Didn’t as “leading publications of the moment” (244). 
According to Lorna Sage in The Cambridge Guide to Women’s Writing in English, the 
first edition of Cleeve’s The Woman Who Wouldn’t “sold out in three weeks” (136). This 
was Cleeve’s most popular publication of her approximately sixty novels (Sage 136). It 
was Cross’s Anna Lombard (1901) that proved to be her most successful novel, but given 
the popularity of Lane’s Keynotes series and the backing of a title that echoed the “best-
selling succès de scandale” (Allen’s The Woman Who Did), we can conclude that The 
Woman Who Didn’t was also a well-known publication of its day (“Introduction” Gail 
Cunningham x). 
                                                 
10
 In the preceding paragraph, I argued that the feminist potential of the intertextual dynamics of these tests 
has been thwarted by our dualistic approach to the New Woman novel (feminist/anti-feminist), and I called 
for a new critical approach invested in cultivating nuanced readings of texts that are considered anti-
feminist by today’s standards. Here, I draw a parallel between the contemporary reception and the current 
reception of the novels. In 1895, the popularity of these novels suggests that there is cultural value in these 
texts and the conversation that they engaged in. The public bought and read The Woman Who intertexts 
even though the critical conversation was shaped by arbitrary discussions about literary rankings and 
authority. That they did so seems to support my claim that we too must approach these texts in new way.  
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 Many of the reviews that jointly dealt with The Woman Who Wouldn’t and The 
Woman Who Didn’t endorsed a very limited connection among the three texts based on 
titular sequence, and this initial relationship commissions a greater exploration of how 
these texts shape one another. As Frow explains, “the form of representation of 
intertextual structures ranges from the explicit to the implicit” (45).  The linking of titles, 
as I previously stated, can serve as an explicit intertextual indicator, as does Cleeve’s 
declaration in the direct announcement in the preface to The Woman Who Wouldn’t. 
Cleeve writes: 
Some years ago, in a speech in the House of Commons, Mr. Labouchere 
exclaimed, “If any one contradicts me, I will contradict him again.” And I 
must confess that I was possessed with a little of this spirit when I began 
this work, and so I fancy have been all those who have answered Mr. 
Grant Allen’s admirable work, the “Woman Who Did.” As someone has 
said, there is no reason that these answers should ever stop. “The Man 
Who did Not,” “The Woman Who Did Not,” and others have followed 
each other in quick succession, and there is no reason that the “man Who 
did,” and the “man Who Wouldn’t” should not follow. (i) 
 
In the same way as Kuehn, who, in referring to The Woman Who Did, writes, 
“The book has great merit as a stimulus to thought on a question that cries for solution,” 
Cleeve views The Woman Who Did as a vehicle for generating questions and responses, 
and, also like Kuehn, she realizes that The Woman Question “cries for a solution” 
(Kuehn 6). Cleeve recognizes the fruitfulness of contradiction and suggests that the 
multiple and diverse “answers” are vital components in the trajectory toward improving 
the relations between the sexes. In The New Woman in Fiction and Fact, Angelique 
Richardson and Chris Willis remind us that “it is important not to bring in late twentieth-
century feminist agendas to considerations of the nineteenth-century Woman Question. 
Victorian feminism is not a simple story of a radical break with tradition” (9).  It is a 
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process marked with controversy and debate. The Woman Who Did served as one source 
of this debate by questioning the validity of the institution of marriage in an extremely 
popular arena.  It provoked individuals to respond—to agree or disagree or reexamine 
personal beliefs. In a letter to the Rector of Haslemere in defense of the novel, Allen 
writes, “my sole object is to arouse inquiry and interest” (Clodd 171). Thus, Cleeve 
writes that she raises her “feeble voice in answer to the ‘Woman Who Did,’” and 
illustrates the transformative power of interrogation, the strength of one “feeble voice” 
among many (vi). 
The connection between Cross’s The Woman Who Didn’t and Allen’s The Woman 
Who Did is less defined. Cross does not directly refer to Allen’s text or position her novel 
as a response to The Woman Who Did. Consequently, some scholars have argued that 
Lane cleverly retitled her work in order to piggyback on the success of The Woman Who 
Did11. Cross’s contemporaries also suggested this possibility. For example, in The Critic 
Arthur Waugh writes of The Woman Who Didn’t: “It is not to be supposed that this tale is 
in any sense a pendant to Mr. Grant Allen’s novel, with which it has absolutely no 
connection (77). In a review in Chicago Daily Tribune, Jeannette Gilder clarifies that The 
Woman Who Didn’t “is not a sequel to ‘The Woman Who Did,’ and does not suggest it to 
the slightest degree. The title was chosen because it seemed to be the only one that would 
fit” (34).  These speculations that dispute the explicit intertextual connection between The 
Woman Who Didn’t and The Woman Who Did do not eliminate The Woman Who Didn’t 
as a possible intertext. Frow reminds us that “the identification of an intertext” can be an 
interpretative act rather than an assertion of “conscious authorial intention,” and more 
importantly, the intertextuality of these three novels informs my analytical methodology: 
                                                 
11
 See Knapp’s “Victoria Cross” page 81. 
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it is through a collective, intertextual reading that we are able to jointly position these 
novels as a “cultural text” [emphasis in original] in which the struggles of the New 
Woman heroine signify and critique the very “complex network of codes” that hindered 
first-wave feminist progress (Frow 46, 47).  
Thus, my interpretation of these New Woman novels as a cultural text in the 
history of feminist thought materializes through a reading process that is both flexible 
and versatile. According to Michael Worton and Judith Still, “what is produced at the 
moment of reading is due to the cross-fertilization of the packaged textual material (say, a 
book) by all the texts which the reader brings to it” (1-2).  My aim in intertextually 
analyzing The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Didn’t, and The Woman Who 
Wouldn’t is not to prove or assert Allen’s influence on Cross’s and Cleeve’s texts; rather, 
I suggest that through a fluid method of reading these three texts, we are able to, as Frow 
describes, “reconstruct the cultural codes which are realized (and contested) in texts” 
(46).  Graham Allen writes, “the act of reading” thrusts us “into a network of textual 
relations,” and in order to unfold the meaning(s) of a text, we must “trace those relations” 
(1). “Reading,” he explains, “thus becomes a process of moving between texts. Meaning 
becomes something which exists between a text and all the other texts to which it refers 
and relates, moving out from the independent text into a network of textual relations” (1). 
Although many New Woman scholars have alluded to the intertextual dynamics of these 
three texts, no scholar has fully explored these dynamics or extensively traced how 
meaning is generated through textual intersections. In fact, of the three texts in my study, 
only The Woman Who Did has received a considerable amount of critical attention from 
scholars. Much like the articles published in 1895 in The Literary World and The Review 
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of Reviews, The Woman Who Didn’t and The Woman Who Wouldn’t are only briefly 
mentioned in conjunction with Allen’s title. Shoshana Milgram Knapp and Melisa 
Brittain have made significant contributions in introducing Victoria Cross and her works 
to the field of New Woman scholarship, but these publications lack extensive intertextual 
analysis of The Woman Who Didn’t12. Aside from Ann Ardis’s succinct discussion of The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t, studies of Cleeve and her works are nonexistent13. These factors, 
along with the understanding that New Woman texts, as Ardis explains, “do not want to 
be read singly or separately” necessitate this project (4).  
  When New Woman literature emerged as a popular literary field of feminist 
study in the early 1990s, Sally Mitchell posed an important question about the future 
direction of New Woman studies: “But should anyone at this point be starting to work on 
the New Woman, or has the rediscovery been done and the subject exhausted?” (581). 
Her query, although it addresses the New Woman texts of the late nineteenth century, is 
one that literary scholars wrestle with as they begin research in a number of genres and 
periods, and it is a question that we must continue to ask if we hope to make meaningful, 
new contributions to the field of literary studies. However, Mitchell’s inquiry is 
especially significant in New Woman criticism because the trend that she evaluates in her 
essay written over ten years ago now—the projects of “mere ‘rediscovery’” and plot 
summaries of forgotten New Woman texts (methods that she explains “will no longer 
do”)—still shapes much of the research today.  Of course, like Mitchell, I acknowledge 
                                                 
12
 See Knapp’s “Real Passion and the Reverence for Life: Sexuality and Antivivisection in the Fiction of 
Victoria Cross” (1993), “Stead Among the Feminists: From Victoria Cross Onward” (1993), 
“Revolutionary Androgyny in the Fiction of ‘Victoria Cross’” (1996), and “Victoria Cross (Annie Sophie 
Cory)” (1999).  Also see Brittain’s “Erasing Race in the New Woman Review: Victoria Cross’s Anna 
Lombard” (2001). 
13
 See Ann Ardis’s New Women New Novels pages 52-53 and 95-96. 
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that there are many scholars who have responded to the call for focused textual, literary, 
historical, and cultural analysis of New Women fiction; however, it is rather alarming 
that scholars still maintain their distance from the actual texts of these texts, especially 
from the New Women novels that lack belletristic merit or that fail to measure up to 
today’s feminist standards. 
 Although Allen’s The Woman Who Did seems to fit both of these categories, the 
immense popularity of the novel and The Woman Who… conversation that followed 
suggests that these intertexts deserve more attention then they have been given. 
Furthermore, I argue that The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Didn’t, and The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t warrant a different type of critical evaluation—an approach which 
privileges the cultural rather than the literary value of these texts and one which is 
attuned to the way that these popular novels possess feminist value today because of the 
way that they reflected and subverted the social purity ideologies that shaped feminism in 
1890s.  We cannot discount or undermine how these New Woman intertexts exposed the 
public imagination to new feminist direction and potential; well-written or not, they were 
widely circulated and immensely popular. The Woman Who Did was one of the best-
known novels of John Lane’s Keynotes Series; it sold thousands of copies and was 
reprinted in over twenty editions. The Keynotes Series included nineteen volumes of 
short stories and fourteen novels by many New Woman writers such as George Egerton, 
Evelyn Sharp, Gertrude Dix, Victoria Cross, and Netta Syrett, and some of these works 
have recently become more accessible and affordable due to digital technology and 
scholarly publishing projects like the Late Victorian and Early Modernist Women Writers 
Series. Yet as Marion Thain and Kelsey Thornton explain in the series’ introduction, 
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many of these works are still “difficult to obtain” or lack “good editions” for research and 
teaching (n.pag.)  In 2004, Broadview Press recognized the need to publish Allen’s 1895 
bestseller, and this critical edition of The Woman Who Did edited by Nicholas Ruddick 
includes reviews and supplementary material that attest to the novel’s cultural value: 
“The Woman Who Did offers to the reader today perhaps the most conventional entrée 
into the labyrinth of fin de siècle sexual politics” (11). 
 Yet, even since the “publication of this “good” edition, scholars have tended to 
avoid an extensive analysis of The Woman Who Did for several reasons. First of all, most 
scholars agree that The Woman Who Did is a poorly written and overly dramatic 
polemical novel which lacks aesthetic merit. Secondly, its heroine, Herminia Barton, 
represents both the New Woman and Victorian Angel to the extreme, and thus some 
scholars stray from a close inspection of the text to a discussion of Allen’s failed attempts 
at feminism.  Aside from a handful of articles which discredit the literary worth of the 
novel or criticize its patriarchal discourse, this most notorious New Woman novel has not 
received the consideration that it deserves with regard to its intertextuality with female-
authored New Woman novels or to its cultural association with the discourses of social 
purity and late-nineteenth century feminism. We find “The Woman Who Did” as a catchy 
phrase or a footnote in practically every New Woman anthology or critical text, and, in 
some cases, we may be able to locate a paragraph or even a page of plot summary. 
However, our understanding of this novel—who “The Woman” is, what she did, how her 
story was told, and why we pay tribute to her—is much too rudimentary. The rediscovery 
of Allen’s The Woman Who Did seemed only to recover a title, although the intertextual 
and interdiscursive conversation surrounding the text suggests that we must read beyond 
23 
 
 
the catchphrase and beyond the textual codes of the “father” text. In doing so, we are able 
to trace contradictory sexual politics in all three texts and see how these reflect cultural 
and social codes. Thus, I argue that we can read Allen’s ideological inconsistencies as 
well as anti-feminist elements of the intertexts as first-wave feminist failures.  
Ruddick aptly positions The Woman Who Did “at the centre of a discursive web 
whose filaments reach deep into late Victorian culture,” which means that it is 
constructed by multiple cultural discourses that transpire and retreat inside and outside of 
the textual perimeters (11). The discursive heterogeneity of the text is reinforced by 
various narrative techniques and thematic elements which foster the conflation of 
Herminia’s language with that of the narrator’s, her individual struggles with those of her 
sex, and her suicide with the regeneration of humanity, and the array of competing 
ideologies that inscribe Allen’s heroine also inscribe Cross’s and Cleeve’s New Woman 
heroines. Cross and Cleeve absorb and attempt to rework these mergers between 
patriarchal authority and female agency, the heroine and her suffering sisters, and 
personal sacrifice and greater human good in their texts, but to some extent, these women 
writers present similar conclusions and employ the same formal operations as Allen. The 
New Woman novel, as a vehicle for challenging the basic logic of Victorian womanhood, 
presents not only the struggles of the heroine but also the complexities of representing 
such struggles. The New Woman novel gained popularity and appealed to readers due to 
its generic New Woman characters and plots, but it also sought to define narrative 
strategies capable of depicting new female identity as both autonomous and universally 
achievable. My examination of the intertextual exchange and interplay of these three 
texts positions the larger framework of social-purity feminism at the very center of this 
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process of literary representation.  The textual commonalities and variances of male and 
female writers serve as a way to explore feminism at the turn of the century. These texts, 
culturally situated in the social-purity movement, reflect how feminist aims transcribed 
by traditional patriarchal ideologies exposed the myth of the angel, and in doing so, they 
called for a transformative feminism sundered from her shadow—for feminist goals free 
from the limitations of feminine purity.  
Thematically and discursively, the intertextual interrelationship of these three 
novels presents a site for us to explore each text’s potential to absorb, maintain, question, 
and transform cultural values. Whether we view these texts as “feminist” or “anti-
feminist” by current standards, these novels, as contributions to the debate on The 
Woman Question, play a significant role in the development of feminist thought. In the 
very act of challenging the status quo, in trying to rethink and reform traditional 
standards of feminine purity, these texts regress to patriarchal stereotypes. Thus, they 
point to a transitional moment in feminist history, to the very impasse of developing 
feminist consciousness and redefining women’s sexuality. Male and female writers 
depicted new women with new freedoms and new narratives; they challenged 
longstanding truths of what constituted “proper” feminine action and practice. Therefore, 
in many ways, they exposed that conventional knowledge regarding women’s position 
was socially constructed by patriarchal structures.  
Judith R. Walkowitz argues that “feminists were limited by their own class bias 
and by their continued adherence to a ‘separate sphere’ ideology that stressed women’s 
purity, moral supremacy, and domestic virtues. Moreover, they lacked the cultural and 
political power to reshape the world according to their own image” (“Male Vice” 89). 
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The Woman Who… novels employ different scenarios in which their New Woman 
heroines attempt to alter the relations between the sexes— “to reshape the world” in the 
Angel’s image—and through these fictional actualizations of feminist missions, each 
narrative confronts the limits of patriarchal discourse to inscribe a new womanhood and 
imagine feminist potential. More significantly, through intertextuality, the cross-
fertilization of social-purity ideology and discourse, and the narratorial allusions to 
feminist campaigns and debates, these novels join forces in order to reproduce and 
challenge feminist strategies at the turn of the nineteenth century.  
By employing and critiquing Victorian constructions of the virtuous, pure woman 
and by appropriating the discourse of the social-purity movement into their fictions of 
feminism, these three texts reveal that the demands of ideal, feminine purity are 
practically and theoretically incompatible with the demands of individual liberty. Linda 
Gordon and Ellen DuBois point out that today “there seems to be a revival of social 
purity politics within feminism,” but, because we “have possibilities for sexual 
subjectivity and self-creation today that did not exist in the past,” current social-purity 
feminist movements seek to undermine rather than uphold sexual norms that oppress 
women (50). Gordon and DuBois also argue that today we have something else that we 
did not have before—“a history of 150 years of feminist theory and praxis in the area of 
sexuality” (51).  By reading these texts as sites of competing voices—as mergers and 
denunciations of social-purity ideologies and Victorian purity doctrines—we can 
reconceptualize the regressive and progressive elements of these texts as indicators of the 
feminist dilemma that shaped late-nineteenth century gender politics. 
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The prominent historical studies of first-wave feminism and social-purity 
ideology acknowledge the ambivalent nature of first-wave feminism. Leslie Hall, Judith 
Walkowitz, Shelia Jeffreys, Lucy Bland, and Margaret Jackson have collectively shaped 
our current nuanced understanding of nineteenth century feminism as a movement that 
was both productive and self-defeating. Some scholars, like Hall, tend to privilege the 
latter description: “In making it clear that sex and gender relations were a problematic 
area, by providing individual evidence, by destabilising accepted categories, feminism 
and social purity had created a context within which existing sexual conventions could be 
interrogated, laying foundations upon which a science of sex might be erected” (50). 
Others, like Walkowitz, are more empathetic to how the anti-vice and moral reform 
campaigns undermined libertarian feminist goals of protecting and empowering women 
(“Male Vice” 80).  Because I wanted to determine how and to what extent The Woman 
Who series engages with first-wave feminist theory and practice and how it evaluates the 
feminist potential of social-purity sexual politics, I approached each chapter without a 
predetermined position. I wanted to move fluidly between these two positions and 
between the three novels in order to allow my intertextual and interdiscursive analysis to 
guide my conclusions. Thus, each chapter recognizes the New Woman’s feminist 
potential—how she challenges the traditional constructs of ideal femininity and female 
sexuality or deconstructs patriarchal myths—and each chapter also traces how the New 
Woman reconstructs the very oppressive structures that she hopes to dismantle—how she 
cannot rethink her individuality or her sexuality outside of the dominant views.  This, I 
believe, is what Annette Kolodny refers to as our purpose as feminist critics—to take up 
“playful pluralism”—a task that is responsive to many critical and theoretical 
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possibilities, “but captive of none” (1397). Through a “plurality of methods,” we are able 
to avoid the oversimplification of any text—“especially those particularly offensive to 
us” (1397). The goal, she claims, is to generate “an ongoing dialogue of competing 
potential possibilities” among feminists (1397), and in the case of The Woman Who Did, 
the very act of challenging its classification as an anti-feminist novel and by positioning it 
among the direct responses of women writers enables me to explore its feminist potential. 
Although this study examines both male-authored and female-authored texts, I do 
not intend to privilege the male literary tradition or to suggest that gender in texts is 
transparent or insignificant. Furthermore, I do not want to discredit the foundational 
contributions of Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, and thus my aim is not to level the 
playing field between male and female artists. I understand that that the woman writer’s 
struggle is marked with the “phenomena of ‘inferiorization’”—that her artistic efforts at 
self-definition are differentiated from the efforts of male writers (50). Indeed, as Gilbert 
and Gubar argue, “the literature produced by women confronted with such anxiety-
inducing choices has been strongly marked not only by an obsessive interest in these 
limited options but also by obsessive imagery of confinement that reveals the ways in 
which female artists feel trapped and sickened both by suffocating alternatives” (64).  
Studies like those of Gilbert and Gubar, which highlight how women writers manipulate 
and escape the influence of male authors (and of patriarchy), have made significant 
contributions to the recovery of women’s writing and to feminism; however, such studies 
as Laura Claridge and Elizabeth Langland suggest, “have depended upon sustaining a 
clear opposition between the insights available to men’s and women’s literature” (12).  In 
gynocritical inquiries, there is no space for us to acknowledge or examine the feminist 
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value of male writers who criticize patriarchal traditions in some way or who attempt to 
write a new story for women.  
The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Didn’t, and The Woman Who Wouldn’t 
address women’s issues, investigate women’s rights for independence, and promote 
social movements to change cultural practices, but by depicting a strict pattern of purity 
as a means of reform, they catalyze a demand for a complete oppositional ideology—a 
new way for women to think about themselves, a feminist consciousness severed from 
the shadow of the angel. Throughout this project, I use “the angel” rather than “The 
Angel in the House” or “The Angel” to distinguish between the mythical feminine 
construct that was housed in the pages of Victorian literature (The Angel in the House) 
and the revised feminine construct that began to take shape in the late-nineteenth century 
(the angel). By 1895, first-wave feminism and New Woman writers significantly 
challenged the Victorian ideal of womanhood and had done much to rethink and revise 
the separate-sphere ideology which had confined woman to the private sphere and solely 
defined her ‘nature’ in connection to her domestic duties. I explore each of these 
processes in the following chapters; however, here I provide a brief sketch in order to 
develop my definition. Social-purity missions brought women into the public sphere 
where they became moral agents of change and active political voices, and, therefore, 
they traversed the physical and ideological boundaries that shaped the Victorian construct 
of femininity. The feminist attack on marriage and the patriarchal customs that oppressed 
women promoted liberal ideals of equality and individual rights, and these feminist 
initiatives that encouraged choice among women further illustrated that ‘ideal’ feminine 
behavior was no longer regulated by the passiveness, compliance, and self-sacrifice of the 
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good Victorian wife. Finally, through feminist campaigns to overturn the Contagious 
Diseases Acts, women cultivated a new discourse of sexuality; they fought for the bodily 
rights of prostitutes as well as for themselves, and they rallied against the double moral 
standard and the way it sexually oppressed women.  
 All of these efforts to empower, protect, and liberate women demonstrate that the 
construct of ideal womanhood had undergone extensive revisions—that women were 
beginning to rethink the conventions that had restricted their actions and their ideas. To 
some extent, these initiatives of feminist ‘angels’ revised and transformed “womanhood” 
in emancipatory ways and allowed women to explore potential avenues of self-fulfillment 
and notions of self-worth far from The Angel’s House. Yet even though women 
experienced newfound public and political mobility and seemed to be moving forward, 
first-wave feminists were beholden to their reinvented construct of collective 
womanhood, but this construct was much less a reinvention than it was a refashioning: it 
was the angel who had escaped The Angel’s House but not The Angel’s Wings14. In 
Woolf’s “Professions for Women,” which I describe at the beginning of this chapter, she 
provides this description of “the Angel in the House” for “a younger and happier 
generation” who “may not have heard of her”: 
                                                 
14
 In anti-feminist articles that that saturated the press at the turn of the century, critics often recognized that 
women were no longer bound by the traditional womanly ideals of The Angel, and in response to what 
Janet Hogarth referred to as the “sex mania in art and literature,” these traditionalists urged for the revival 
of The Angel’s presence and prevailing influence (592). For example, in “Literary Degenerates” in 1895, 
Hogarth writes, “May the angel soon find her wings again, or may she, at least keep her diabolical 
manifestations out of print” (592).  This example, which depicts the public’s sentiment and nostalgia for 
The Angel of the past, inspires the Angel/angel distinction in this study. At the end of the nineteenth 
century, first-wave feminism and New Woman fiction had reshaped womanly standards and practices, 
yielding a new image of the angel, but the angel had certainly not escaped the societal and cultural forces 
which beckoned her to “find her wings again” rather than try to escape their shadow. 
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She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She was 
utterly unselfish. She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. She 
sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she took the leg; if there was 
a draught she sat in it—in short she was so constituted that she never had a 
mind or a wish of her own, but preferred to sympathize always with the 
minds and wishes of others. (58-59)   
      The model of womanhood that emerges in the late nineteenth century certainly 
challenges these Angelic parameters, yet Woolf reminds her readers that there is one 
more all-encompassing, distinguishing feature of this “phantom”: “Above all—I need not 
say it—she was pure. Her purity was supposed to be her chief beauty—her blushes, her 
great grace” (59). Not all first-wave feminists were official members of social-purity 
organizations or participants in the philanthropic missions to purify society, but first-
wave feminism, as illustrated by its initiatives and campaigns, depicted in multiple 
addresses and articles, and explored in the fictional ‘feminisms’ of the New Woman, was 
a movement committed to social-purity ideals—to the standards of moral and sexual 
purity that had inscribed The Angel and continued to restrict the feminist potential of the 
angel.  
 As Mary Douglas argues, the search for purity is paradoxical as “purity is the 
enemy of change”; it only leads to contradiction (162). In the same sense, as these New 
Woman intertexts explore the limitations imposed by purity politics, they conclude by 
stifling potential radical messages.  However, before Herminia Barton commits suicide or 
Opalia D’Arcy gives in to Alan’s carnal desires or Eurydice Williamson returns to her 
unfulfilling marriage, each text questions the ideological, discursive, and practical 
implications of purity.  Each heroine poses thought-provoking questions about the power 
of her purity and about the potential of purity politics to provide agency or facilitate 
change. These New Woman novels challenge the patriarchal concept of marriage and 
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traditional romantic logic through representations of unconventional femininity marked 
by female desire. The heroines’ desires—which shape much of their narratives—
interrogate the potential of feminine purity, and even if each text concludes by endorsing 
the power of purity, these unsettling issues open up a larger conversation about the 
validity of feminist ideologies rooted in existing sexual stereotypes.  
 Another theoretical concept that intersects this entire study is protofeminism or 
feminist potential, as I refer to it. The majority of scholars who pay any attention to The 
Woman Who Did reveal that it is precisely one of those “offensive” texts which has been 
simplified into a novel marked by Allen’s patriarchal discourse, misogyny, and 
overwhelming support for the double moral standard. In order to challenge this 
perception, I would like to offer another reading which highlights the protofeminism or 
the feminist potential of The Woman Who Did. My usage of the term protofeminism 
refers to a tradition which anticipates and lays the groundwork for feminism by 
stimulating conversation and eliciting responses. Together, The Woman Who Did, The 
Woman Who Didn’t, and The Woman Who Wouldn’t provide an intricate cultural 
framework for understanding the problems posed by essentialist theories of first wave 
feminism.  
Barbara Arnett Melchiori, one of few scholars who validates Allen’s effort to 
emancipate women in The Women Who Did, suggests that Allen, like his heroine 
Herminia, writes “the despairing heart-cry of a soul in revolt” (106).  Melchiori asserts 
that although readers may be “left with a number of caustic doubts concerning the 
validity of this novel,” especially as a result of Herminia’s suicide, “the good faith with 
which it was written is beyond question” (129). In justifying Allen’s “good faith,” 
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Melchiori seems to posit that Allen’s intentions exceed the problematic patriarchal 
discourse of the text, and, as much as we claim to dissociate texts from their authors, our 
understanding of New Woman texts and their relationship to feminism is often shaped by 
our perceptions of the writer.  Because many New Woman fiction writers were also 
simultaneously publishing articles and essays on The Woman Question and some were 
actively pursuing feminist political and economic reform, we often look to the author to 
gauge his or her implied intentions. In the many analyses of the implications of the novel, 
scholars such as Melchiori observe that professionally Allen was a scientist who admitted 
that his fiction writing was “hackwork” and that he “had no hesitation in using all the 
tricks of the trade” in order to produce popular best sellers (45). Even if he did exploit 
and manipulate the conventions of the New Woman genre for personal gain and public 
recognition, Melchiori suggests that Allen surpassed his primary purpose: 
What I find so interesting about his technique of gathering material is that 
he so often went beyond his original intention of providing entertainment 
and amusement and produced more serious novels than he had originally 
intended, thought-provoking novels which run the serious risk of upsetting 
the firmly held ideas and principles of the more conservative of his 
contemporary readers, something that a best-seller can in no wise be 
allowed to do. (45) 
My argument regarding the protofeminism of The Woman Who Did will develop 
from the method of disconnecting the text from the author’s intentions in order to achieve 
what Alan Sinfield refers to as the practice of reading dissidence.  For Sinfield, 
“dissidence” implies “refusal of an aspect of the dominant, without prejudging an 
outcome” (820). The “dissident potential” of a text, according to Sinfield, “derives 
ultimately not from essential qualities in individuals (though they have qualities) but from 
conflict and contradiction that the social order inevitably produces within itself, even as it 
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attempts to sustain itself” (814). In the process of opposing the traditional institution of 
marriage, Allen invokes the very structures that he sets out to disrupt, but does this mean 
that the text’s potential for dissidence is contained?  If we are to trace the feminist 
potential of The Woman Who Did, we must shift our examination from Allen to 
intertextual and interdiscursive dynamics that are woven into all three texts. Here we find 
“the awkward, unresolved issues, the ones in which the conditions of plausibility are in 
dispute” (Sinfield 818).   
 Sinfield asserts that “conflict and contradiction stem from the very strategies 
through which ideologies strive to contain the expectations that they need to generate” 
(814). This process is demonstrated by each text’s attempts to make sense of or stabilize 
competing ideologies and by each text’s concluding rearticulation of the dominant 
discourse.  For example, in order to make The Woman Who Did plausible in England at 
the turn of the century is to rely on the notion that Herminia must sacrifice herself and her 
convictions, that she must accept her fate as a fallen woman. As Jeanette Shumaker 
points out, “the essential woman that she tries to become cannot flourish within a culture 
that opposes her”; therefore, through Herminia’s self-destruction, “Allen’s initially 
subversive” novel turns “conservative” at the end (41). Yet, as Sinfield posits, “Readers 
do not have to respect closures . . . We can insist on our sense that the middle of such a 
text arouses expectations that exceed the closure” (819).  It is precisely this middle—the 
liminal space of the text where feminist and antifeminist ideologies compete—which 
exposes the unsettling questions that need plausible, feminist answers.  
To examine the dissidence of the texts as protofeminism, each chapter will 
intertextually analyze The Woman Who Did The Woman Who Wouldn’t, and The Woman 
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Who Didn’t and their dialectical exchanges of first-wave feminist ideas and practices. I 
have organized this analysis by identifying three conversations in which first-wave 
feminism and these New Woman novels intersect, or, in other words, I take up three 
competing cultural narratives that the texts respond to on thematic, narrative, and 
discursive levels and trace how they use and/or attempt to dismantle these opposing 
voices. In Chapter 1, “Good Angels to the Rescue: The Fictionalization of the Social-
Purity Mission,” I examine the intertextual dialogue between The Woman Who series and 
social-purity feminism. I draw on the social-purity platforms, messages, and agendas of 
feminist leaders like Frances Power Cobbe, J. Ellice Hopkins, and Lucy Re-Bartlett in 
order to reveal how these texts fictionalized the missions of social purity by fashioning 
their New Women as social-purity feminists who seek to change the world around them 
by fulfilling their roles as moral guardians and by elevating their purity. Throughout this 
discussion, I argue that the textual encounters with social-purity theory and practice 
challenge the monolithic definition of the pure woman and undermine the transformative 
power of the angel in order to redirect feminist thought beyond the current purity politics. 
In Chapter 2, “’Exactly as She Wills’: Marriage Reform and the New Woman’s Search 
for Authentic Liberty,”  I turn my attention to how The Woman Who Did, The Woman 
Who Didn’t, and The Woman Who Wouldn’t simultaneously enlarged nineteenth-century 
feminist arguments about marriage reform and subverted the dominant feminist 
ideologies that fueled such arguments. I argue that these New Woman texts project new 
romantic and marital situations, and in doing so, they shape an intertextual critique of the 
patriarchal values that restricted feminist progress and thwarted the liberal goals that first-
wave feminism sought to accomplish. By focusing on the issue of “active choice” with 
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regard to marriage, these texts reflect how the first-wave feminist endorsement of “free 
choice” was wrought with contradictions: women were “free to choose” only to the 
extent that their self-made choices respected conventional sexual and moral standards. 
 Chapter 3, “Individual Passions and Collective Virtues: First-Wave Feminist 
Sexual Politics and the Sexual Education of the New Woman,” follows up what the 
previous chapters have all alluded to: how the New Woman’s encounters with social-
purity politics and with the issues of the marriage debate threatened to unveil the 
“instinctively shrouded” topics—the reticent sexual politics that emerged into the public 
conversation as a result of feminist campaigns against the Contagious Diseases Acts. I 
start by examining the public’s anxiety about a society that was beginning to abandon the 
customs of decency and silence that had regulated the thoughts and behaviors of women 
and protected their moral and sexual purity, and this discussion foregrounds my 
subsequent analysis of Josephine Butler’s efforts to spearhead a feminist campaign to 
overturn the Contagious Diseases Acts and dismantle the double sexual and moral 
standard. The Woman Who intertexts merge with the aftermath of these feminist 
campaigns by appropriating prostitution and slavery phraseology into their narratives, 
and in doing so, the texts echo the sexual ideology of first-wave feminism, especially in 
instances in which the texts elevate the “natural” maternal function of woman or extol her 
collective feminine identity as a means to foster personal empowerment and social 
change. However, The Woman Who series is also invested in the idea that each individual 
heroine must carve out her own pathway and seek personal fulfillment, and as each 
narrative explores this idea of self-definition in conjunction with alternative images of 
female sexuality and individualized approaches to sexual knowledge, the texts challenge 
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their commitment to first-wave feminist politics and values. Thus, as each text 
interrogates the social and cultural forces that regulate women’s access to sexual 
knowledge and construct female sexual identity, they jointly produce an intertext wherein 
the “unpractical utopianism” of the New Woman heroine parallels the oppositional sexual 
politics of the first-wave feminism. 
In an effort to assay how the late-Victorian woman’s press evaluated the literary 
representation of women at the turn of the century, Molly Youngkin argues that feminist 
publications like Shafts and The Woman’s Herald emphasized that successful feminist 
fiction featured heroines who “needed to assert agency in the same manner real-life 
women did: they needed to experience a transformation of consciousness to realize their 
condition, articulate their condition through spoken word, and use concrete action to 
change their condition” [emphasis in original] (7). Using Youngkin’s framework as well 
as other feminist evaluative modes of 1890s literary criticism, I plan to trace how the 
conventions of the New Woman novel limited a text’s potential to depict the heroine’s 
agency and consciousness in a feminist fashion. The construction of the fictional New 
Woman was restricted by the standards of the genre; authors employed similar measures 
to depict this new heroine, but, in doing so, they often rendered unreal and unbelievable 
female characters.  Thus, it was tricky to do both—to write the New Woman and depict 
real women. Yet, in my effort to find feminist potential in this discursive web of female 
characters who did, didn’t, and wouldn’t, I suggest that we can read their abundance of 
active roles and bold credos as attempts to combat constructions of passive and 
purposeless femininity. Even if this activity—as a form of resistance—is ultimately 
consumed by the confines of purity, the heroine as rationalist, warrior, martyr, savior, 
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teacher, rhetorician, and protester arouses “expectations that exceed the closure” (Sinfield 
819).  
If we read The Woman Who Did as an intertext too deeply immersed in (male and 
bourgeois) patriarchal structures, it is easy to label it anti-feminist. Indeed, the text is 
shaped by essentialism and eugenics, but many Victorian feminist platforms were also 
founded on such concepts—that women were the “naturally” superior sex, armed with 
piety and motherhood and capable of purifying an inferior and vulgar race of men.  With 
the abundance of woman writers at the turn of the century, especially writers like George 
Egerton who was committed to “put[ting] her own sex” into her works, why waste our 
time with a “woman who did” what a man thought she should do (1)?  Why is it 
important to recover Cleeve’s “feeble” response or Cross’s seemingly stereotypical 
heroine and situate these texts with Allen’s and within a network of social purity, 
feminism, and sexual politics?  In my attempt to open up other possible readings, I carry 
on Cleeve’s contradictory (and intertextual) spirit that she offers in the Preface to the 
Woman Who Wouldn’t:  
Some years ago, in a speech in the House of Commons, Mr. Labourchere 
exclaimed, “If any one contradicts me, I will contradict him again.” And I 
must confess that I was possessed with a little of this spirit when I began 
this work, and so I fancy have been all those who have answered Mr. 
Grant Allen’s admirable work, the “Woman Who Did.” As someone has 
said, there is no reason that these answers should ever stop.” (i) 
As Cleeve commits to “add” her “quota to the many arguments his [Allen’s] book has 
given rise to,” I intend to do the same, but I hope to do so by uncovering another 
intertextual web to shape our understanding of these texts (iv). Feminism—at the turn of 
the century and today—is shaped by dialectics, by the processes in which we ask new 
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questions and examine texts in various contexts. Allen asked his readers: How can 
women claim independence and maintain purity? Cross and Cleeve absorbed the question 
and experimented with possible revisions, and in so doing they rendered unsatisfactory 
feminine answers and posed feminist questions about the nature of the relationship 
between purity, sexual desire, independence, and social conventions.  During this process 
of textual and discursive exchange and appropriation, Allen, Cross, and Cleeve revised 
purity rhetoric and refigured purity plots in order to construct new heroines committed to 
old conventions.  Individually, each text is marked with contradictions and double 
visions. Collectively, these texts are unable to figure a method to fully empower and 
liberate the New Woman heroine through her purity. They do, however, open up a 
dialogue about women’s moral rights and sexual desires; they raise unsettling questions. 
These queries are stifled by narrative closures that establish traditional Victorian 
femininity. Yet, in this closure, The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Didn’t, and The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t provide one vital conclusion: Such questions would not (and 
could not) be answered by the problem novel of the nineteenth century or by the pure 
angel who was housed in its pages.  
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CHAPTER 1 GOOD ANGELS TO THE RESCUE: THE FICTIONALIZATION 
OF THE SOCIAL-PUITY MISSION 
 The relationship between nineteenth-century feminism and social purity suggests 
that the ideology and practices of the women’s movement at the turn of the century were 
far afield from the sexually radical politics of post-sexual-revolution feminism. Rather 
than severing all ties with Victorian respectability and traditional patriarchal standards, 
first-wave feminists endorsed sexual and moral purity—not sexual freedom—as a means 
for women to gain power. Consequently, foundational historical studies tend to depict the 
social-purity movement as antithetical to feminism because of its anti-sexual, repressive, 
and evangelical tendencies. However, in the last twenty years or so, the contributions of 
scholars like Lucy Bland, Shelia Jeffreys, Judith Walkowitz, and Lesley Hall have 
negated this antagonistic view in favor of a more complex understanding of how first-
wave feminism utilized social-purity discourse and traditions in productive and 
protofeminist ways. Hall points out that “there is often assumed to have been a vast 
dichotomy in the late nineteenth century between an emergent scientific discourse of 
‘sexology’ on the one hand, and feminism and the related social purity movement on the 
other”; however, both movements “were fighting, on somewhat different fronts, a 
common enemy that privileged the (white, upper-/middle-class heterosexual) male in 
both actual law and in social practice” (36, 37).  
 Like these scholars, I fully acknowledge, as Hall describes, “the extremely 
ambivalent nature of social purity in practice, with its tension between policing and 
punishment on the one hand, and rescue and support on the other,” as well as the apparent 
limitations of a women’s rights movement founded in traditional Victorian sexual politics 
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(36). Therefore, it is necessary to extend the work of these scholars to consider further the 
dynamic role that social-purity discourse played in advancements of women’s rights and 
in the development of feminist though, by identifying how New Woman Novels integrate 
social-purity rhetoric and how they reinforce but also undermine social-purity 
philosophy. In this chapter, I present an intertextual analysis of the correlation between 
The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Wouldn’t, and The Woman Who Didn’t and 
social-purity theory and practice to show that these texts produce new directions for 
feminist thought.  Through various fictionalizations of the social-purity mission, The 
Woman Who intertexts confront the ideological and practical constraints of ideal 
femininity. They challenge the monolithic definition of the pure woman, undermine the 
transformative power of the angel, and discredit the efficaciousness of her mission, and 
as a result, these texts call for a feminist future unfettered from the “feminine” past of 
The Angel. 
The aforementioned scholars have paid considerable attention to the correlation 
between social purity and feminism. However, most of their studies draw on non-fictional 
texts, historical phenomena, and biographical accounts related to the women’s movement 
and the development of sexology. Hall argues that “in making it clear that sex and gender 
relations were a problematic area, by providing individual evidence, by destabilizing 
accepted categories, feminism and social purity had created a context within which 
existing sexual conventions could be interrogated, laying foundations upon which a 
science of sex might be erected” (50). As scholars have demonstrated thus far, we find 
evidence of this foundational context in social-purity publications, first-wave feminist 
campaigns and correspondence, and political occurrences; however, less attention has 
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been paid to the interdiscursive and intertextual relationship of New Woman fiction, first-
wave feminism, and social purity.  Thus, because The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who 
Didn’t, and The Woman Who Wouldn’t were immensely popular publications that 
produced and responded to this context of transitional sexual politics, this chapter looks 
to further explore the nature of this foundational moment through the cultural analysis of 
these texts and their relationship to various social-purity ideologies and campaigns. 
In Frances Power Cobbe’s 1881 preface to The Duties of Women, a series of  
lectures she previously delivered to women in London and at Clifton in 1880, she begins 
by warning her readers that even though “the woman’s movement” has facilitated many 
advancements for women, women must prepare themselves to face the “dangers” that lie 
ahead (7). She reminds women that they are “bound” to “lift” themselves up by “the ideal 
of womanly virtue” and by their commitment to morality (8). In order for the woman’s 
movement to be powerful and effective, Cobbe asserts that it must remain on an 
honorable path: 
What we wish to accomplish, and what it is our imperative duty to strive 
to accomplish with all our might is to direct aright the great progress in 
question, to set up sign-posts of warning against those wrong turnings in 
the road which can only lead to destruction, and to point all eyes which we 
are permitted to direct up to the straight, clear way before us,—the one 
only safe, true way of progress,—the way of DUTY. (8) 
Cobbe urges women not to be led astray by the “adoption of looser and more ‘Bohemian’ 
manners” or by “that fatal laxity of judgment regarding grave moral transgressions” (8). 
She classifies such “faults and mistakes” as “deadly perils to the whole movement for the 
advancement of women” and implores “every woman who sympathizes with the 
movement” to commit herself to one lofty mission: “to make society more pure, more 
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free from vice, either masculine or feminine, than it has ever been before, not to allow its 
law to become one shadow of a shade less rigid” (8, 9).  
 Like many New Woman novels, The Woman Who series was intensely embroiled 
in The Woman Question on many fronts; however, by individually incorporating social- 
purity discourse and agendas into their narratives, these texts jointly produce an 
intertextual and interdiscursive conversation wherein traditional feminist politics enter 
uncharted sexual territories. The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Didn’t, and The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t reiterate, reappropriate, and challenge social-purity ideals. In 
some ways and to different extents, these texts reproduce Cobbe’s feminist vision of 
purity, progress, and the angelic feminine construct, yet, through their critique of social-
purity politics, these texts also inscribe the very “deadly” sexual and moral “perils” that 
first-wave feminists sought to overcome (Cobbe Duties 8).  In doing so, The Woman Who 
Did, The Woman Who Didn’t, and The Woman Who Wouldn’t function less as “sign-posts 
of warning” against destructive “wrong turnings in the road” and more as indicators that 
the road to women’s liberty must eventually diverge from  the “straight” and “clear” path 
of the dutiful Angel (Cobbe Duties 8).  
 Although first-wave feminism encompassed a number of tactics and approaches, 
Cobbe’s general philosophy—one of social-purity feminism which emphasized women’s 
responsibility to serve as moral agents of change—dominated feminist ethics at the turn 
of the century15. As Lucy Bland explains, the feminist social-purity campaigns of the 
1880s and 1890s focused the majority of their efforts on “the ‘purification’ and 
                                                 
15
 See Anne Mellor’s Mothers of the Nation: Women’s Political Writing in England, 1780-1830 (2002) for 
a discussion of how this social purity approach emerged in late-eighteenth century and early-nineteenth 
century feminism. 
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‘civilization’ of both public and private worlds” (Banishing 97). First-wave feminists 
sought to curb immoral behavior through philanthropy and legislation because as Bland 
describes, “immoral behavior was viewed with as much suspicion as overtly political 
beliefs and activities” (Banishing 97). Thus, instead of abandoning the spirit of 
“Victorian moral and social reform,” many feminists “combined a liberal stress on their 
right to freedom of the streets, with a religious emphasis on the moral superiority of the 
‘pure’ woman” in hopes of transforming “the public world for the benefit of all” (Bland 
Banishing 97, 123, 122). By tackling the issues of prostitution, sexual abuse, and the 
sexual double standard, social-purity organizations like The Social Purity Alliance, The 
Moral Reform Unit, The National Vigilance Association, and The Ladies National 
Association afforded women a public voice in a male-dominated society and proved to be 
effective in generating the legal reform of women’s civil rights.  
  The duty of social-purity feminists as captured by Cobbe’s phrase—“to make 
society more pure, more free from vice, either masculine or feminine” (Duties 9)—was 
predicated on the belief that women were morally superior to men and therefore 
“naturally” equipped to purify public life for the benefit of all individuals.  As Bland 
explains, “the current and dominant definitions of femininity, sexuality, and morality 
provided not simply ‘raw material’ for the new feminist ideas, but they of course also 
represented many of the assumptions about women which feminists were reacting 
against” (Banishing 48). Rather than completely revolutionizing traditional ideas of 
feminine nature—the very ideas that justified separate-sphere ideology—first-wave 
feminists drew on long-standing patriarchal beliefs in order to, as Bland describes, 
construct a “feminist ethics which, in explaining the basis of existing immoral practices, 
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pointed the way to greater morality in the future” (Banishing 48). This new feminist 
philosophy was founded on the nineteenth-century ethos of female sexual purity—that 
women were asexual and passionless. Furthermore, in an effort to rid society of the 
sexual double standard which oppressed women, a majority of feminists not only 
accepted this dominant feminine construct but also embraced it as a means to combat 
what they saw as destructive male sexuality.  
 In Grant Allen’s The Woman Who Did, the narrator draws on social-purity 
discourse in order to portray Herminia Barton as an ideal woman who is capable of 
purifying the world around her. She is a “real woman” in both “face and form,--physical, 
intellectual, emotional, moral” (Allen 11, 10). During his visits with Herminia at Mrs. 
Dewsbury’s, Alan discovers that he “had never before seen anybody who appeared at all 
points so nearly to approach his ideal of womanhood. She was at once so high in type, so 
serene, so tranquil, and yet so purely womanly” (23). In the early stages of their 
courtship, the narrator emphasizes Herminia’s purity—the way in which she fulfills the 
traditional feminine construct in all possible ways, and the narrator also points out that 
Alan is a “true man”—ultimately in need of a “good angel” to rescue him from his 
natural base desires (11). Being “over thirty and still unmarried,” Alan is described as 
being “a trifle fastidious”—still “waiting to find some woman who suited him” (31). 
Thus, Alan is at a point in his life when “he should be settled” in order to avoid “the 
lowest depth of emotional disgrace” (32)16. Herminia functions as the good woman who 
will “preserve him” (32). The narrator explains, “it was her task in life, though she knew 
                                                 
16
 See John Tosh’s A Man’s Place: Masculinity and the Middle-Class Home in Victorian England (2007) in 
which he argues that the redemptive qualities of the home, matrimony, and fatherhood constructed the 
masculine ideal of the Victorian period.   
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it not, to save Alan Merrick’s soul. And nobly she saved it” (32).  Here, the text 
highlights Herminia’s inborn sense of duty—her propensity to serve as man’s moral 
guardian and spiritual savior because she harnesses the power of ideal womanhood.  
 Thus, Alan falls in love with Herminia, and he also “admire[s] and respect[s] her” 
(Allen 32). More importantly, the narrator comments that Alan fully understands 
Herminia’s function in his life: “She had power in her purity to raise his nature for a time 
to something approaching her own high level. True woman has the real Midas gift: all 
that she touches turns to purest gold” (32-33). The premise that the narrator presents 
here—that women’s power for reform lies in their purity and true womanliness—echoes 
the fundamental philosophy of social-purity feminist doctrines. The entirety of The 
Duties of Women focuses on “the special ways in which women may use their power to 
purify and amend society,” and at the heart of Cobbe’s message is the premise that 
women can accomplish this goal in the very act of elevating their womanly natures: “If a 
woman herself be pure and noble-hearted, she will come into every circle as a person 
does into a heated room who carries with him the freshness of the woods where he has 
been walking—‘the smell of the field which the Lord hath loved’” (166). Cobbe insists 
that “the power of any individual to do good”—to facilitate any change in “the family, 
the home, in society, and in all public work…must depend almost measure for measure 
on the extent of that individual’s power for sympathy,--the wideness and warmth of his 
heart” (Duties 167). She asserts that “it is here, in the faculty of noble, disinterested, 
unselfish love that lies the true gift and power of our womanhood” (Duties 168). Cobbe 
continues, it is this gift—this special power that women possess—“which makes us, not 
the equals to men (I never care to claim such equality), but their equivalents, more than 
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equivalents in the moral sense” (Duties 168). Once again, Cobbe emphasizes the 
heightened moral status of women and outlines the systemization of first-wave feminist 
thought: women are “more than” man’s counterparts—that is, they occupy a superior 
position to men [emphasis added] (Duties 168).17 Consequently, The Woman Who Did 
envisages this axiom of first-wave feminist philosophy through its focus on Herminia’s 
moral mission. Herminia seeks to raise Alan to “moral heights he had hardly yet dreamt 
of,” and the narrator is careful to discern that such moral heights were “the best of which 
he was capable” (Allen 33). Alan cannot occupy the same moral ground as Herminia 
because a woman’s morality naturally supersedes that of man—she possesses a power 
exclusive to womanhood18. 
 Herminia’s role as moral guardian positions her as a mouthpiece for social-purity 
agendas like those expressed by Cobbe, and, in this way, she embodies the characteristics 
of the traditional heroine. Additionally, Herminia’s propensity for self-sacrifice and 
martyrdom further reflects the constructs of Victorian femininity that social-purity 
feminists utilized to their advantage in an effort to eradicate the double standard. Cobbe’s 
social-purity platform emphasizes that women are able to “conquer”—to affect the world 
around them—by  striving for “the divine breath of higher life” and by harnessing the 
“self-sacrificing love” that is inherent to women (Duties 168). This drive to conquer—to 
                                                 
17Cobbe’s assertion echoes that of Miss Jenkyns (Deborah) in Elizabeth Gaskell’s Cranford (1851). Mary 
explains, “Miss Jenkyns ... altogether had the appearance of a strong-minded woman; although she would 
have despised the modern idea of women being equal to men. Equal, indeed! she knew they were superior” 
(12). 
18
 Cobbe’s rhetoric here is reminiscent of Florian’s concluding speech in Tennyson’s The Princess (1847). 
Florian envisions a future in which man will “gain” in “moral height” because of woman’s guidance; 
however, he is careful to discern that man will maintain his physical strength and woman will maintain her 
moral influence (1213). Florian suggests that it is these “distinct” differences which will improve the 
relations between the sexes (1214). Similarly, Cobbe’s approach is one that celebrates women’s “special 
power” (or difference) as a means to facilitate change.  
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do good in the world—is evident in Herminia’s willingness to save Alan from moral 
corruption, and it is also evident in her plan which envisions her self-sacrifice as the 
means to purify humanity. She explains to Alan: “it never occurred to me to think…my 
life could ever end in anything else but martyrdom . . . For whoever sees the truth, 
whoever strives earnestly with all his soul to be good, must be raised many planes above 
the common mass of men around him; he must be a moral pioneer, and the moral pioneer 
is always a martyr” (Allen 44). Just as Cobbe asserts that women are beacons of “the 
Godlike thing in human nature” (Duties 168), Herminia, too, believes that “good life can 
but end in a Calvary” (Allen 45).  
 Herminia’s theories are closely aligned with social-purity ideology, and she 
utilizes the social-purity discourse of feminine virtue, Godliness, and privileged female 
morality in order to justify her vision. As Jeanette Shumaker points out, The Woman Who 
Did “confirms the Victorian stereotype of good women as sacrificial moral leaders who 
idolize the men they love” (45).  However, as Shumaker also mentions, Herminia’s ideal 
femininity is at odds with her radical views of marriage and purity, and therefore “the 
novel is both radical and conventional in its treatment of fallen women” (45). Insomuch 
as Herminia exhibits the characteristics of conventional womanliness in her roles as 
martyr and moral guardian—crucial roles which empowered social-purity feminists and 
cultivated first-wave feminist politics—she diverges from the mainstream social-purity 
platform in her formulation and execution of an “irregular compact” of free union, 
economic independence, and equal-partnership parenting (Allen 69), and she is certainly 
willing to accept the repercussions that this improper arrangement will bring. Herminia 
reasons, “Other women have fallen, as men choose to put it in their odious dialect; no 
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other has voluntarily risen as I propose to do” (Allen 48). Here, Herminia reconstructs the 
fallen woman and inscribes her with a positive, uplifting potential. Instead of associating 
the fallen woman with her descent into sexual promiscuity and immorality—what 
Herminia identifies as “odious” patriarchal constructs—she contends that her “fall” is 
actually an ascension—an act of progress. For Herminia, the rejection of conventional 
sexual practices does not qualify her as a sexually corrupt or fallen woman as society 
would traditionally label her because she is not a victim of sexual temptation. Instead, she 
is an active participant in a plan of her choosing, a plan that she believes will incite the 
dismantling of the “vile foundations” of patriarchy (48). Herminia explains to Alan, 
“Brave women before me have tried for awhile to act on their own responsibility, for the 
good of their sex; but never of their own free will from the very beginning” (46). She 
reasons that her calculated defiance of sexual marital conventions—her willingness to 
“fall”—will serve the ultimate blow against the institution of marriage. Herminia boldly 
relinquishes her social honor in the name of freedom and personal principle. 
Ambiguously, she is both fallen woman and moral pioneer. Or, in her estimation, she 
reasons that it is precisely her deliberate fall which will empower her and other women to 
reach new moral heights. She proclaims to Alan, “Here, of my own free will, I take my 
stand for the right, and refuse your sanctions!” (48).  
 Thus, shortly after Alan and Herminia enter into their “irregular contract,” Alan 
ventures to Herminia’s cottage on Bower Lane, and Herminia, “dressed from head to foot 
in a simple white gown, as pure and sweet as the soul it covered,” presents herself to him:  
Her cheek was aglow with virginal shrinking as she opened the door, and 
welcomed Alan in. But she held out her hand just as frankly as ever to the 
man of her free choice as he advanced to greet her.  Alan caught her in his 
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arms and kissed her forehead tenderly. And thus was Herminia Barton’s 
espousal consummated. (Allen 77)  
Once again, Herminia represents the ideal woman—pure, passive, and virginal, but this 
ideal construct of womanliness directly opposes what is about to ensue—the 
relinquishment of her purity to a man to whom she is not legally married. Furthermore, 
her virginal passivity is overshadowed by her active role in initiating their sexual 
encounter: she is dressed in a white gown when he arrives, and she “frankly” gives her 
hand to him—to the man that she has actively chosen to be her “friend” not her husband. 
Finally, this scene presents the trappings of the traditional wedding night, and the narrator 
even refers to their union as an “espousal,” yet the entirety of Herminia’s life is motivated 
by her duty to dismantle the “vile” institution of marriage, which she likens to slavery 
and prostitution19.  
 In constructing a self-proclaimed feminist heroine who intentionally chooses to 
fall, The Woman Who Did—regardless of its manifestation of social-purity ideals—
ultimately deviates from the social-purity platform through Herminia’s display of radical 
purity politics. The novel maintains that Herminia is pure, godly, and good even after she 
and Alan consummate their relationship. In the six months following the beginning of 
their free union, Herminia continues to teach at Carlyle Place Girls’ School and keeps her 
own cottage on Bower Lane. The narrator describes these months as “the happiest time” 
of Herminia’s life (Allen 78). She enjoys Alan’s “sweet converse and companionship” 
when he drops by to visit, and because Herminia is “too free from any taint of sin or 
shame herself ever to suspect that others could misinterpret her actions, Herminia [is] 
hardly aware” of how the neighbors gossip about her “relations with the tall gentleman” 
                                                 
19
 See the final chapter for a discussion of the marriage/prostitution analogy. 
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who frequents her home (78).  And although Herminia openly defies traditional sexual 
standards, the narrator contends that it is the gossiping neighbors—not Herminia—who 
are misguided in their judgment: “Poor purblind Bower Lane!” A life-time would have 
failed it to discern for itself how infinitely higher than its slavish “respectability” was 
Herminia’s freedom” (79). Additionally, the narrator continues to assert Herminia’s 
morality in light of the community’s concerns: “To the pure all things are pure; and 
Herminia was dowered with that perfect purity” (79).  It is here in these early stages of 
their relationship that the text continues to redefine purity through Herminia’s example. 
Herminia’s “perfect purity”—her spotless womanhood—thrives regardless of her 
lifestyle—a lifestyle that, according to nineteenth-century decorum would typically 
warrant shame and scorn for an unmarried woman. Thus, through the use of the word 
“dowered,” the text redefines purity as an essence—as a natural gift that Herminia 
possesses through personal principle and mental determination20. Through Herminia, The 
Woman Who Did suggests that purity is a state of mind maintained through the 
preservation of a woman’s pious and dutiful resolve—that a woman’s nature can remain  
idyllic even when society deems her actions to be adulterated.  
 The Woman Who Did continues to assert that society is unable to comprehend 
Herminia’s infinitely higher, perfectly pure nature—that Herminia is surrounded by “low 
minds” who are deluded by their “woman-degrading and prostituting morality” (Allen 
88). The narrator is extremely critical of Herminia’s community—a society engrained 
                                                 
20
 “Dowered” also invokes a reference to the word dowry. In traditional marriages, the term dowry usually 
refers to the material goods, property, or money that the wife contributes to the marriage. Thus, the word is 
often associated with the very mercenary-like marriage customs that Herminia wants to avoid. In the final 
chapter, I discuss how The Woman Who Did employs slavery and prostitution phraseology to criticize the 
transactional practices of marriage; however, it is worth noting here that the union of Herminia and Alan is 
not predicated on financial gain or tangible things.  
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with the ideology that “what is usual is right; while any conscious striving to be better 
and nobler than the mass around one is regarded at once as either insane or criminal” 
(88).  What the “mass” views as Herminia’s wrongdoings—her sexual deviance and 
disregard for social norms—is, according to the novel, a legitimate attempt to be “better 
and nobler” (88). Herminia seeks to uplift women from oppression by transforming the 
image of purity. For Herminia, “unchastity…is a union without love,” and just because 
her union with Alan is not sanctioned by lawful marriage, it does not mean that she is 
impure or unchaste (98). Shumaker argues that Herminia eludes the miserable fate and 
disapproval that usually accompanies the fallen-woman heroine of the early nineteenth 
century: “No longer must the fallen woman reform to be idealized. Because chastity has a 
new meaning, her so-called fall is an illusion” (46). However, just as Herminia’s 
neighbors were unable to conceive her fall as ascension, nineteenth-century readers of the 
novel also failed to accept Herminia’s reinvented feminine ideals as valid. Anti-feminists 
and feminists alike unfalteringly clung to old meanings. They embraced traditional 
definitions of feminine purity and chastity as the standard for all women. By combining 
the standards of conventional feminine purity and morality that pervaded the construct of 
The Angel in the Victorian Period with the liberal feminist goals of freedom and equality 
for women, social-purity feminists validated their mission to transform society. Thus, 
because Herminia ultimately rejected these feminine sexual mores that were central to the 
angelic first-wave feminist platform, her commitment to social-purity ideals was an 
illusion; her fall, regardless of how she justified it, was real, and it was just that: a fall.   
 Thus far, I have illustrated how Herminia’s seemingly individualized feminist 
philosophy is not intrinsic or newfangled. It is heavily comprised of social-purity feminist 
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principles and discourse. Yet what makes Herminia’s theories neoteric and what 
dismantles her social-purity program is her radical redefinition of purity. Therefore, in 
configuring a heroine who is both Angel/angel—“perfectly pure,” exceedingly moral, and 
self-sacrificing—and fallen—sexual and socially deviant—The Woman Who Did 
confounds Victorian types of femininity. Herminia is a heroine who eludes classification 
in the pure/fallen dichotomy that structured nineteenth-century ideology. Conceptually 
speaking, how can a woman be both “fallen” (impure) and angelic (pure, inherently good 
and respectable)? For late-nineteenth-century readers, this image of femininity was 
disconcerting and unconceivable, perhaps even profane.21 Yet Herminia flaunts this 
unthinkable construction of womanhood as proof of her “moral purity and moral 
earnestness,” as an innovative weapon which will generate change (Allen 80).  Thus, the 
novel creates a vision of feminist potential empowered by the reconstruction of 
femininity—by the dismantling of the rigid sexual standards that oppress women. The 
Woman Who Did invents a heroine who exposes the paradoxical nature of the traditional 
feminine ideal, and in doing so, it suggests that the transformative power of the woman’s 
movement may lie beyond traditional notions of purity. In other words, the novel 
imagines feminist potential through the revision and eventual reinvention of the angel.  
 The Woman Who Wouldn’t and The Woman Who Didn’t further expose the 
limitations of feminist potential inscribed by traditional notions of femininity by 
                                                 
21
 In presenting this disconcerting representation of purity, The Woman Who Did enhances the 
compassionate portrayal of the fallen woman that we see in novels such as Elizabeth Gaskell’s Ruth (1853) 
or Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles (1891). These texts also erase the boundaries between sexual 
purity and spiritual purity but do so by deemphasizing the heroine’s role in her fall and by highlighting her 
victimhood. The Woman Who Did, however, thematically reframes the purity conversation through its 
emphasis on Herminia’s active role in calculating and controlling her fall. See Susan Bernstein’s 
“Confessing and Editing: The Politics of Purity in Hardy’s Tess,” from Virginal Sexuality and Textuality in 
Victorian Literature (1993) for further discussion. 
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engaging with social-purity politics and by highlighting the conceptual battle between 
feminine purity and masculine passion. By formulating oppositional pairings related to 
purity/passion—virtue/vice, Divine/human, spiritual/physical—these texts draw on 
social-purity rhetoric and, much like The Woman Who Did, they contribute to an 
intertextual conversation which destabilizes the binary logic that structured Victorian 
notions of gender. Although first wave feminists refashioned the Victorian ideal as a 
source of power and independence for women and reinscribed The Angelic so that it was 
no longer in the service of Man, first-wave feminist ethics were still heavily influenced 
by traditional gender politics and by the dominant ideological dualities that sanctioned a 
woman’s cultural and societal position. Thus, by challenging these binary structures, 
these texts also display how the angel—even the reclaimed and repurposed image of 
her—undermines feminist potential and inhibits feminist progress.  
In The Woman Who Wouldn’t, Opalia Woodgate’s experiment of marital celibacy 
results from her desire to facilitate women’s liberty through “a crusade against passion” 
(Cleeve 87). In both the lives of her friends and in the lives of poor “fallen” women, 
Opalia constantly confronts the “the horrible unpoetic results of satiated passion,” and 
thus she contends that the only way to uplift women from their subjugated position is to 
“resist certain encroachments which had been instituted by men” (35). Specifically, 
Opalia challenges the womanly ideal perpetuated by a patriarchal society and highlights 
how this male-authored construct of femininity is marked with inconsistencies and 
contradictions.  Opalia points out that she, like other women, has invested everything to 
conform to the feminine ideal—to remain pure in body and in mind. She thinks, “What 
was the good of educating a girl to purity and modesty, if in one night that education was 
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negatived?” (11). Consequently, she cannot comprehend how to maintain her physical 
and spiritual purity in a marriage “bound by the horrible bestial ties that degraded other 
women” (162).   
Whereas Herminia’s definition of ideal femininity situates purity as an essence—
as an inherent mental and emotional state—Opalia’s view of ideal womanhood is 
informed by the traditional definition of purity as the preservation of both spiritual and 
physical integrity. According to societal and cultural standards of femininity, women 
were to remain pure in both body and mind prior to marriage, and after marriage, they 
were expected to sexually submit to their husbands yet still preserve the semblance of 
physical purity. Women who consummated their marriages were considered to be good 
women and ideal wives because they were passionate about their domestic duties and 
apathetic toward sexual intercourse and physical gratification. It was only through this 
ambiguous notion of marital purity and renunciation of sexual desire that married women 
could theoretically continue to meet the demands of ideal femininity. Yet Opalia is 
unconventional in believing that there are no exceptions to authentic purity; not even 
legal marriage justifies a woman’s fall. Opalia exposes how the construct of ideal 
femininity is incompatible with marriage because the sexual requirement of marriage 
defiles a woman’s bodily purity. Both Herminia and Opalia seek to illustrate the 
hypocrisy of the pure/fallen dichotomy, but rather than redefining its limits, Opalia 
actualizes its constructs and extends its parameters into the territory of marriage.   
For Opalia, marriage “[mars] perfect love” because “it put[s] an end to all the 
modest maidenly ways” of woman (Cleeve 10, 11). For a woman, the conjugal 
requirement of marriage “means the woman giving up everything”—she must relinquish 
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the very purity that has predicated her existence as an ideal woman, and in doing so, she 
makes a “terrible sacrifice”—her very being (13, 15).22 Thus, because Opalia feels that 
“Real love” and companionship can thrive without physical passion and because she is 
terrified of “the ordeal” that follows a marriage ceremony, Opalia declares, “What is the 
good of feeling as I do if I do not carry it out?” (8). Thus, when she falls in love with 
Alan D’Arcy and he proposes that they get married, Opalia is intent on carrying out her 
plan—on preserving her sexual purity and cultivating an unblemished union with her 
husband. 
As Jeffreys explains, for some feminists, “lust meant the male desire for sexual 
intercourse, imposed on woman against her will, or with indifference as to her consent, 
with appalling consequences to women in diseases, unwanted pregnancy, and ill-health, 
and with little or no attention to tenderness, affection or what might give the woman 
pleasure” (Spinster 39-40). Therefore, in an effort to avoid such circumstances, many 
feminists promoted ideas of “psychic love”—the possibility of finding “individual 
spiritual satisfaction” if “they were able to rise above fleshly concerns” (Jeffreys Spinster 
40). Although, as Jeffreys points out, the devaluation of sexual activity was a 
“mainstream” feminist tactic, women still needed to fulfill their roles as mothers, so 
marital sex could not be completely avoided (Spinster 40). However, in the late 
nineteenth century, many militant feminists promoted “the elimination of genital sexual 
activity between men and women as far as possible” in an effort to eradicate the 
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 Margaret Oliphant’s “The Story of a Wedding Tour” (1894) explores how Janey quickly learns that 
Rosendale’s idea of “love” in marriage does not coincide with her romantic expectations.  Instead of 
finding companionship and love in her marriage, Janey learns of her husband’s lust and cruelty. She 
experiences “a disenchantment and disappointment which was almost more than flesh and blood could 
bear” (Oliphant 407). This is precisely the type of “terrible sacrifice” that Opalia fears and therefore vows 
to abstain. 
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oppression of women that resulted from their sexual subjection (Jeffreys Spinster 35). 
Jeffreys explains that the “promotion of the ideas of continence and psychic love” were 
“representative of mainstream feminist opinion”; however, she points out that there were 
some variations regarding the proposed tactics and solutions (Spinster 40).  
For feminists then, celibacy and/or the devaluation of sexual activity served as the 
means that women could use to transform the relations between the sexes—to reinvent 
love and marriage in a way that was fulfilling to both man and woman. However, such 
images of female celibacy, especially in New Woman fiction, were misunderstood and 
misrepresented by the traditionally minded public. For example, in “Celibacy and the 
Struggle to Get On,” published in Blackwood’s Magazine in 1894, Hugh E. M. Stutfield 
proclaims that the New Woman novelist is embracing celibacy in order to put “the end-
of-the-century young man on his trial” by convincing female readers that “man is a vile, 
degraded being, diseased and enfeebled, as a rule, both in mind and body, and in every 
respect thoroughly objectionable” (777-778).  The New Woman, who has rebelled 
“against her natural instincts” and refused to “to seek intercourse” with man, warns 
female readers that “no decent-minded girl ought to touch him with a barge pole” (777, 
778). Stutfield continues, “from our clubs, from the moral gutters where we lie 
wallowing, we will stretch forth our hands to meet those of the lady novelist and her 
angel helpmates (789). In order to renounce the New Woman as the moral savior of man, 
Stutfield contends, “I do not believe that men of our day are any more misogynists than 
their forefathers” (781). He argues that men may be “less romantic” than they were in the 
past, but only because of the “gloom and uncertainty of the present business outlook” 
(781). To Stutfield, bachelorhood is not a mark of selfishness or viciousness as the New 
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Woman suggests; it is, at times, a “dire necessity” (781). Men find it difficult settle down 
in matrimony simply because “they cannot afford the luxury of a wife” (781). In a direct 
address to Sarah Grand, he asks, “Does she know nothing of the daily wear and tear, the 
mental strain and worry, of commercial and professional life?” (782).  
It is Stutfield’s position then, that the New Woman’s justification for celibacy is 
unfounded because her depiction of man is uninformed. However, it is Stutfield who 
misinterprets the motives of the New Woman. As suffragette and spiritual feminist Lucy 
Re-Bartlett explains in Sex and Sanctity in 1912, “Feminine celibacy and its increase is a 
question which is engaging the attention of a considerable number of people today, yet 
amidst all that is written and spoken in regard to it, the deepest causes remain generally 
undefined” (304 Jeffreys The Sexuality Debates). Re-Bartlett argues, “we hear a good 
deal about unequal population, and economical difficulties, but those deepest internal 
causes which are resident in the changing nature of woman herself, are either not set forth 
at all, or set forth falsely” (304). Stutfield’s views which inaccurately depict women’s 
propensity for celibacy are representative of the mainstream understanding of the issue, 
and it is precisely misguided ideas such as these that Re-Bartlett attempts to debunk. In 
an effort to outline a “wider comprehension” of the meaning of celibacy, Re-Bartlett 
argues that many women have begun to embrace celibacy as a mere tactic of “self-
preservation”—as a basic human instinct to “preserve the species” (306). She asks, “May 
it not be that the mental and moral life of woman today has need of something of the 
same fierce instinct of self-preservation if it is to be preserved to do its ultimate work in 
society, and that women who feel this new life stirring in them are being only true and 
faithful in not bowing to conditions which would crush it?” (307). Furthermore she 
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argues that girls’ schools are inspiring females with a “sense of new possibilities” (306). 
Re-Bartlett writes, “along with the new development of brain is going also a great 
development of the moral life—woman’s value, woman’s independence, woman’s 
dignity, are all things which the modern school girl is beginning to feel strongly” (306). 
Inspired by these stimulating mental and moral horizons, a woman may turn to celibacy 
as an immediate form of protest—as a way to voice her discontent of “unfair laws” or 
“the attitude of the average man” (306, 307).   
Re-Bartlett identifies self-preservation and discontent as two of the reasons why 
some women embrace celibacy. She labels these women “mental women,” meaning that 
they possess new mentalities shaped by their society and are therefore “connected with 
changes in form” in response to the present upheaval (307). However, Re-Bartlett 
identifies another type of woman “whose celibacy has a deeper origin” and who is 
“entitled to an even deeper respect” (307). This type of woman is associated with a 
change in spirit, and this “spiritual woman” embraces celibacy for greater purposes 
beyond the transformation of the relations between the sexes (307).  For the spiritual 
woman, “it is simply the struggle for existence—that struggle which all humanity has 
waged—lifted to the spiritual plane. It is the soul here which is crying out for room to 
breathe, but just as all humanity has cried out in the physical world” (309). She “fights 
desperately with herself and with man,” and she must stand “away from man until he 
understands” (310). This “warrior maid” as Re-Bartlett calls her, realizes that “the day 
has passed in which the purely gentle woman was she who could do most for man,” and 
she waits for the day when she will unite with a “warrior man” who understands and 
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shares in her “vision of the wider life” for it is only then that “the wings of liberty may 
cease their anxious beating and fold themselves in peace” (310).  
By contextualizing The Woman Who Wouldn’t in the anti-feminist and feminist 
sentiment that framed the celibacy conversation at the end of the 19th century, we are able 
to see how the novel engages with social-purity feminism, and we can become more 
familiar with the background that shaped the reviews of the text in 1890s. In New 
Woman scholarship to date, no scholar has published any extensive textual analysis or 
literary commentary on The Woman Who Wouldn’t in order to highlight its historical and 
cultural connections to the social-purity movement. This lack of critical attention may be 
due to its sparse circulation or to the belief that this poorly written novel does not merit 
any serious literary attention. Undoubtedly, much like the other New Woman novels of 
my study, The Woman Who Wouldn’t is no literary masterpiece. Yet, also like the other 
novels in this study, The Woman Who Wouldn’t was extremely popular; despite being 
labeled as a “silly book” by The Literary World, the first edition sold out in three weeks 
(200). The Saturday Review insisted that the novel was “simply an essay in what one 
might call serious pornography” to “be extensively read by the nasty-minded pure” 
(387.). Reviewers were also very critical of the novel’s heroine. L.F. Austin of The 
Album labeled Opalia a “foolish freak,” (n.pag.), and The Literary World commented that 
“Opalia is not worth three shillings and sixpence” (200). According to these reviews, the 
premise of the novel was preposterous and Opalia’s notions and approach to sexual 
equality lacked any semblance to real life. The Saturday Review stated, “the book is in no 
way a contribution to the sexual question, because the writer is evidently quite unaware 
of the nervous physiology of the matter” (387).   
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It would seem then that Cleeve’s contemporaries belittled Opalia and her ideas 
about celibacy in a similar fashion to that of Stutfield: both discredited the validity of 
women’s concerns regarding the issue of celibacy and both seemed to be made anxious 
by these concerns. As Re-Bartlett affirms, such critiques “failed to grasp” the “deeper 
significance” of what the “majority of people” has judged as “madness” (295). In an 
effort to combat the misguided opinions of society, Re-Bartlett suggests that “the 
enormous power of these women militants to suffer and to sacrifice themselves for an 
impersonal Cause is the one thing which thoughtful people at this moment should be 
finding worthy of consideration” (295). Re-Bartlett acknowledges that even though some 
of these examples of “woman’s militancy” (the promotion of celibacy for example) may 
certainly be “immature expressions,” they are nevertheless evidence of radical revolt that 
“cannot be suppressed” because they attest to “a spiritual uprising” (296). Thus, even if 
Opalia’s preference for celibacy is seemingly “foolish” or shortsighted by nineteenth-
century standards or if Cleeve’s treatment of celibacy is seemingly counterproductive by 
today’s standards, Opalia’s “immature expression” is, according to Re-Bartlett, relevant 
to a larger conversation “for it forms part of a new social conscience which all the 
progress of the times is serving to augment” (296). Re-Bartlett’s perspective enables us to 
locate feminist potential in Opalia’s cause—it emphasizes how Opalia’s disavowal of 
cultural norms is the result of “a newly awakened consciousness” (298). She turns to 
celibacy—to an immediate and accessible physical response—as “only a ‘strike’-a 
temporary protest- an appeal” (Re-Bartlett 298). Opalia’s revolt “constitute[s] woman’s 
revolt, not against man, but against certain false social condition which her soul has 
grown too large to let her any longer tolerate” (298).  
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The Woman Who Wouldn’t even goes so far as to anticipate the cultural scrutiny 
that it will receive through its portrayal of the unsupportive and unenlightened individuals 
who try to convince Opalia to rethink her plan. For example, when Opalia attempts to 
discuss her feelings with her mother, she realizes that it is “a hopeless task” (Cleeve 7). 
Mrs. Woodgate tells her daughter, “In my day girls knew nothing of these things, still less 
spoke of them” (7). Opalia informs her mother, “It is not the knowing, dear mother, it is 
the not knowing that is the suicide of women’s happiness, it is the not acting on that 
knowledge” (7). Here, Opalia illustrates how she feels impelled to act—to physically do 
something in order to validate her knowledge. The narrator further describes Opalia’s 
response to others who are skeptical of her plans:  “‘You are an extraordinary girl,’ her 
mother and a thousand others would say over and over again, but Opalia would say, with 
earnestness, ‘what is the good of feeling as I do if I do not carry it out?’” (8). Once again, 
Opalia identifies celibacy as a way to actualize her revolt. As Re-Bartlett explains, 
women are confronted with “their own helplessness to bring any remedy”—to actually 
transform the world around them (297). Re-Bartlett notes that as a result, “many women 
are moved to things far deeper and more tremendous”; in their hearts rises a cry 
“somewhat like this: ‘If I cannot help, at least I will not acquiesce….I will know no man, 
and bear no child, until this apathy be broken through—these wrongs be righted’” 
[emphasis in original] (297).  
Opalia is unwilling to acquiesce; she hopes that through “a conquest of self and 
steadfastness of purpose”—abstaining from sexual activity with her husband—she will 
become “the first really emancipated woman” (Cleeve 162). More so, Opalia believes 
that her unprecedented and uncompromised purity will facilitate much more than her 
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individual liberty; she trusts that her example will serve to enact “the restoration of 
womanhood in its original sense, the original Divine sense before the Fall” (96). Opalia is 
determined to prove that in order for a woman to truly be the angel that she has been 
trained to become, she must unite “oneself with the Divine in all the glory of its holiness” 
(96). Opalia approaches women’s liberty through a relentless dedication to Victorian 
sexual codes of female purity, and her narrative chronicles how she struggles to embody 
the prescribed ideal feminine role of The Angel in the House and of a Madonna in 
Heaven. 
When Opalia informs Alan of her terms—that she will marry him in a church and 
“afterwards be a true, loving sister” to him—Alan attempts to dissuade her by saying, 
“don’t let some foolish ideas mar our future happiness” (Cleeve 18). Here, Alan 
demonstrates that he too is one of the majority—that he does not understand Opalia’s 
purpose, and his response seems to anticipate the reviews of the novel. To Alan, Opalia’s 
ideas are “foolish,” and he further belittles her when he warns her not to “weary” herself 
with “so much self-analysis and analysis of life” (18). Instead, Alan tells Opalia that she 
should acquiesce and that she should “be thankful” that she is an ideal woman who has 
been given a favorable lot in life: “You are placed in this world to enjoy yourself and to 
be happy, to take what the gods have given you in the shape of charming, good-looking 
young husband, with great ability, to say the least” (18). In other words, Alan emphasizes 
that women should be passive and satisfied with their lives, yet Opalia feels that the only 
way she can be content is by upholding her “principles” (18).  Opalia assures Alan that 
she loves him and tries to convince him that her undying, pure love should be enough for 
him—that “the blessing of God is not for human gratification, but for the union of man 
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and woman for the purposes of greatness and perfection” (19). She reasons with him and 
contends, “The Church cannot make holy what would otherwise be unholy” (20). 
 Although Alan is terribly disappointed, he acknowledges that Opalia’s position is 
justifiable. The narrator describes how Alan implicates himself in the situation:  
It all seemed so true when she said it; he had a horrible shameful feeling 
that now that she had offered love which he had pretended was all he 
coveted, it was no good to him. It revealed to him what his thoughts had 
been since he had met this beautiful woman, only a longing for possession 
unacknowledged to himself. She offered what was supposed to be the 
most beautiful thing, ‘Love,’ and it was like Dead Sea fruit to him. 
(Cleeve 20) 
Yet their many “long talks” prior to this moment led Opalia to believe that Alan had 
“seemed to acquiesce” (21). Opalia thought that Alan “was the one man who would unite 
with her to establish her principles and to help her”—that he was different from other 
men—that Alan was capable of thriving on the type of pure, unadulterated love that 
Opalia had offered him (21). Opalia had hoped that Alan, like herself, was willing to 
make “the tiny sacrifice” for the greater purpose of “build[ing] up the future” for women 
and men alike (18-19). When Opalia learns that Alan is unwilling or unable to suppress 
his sexual desires in exchange for unblemished purity and love, the narrator concludes, 
“If Alan failed, all men would fail; Alan had been nearer in ideas to her than anything she 
had ever read or anyone she had ever spoken to and many men had made love to her; and 
if Alan failed, then all indeed, was lost” (22). 
 Opalia’s commitment to celibacy is not motivated by her disgust of men but by 
her desire to do more for mankind. Opalia stands as the “warrior maid” who desperately 
wants Alan to be the “warrior man” who will share her “vision of the wider life” (Re-
Bartlett 310).  The entire text chronicles Opalia’s struggle to understand herself and to 
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actualize what Re-Bartlett identifies as “a new social conscience” (296), and it does so by 
creating a narrative in which the heroine’s celibacy serves to magnify the unrealistic 
standards that society places on women. The central premise of Opalia’s philosophy 
echoes that of social-purity feminists: both envisioned the possibility of erasing the 
sexual double standard by holding men accountable to the same level of physical and 
moral purity as women. However, most feminists recognized that marriage sanctioned the 
occasional sacrifice of one’s physical purity for the purpose of reproduction, and both 
feminists and traditionalists accepted this moral contradiction because it was central to 
the preservation of ideal womanhood. If women confronted the reality of this deep-rooted 
opposition, then married mothers could no longer be pure and angelic. Thus, if society 
began to see the construct of the Angel of the House for what it really was—an 
unattainable, mythical construct—then they would be forced to re-evaluate traditional 
notions of proper femininity and purity.  However, The Woman Who Wouldn’t exposes 
this impasse—it highlights how celibacy is the only true expression of ideal femininity 
because it is the only practice that preserves a woman’s physical and moral purity. In 
doing so, it exposes how the transformative power of social-purity feminism is founded 
on a myth—on an unreal representation of purity. And if women were not pure, then how 
could they successfully purify society?  
 Despite these inconsistencies that structured Victorian notions of femininity, 
social-purity feminists were not yet ready to abandon the longstanding tradition of the 
Angel of the House. Instead, they emphasized her power to transform the lives of women 
through campaigns that sought to change attitudes and behaviors of men. Rather than 
shirking the conventional feminine ideals, first-wave feminists attempted to expand the 
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ideology of The Angel and promote purity among men; they reasoned that both women 
and men alike would greatly benefit if all of society adhered to the moral and sexual 
standards of the ideal woman. One such campaign was led by J. Ellice Hopkins, a woman 
who, according to Jeffreys, “had more influence than any other woman or man on the 
development of 1880s social purity” (Spinster 9). Jeffreys points out that although 
Hopkins is “not generally mentioned in connection with the history of feminism,” her 
“position was almost identical to that of the most radical feminist campaigners” (Spinster 
9). After 1866, the majority of Hopkins’s efforts focused on eliminating the degradation 
of women and purifying society through the prevention of prostitution, a task which she 
believed was dependent on reforming men’s sexual behavior (Jeffreys Spinster 10). 
According to Jeffreys, Hopkins’s “work and influence lie behind the creation of the 
Ladies Association for Friendless Girls, the White Cross Army and the Church of 
England Purity Society,” and her message of equal purity standards for both sexes also 
triggered the formation of many  purity organizations and purity leagues (Spinster 10).  
 What Opalia had envisioned for Alan—a denial of the male sexual urge in 
exchange for godliness and morality—was the very message that Hopkins popularized in 
her many articles, pamphlets, and public speeches. Thus, in addition to the way that The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t engages in an intertextual conversation about the public’s 
perception of female celibacy, it also offers a critique of the evangelical social-purity 
platform as promoted by feminist campaigners like Hopkins. As absurd as Opalia’s 
marital experiment seemed to reviewers, Opalia’s theories were certainly substantiated 
and contextualized in the rhetoric of social purity, and, thus, The Woman Who Wouldn’t 
did indeed contribute to and complicate “the sexual question” of the day—the very 
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conversation that Hopkins sought to advance through her feminist, social-purity agenda 
(The Saturday Review 387). According to Hopkins, men’s base sexual immorality—their 
natural inclination for sexual activity—was a mythical justification, not a biological fact. 
Thus, her platform called for the reform of men’s sexual behaviors, and she approached 
this task by appealing to men’s Christian sensibilities and by publically criticizing the 
Church of England for its negligence and hypocrisy. And although her central goal was to 
eliminate the degradation of women and the sexual corruption that resulted from 
prostitution, her rhetoric encompassed the position that spiritual and sexual purity would 
regenerate individuals and empower the nation. According to Hopkins, the adoption of 
equal sexual standards for men and women would prove to be the panacea for society’s 
problems.  
In “The Apocalypse of Evil” published in The Contemporary Review in 1885, 
Hopkins appeals to her readers’ fear of degeneration and disorder and asserts that the 
adoption of a new masculine ideal—an ideal which privileges absolute purity and 
Godliness—will combat such looming threats. Hopkins writes that the nation’s only hope 
of reinstating “God’s order”—a state wherein man will function as “head of the woman 
to guard her from all that makes her unfit to be mother of the race, and the woman will be 
the heart of the man to inspire him with all noble purpose”—is through a commitment to 
equal sexual and moral standards for men and women (341). She argues that such a feat 
begins with the training of young boys—in teaching them that “if they would have a clear 
brain, a firm nerve, and a strong muscle, then they must be pure, and purity is looked 
upon as manly” (341). Hopkins’ reinvented vision of masculinity emphasizes that purity 
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is as vital “truth and courage” (341).23  Her logic follows the reasoning that productive 
companionate relationships between healthy-minded men and fit, dignified women are 
the cornerstone of desired societal order and the result of God’s intended purpose for 
humanity. Such relationships can only be experienced in instances wherein “the woman 
requires the man to come to her in holy marriage in the glory of his unfallen manhood, as 
he requires her to come to him in the beauty of her spotless maidenhood” (341).  
 In order to offer a convincing argument to a public that was receptive to the 
threats of degeneration and concerns of “fit” reproduction, Hopkins positions the value of 
male purity at the very crux of her campaign, and she reports that her message of male 
purity is one that the country is beginning to embrace. She writes, “I know young men 
who have joined this crusade in whom a nobler passion to rid the world of woman’s great 
wrong has burned all baser passions in their blood, and who, fighting all that is base and 
foul and impure and mean and vile in our life, have in Christ’s strength slain it in 
themselves; men ‘whose strength is as the strength of ten’ because ‘their heart is pure;’ 
men cut out of one solid chrysolite” (342).  The “crusade” that she refers to was 
generated by the establishment of the Church of England Purity Society under the 
Archbishop of Canterbury on May 25, 1883. In a Church of England Purity Society 
Pamphlet entitled “Purity and the Prevention of the Degradation of Women and 
Children,” which was circulated in 1884, Admiral Alfred Philip Ryder reports that over 
                                                 
23
 It is worth noting here that Hopkins’ rhetoric (as well as the rhetoric adopted by The Church of England 
Purity Society) couples the notion of male purity with traditional masculine ideals such as good health, 
strength, and bravery. In an age of much cultural anxiety about the re-establishment of the Roman Catholic 
Church in England, Hopkins strives to present an ethos of “manly” purity in order to distinguish between 
the moral and physical purity of ideal Protestant men and the absolute celibacy of Roman Catholic priests 
who were often depicted as effeminate and unmanly. See F. Knight’s section on “Christian Manliness” in 
Chapter 1 (“’Male and Female He Created Them’: Men, Women, and the Question of Gender”) from 
Religion in Victorian Britain: Culture and Empire (1997) for further discussion.  
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500 men attended the inaugural meeting of this society (25). In “The Preliminary Report 
of the Executive Committee,” the Church of England Purity Society published their 
intentions and plan of action to promote the following: 
1. Purity among Men.  
2. A Chivalrous Respect for Womanhood.  
3. The Preservation of the Young from Contamination.  
4. Rescue Work.  
5. A Higher Tone of Public Opinion.  (Ryder 25) 
 According to Ryder’s report, the Council of the Church of England Purity Society 
“are indebted to their friend and Lady Referee, Miss Ellice Hopkins” for providing them 
with a “list of suggestions” that they relied on in order to articulate the proposed 
objectives for their organization (26). Although membership in the Church of England 
Purity Society was restricted to men over the age of 18, Hopkins was a key figure in 
developing the society’s mission, and she continued to serve the society in her role as a 
public educator by speaking to many gatherings of men and by publishing 
pamphlets/material that were circulated to male members.  The message at the core of all 
of Hopkins’ literature and campaigns—the insistence on equal standards of purity for 
men and women—was readily adopted as “one of the cardinal principles of the Church of 
England Purity Society” (Ryder 36).  The society’s prayer, which was composed by the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and circulated to all its members, reiterated not only that men 
were capable of maintaining their purity but that such a commitment enabled men to 
“fight manfully against the corruption that is in the world” (37). Members prayed to 
remain “pure in heart” and in body in order to “see God” more clearly (37), and they 
were required to promote the five principles of the society in an effort to declare that 
“Purity is ‘equally obligatory on men and women alike’” (36). 
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 Hopkins’s involvement in The Church of England Purity society reflects her 
message that “mass meetings are powerful agents in purging the moral atmosphere and 
letting in these great purifiers, light and air” (338). And although Opalia’s philosophy 
draws on Hopkins’s overall message and thus theoretically aligns itself with social-purity 
politics, Opalia’s skepticism of the church’s efforts to promote purity exposes the 
shortcomings and limitations of social-purity practices.  The narrator explains, “perhaps 
nothing was so revolting to Opalia as Mrs. Kerr herself, a pale wan little woman, 
expecting her eleventh baby, while the Rev. Arthur Kerr preached sermons on purity on 
Sunday evening to congregations of celibate young men” (Cleeve 47).  Here, the text 
critiques a church-organized purity initiative, much like that of The Church of England 
Purity Society. Once again, The Woman Who Wouldn’t presents the contradictory politics 
of social-purity ideology and reiterates Opalia’s skepticism of a movement void of 
universal standards. Just as she condemns the sustainment of a feminine ideal of purity 
fraught with inconsistencies, Opalia also struggles to understand the contradictions 
between the reverend’s messages and his practices; she asks herself, “Oh! What was 
meant, what was God’s intention?” (Cleeve 47).   
  Much like Opalia’s, Hopkins’s crusade for remedying society’s “great moral 
problems” was motivated by evangelical revivalism—by a desire to reconnect with, as 
Hopkins calls it, “the divine possibilities of our humanity” (333, 340). Yet, as much as 
Opalia believes that she will reach these “divine possibilities” through genuine physical 
and spiritual purity, she questions whether or not men can follow this same path, and 
after some time, Opalia realizes that Alan cannot accept the terms of her marital 
arrangement—that he cannot reach the divine heights for which she strives. The narrator 
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explains, “he could not agree, he could not in all the passionate vigour of his manhood 
promise what she had asked” (Cleeve 27). Throughout their engagement, Alan hopes that 
Opalia will change her mind, that she will “one day realize that the demands of love are 
instituted by God, and that there is no degradation in them,” but Opalia remains steadfast 
in her purpose and decides that she has no other choice but to end their engagement (30). 
After regretfully dissolving their engagement, Opalia is “more firmly convinced every 
day that without sacrifice no good was attained, that the instinct of perfection, the thought 
of an ideal future could alone save the world from falling hopelessly into immorality, 
selfishness, and ultimate damnation, towards which it was drifting” (44).  Thus, she 
presumes that she is blessed with the knowledge of “God’s intention”—with a sense of 
purpose that men like Alan and even Rev. Arthur Kerr do not possess (47).  
 Although Opalia concludes that she cannot marry Alan, she still wonders 
“whether woman’s mission was to sacrifice herself to man, so that man would realize the 
beauty of woman’s sacrifice?” and “whether men were taught anything by woman’s 
love?” (Cleeve 44). For days, she ponders these questions and contemplates her decision 
while she busies herself with church, “early walks,” and “hard work” (50). Yet, all her 
activities, “reasoning,” “argument,” and “heartache,” “brought no solution and no real 
comfort to the soul of Opalia” (50). It is not until she encounters Alan’s painting in the 
Academy that Opalia begins to make sense of her situation. She gazes at his painting 
titled “Purity and Passion,” and the picture speaks “straight to her, as Alan’s soul was 
speaking to her when he painted it” (50). The narrator describes what Opalia sees in 
Alan’s painting during what is described as “the most terrible moment of her life” (52): 
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It had but three prominent figures. The picture represented three figures 
standing at the gates of heaven. Vaguely the gates were represented as 
golden bars coming from vaults of blue, and with columns like opals and 
rainbows. All was a hazy blue and gold and faint glory, while beyond a 
mist of golden light showed vaguely the entrance to the other world. 
Groveling in darker vaults of blue crouched the eternally damned. At the 
very gates stood a young man gazing longingly at a future, but a rosy-
faced woman was dragging him away with her naked white arms. The 
sensual mouth, the wild excited air, all depicted this figure to be a portrait 
of Passion leading the young man to destruction, while his gaze remained 
mournfully, despairingly turned to the white-robed figure of Purity waving 
him away from the gates of heaven, and in that pure expression, half of 
severity, half tender pity and deepest love, Opalia recognized her own 
face. (51) 
At this moment, the narrator explains that Opalia can almost hear Alan’s voice calling to 
her and saying “Save me, save me” as if “the laws of God” seemed to sanction her to 
return to him (52).  
 The message that Opalia takes away from Alan’s “Purity and Passion” echoes 
Alan’s situation as he struggles to resist the advances of Lady Morris, a married woman 
who has hired him to paint her portrait. As Alan and Lady Morris spend time together in 
his studio which is “charged with that extraordinary sexual electricity which rules the 
world,” Alan “follow[s] a feverish dream of a woman who was not his ideal,” but all the 
while, he thinks of Opalia (Cleeve 62, 70-71). When he reminisces about Opalia, he feels 
“like a man who, having communed with angels on the heights of a mountain, has 
descended to earth again” (71). He recognizes that Lady Morris is certainly a “beautiful 
woman,” and tries to justify accepting her offer of love, but he always returns to his 
“Madonna-like love” for Opalia (55). Yet Lady Morris is persistent; she longs for Alan to 
declare his passion, for “the triumph over the unknown woman” who occupies Alan’s 
thoughts while they are together (71). As Alan continues to spend more time with Lady 
Morris, he begins to fall prey to her: “Opalia’s image, her influence, both were waning, 
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just as our good angel (as we are told in childhood) veils his face and goes back to heaven 
if he sees us do something naughty” (81). Finally, after Lady Morris instructs Alan to 
visit her one night when her husband will be out and bluntly offers him “all that Opalia 
kept back,” Alan vocalizes the very words that Opalia imagined when she was confronted 
with his painting (85). “Opalia! Opalia! Save me!” Alan cries (85). He continues, “Can 
you not see what you are doing? Can you not understand that your mission, the mission 
of all pure women, is to fight against the other women, not against men? We are the 
weak, you are the strong, but you don’t know it. Your curse is, that you do not know why 
you are in the world” (85). 
 As Alan thinks of what is to ensue with Lady Morris, he calls out to his angel, to 
the woman who will save him from the destruction and damnation that he envisioned in 
his painting. Thus, at this moment in the narrative, Alan’s situation mirrors that of his 
painting: he must choose between salvation or damnation, and those two choices are 
bound in two opposing feminine forms, one good and one evil. In the painting, evil takes 
the form of “a rosy-faced woman” with exposed “naked white arms” and a “sensual 
mouth”; in “the wild excited air,” she is “dragging” the mournful “young man” toward 
damnation (51). Conversely, the good “white-robed” woman is “waving” him in the other 
direction; her “pure expression” gently beckons him to her “deepest love” and tenderness 
(51). As Nina Auerbach notes in “The Rise of the Fallen Woman,” such nineteenth-
century artistic expressions of the fallen woman and her evil potential are all too familiar: 
“her prone form becomes so pervasive an image that it takes on the status of a shared 
cultural mythology” (29). Auerbach reflects that “then and now, she seems to enlightened 
minds a pitiable monster, created by the neurosis of a culture that feared female sexuality 
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and aggression and so enshrined a respectably sadistic cautionary tale punishing them 
both” (“The Rise” 31). Contrary to the representations of the fallen women that Auerbach 
discusses—those examples in art and literature which challenge the mythical construct of 
the fallen woman by envisioning alternative outcomes for her and inscribing her with 
uplifting spiritual potential—Alan’s portrayal of the fallen woman in his painting as 
inspired by the example of Lady Morris certainly adheres to the Victorian stereotype of 
“a woman her readers might dream about but could not live with” (Auerbach “The Rise” 
33).  The “portrait of Passion” in the painting, much like Lady Morris, is sexually and 
spiritually threatening and must be cast out of Alan’s life if he is to save himself from the 
perils of evil.  In direct opposition to passion is “the white-robed figure of purity” which 
symbolizes the good, chaste woman in Alan’s life: Opalia. Alan’s representation of purity 
and passion in his painting reflects the dominant cultural ideology which 
compartmentalizes women into two distinct categories: pure and fallen. The pure woman 
is sexless, angelic, gentle, and passive, and the fallen woman is sexual, sinful, excited, 
and detrimentally active. In this dichotomy, the ideal woman maintains her proper place 
in society precisely by resisting passion. Furthermore, according to social-purity 
feminists, the ideal woman serves as man’s moral savior; it is her duty to rescue him from 
his own debased sexual nature. 
 Although Alan’s painting reproduces the purity/passion pure/fallen good/evil 
cultural construct of femininity, he begins to understand how his desire for Opalia is 
antithetical to the preservation of these rigid boundaries. The narrator explains, “one of 
the greatest enigmas of Alan’s life just now was the impossibility of realizing, or thinking 
of Opalia in the sense in which she would be thought of” (Cleeve 73).  In other words, he 
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cannot regard her wholly as “the figure of purity” that she is because what Alan 
ultimately wants is for Opalia to succumb to passion: the only ending he is able to depict 
is “himself by her side, his arm encircling her, their lips meeting in that one first kiss” 
(74). Alan desires Opalia over Lady Morris because Opalia perfectly adheres to the 
feminine ideal—because she is not the wild, improper temptress that Lady Morris is. Yet 
Alan’s attraction to Opalia is further fueled by the potential collapse of the boundaries 
that separate these two women—by the contingency that the pure woman is a mythical 
construct. Alan requires that Opalia exist as the “white-robed figure of purity” in his 
painting—that she conform to the feminine ideal in public and in his mind—but he 
desires her to submit to passion in private in order to serve him as his dutiful wife.  
 Opalia also struggles to stifle “the enemy” that is “gnawing at her very heart”—
her passion for Alan (Cleeve 88). The narrator explains, “What to her seemed worst of all 
was the fact that she knew that this deep passion people talked of was burning in her 
heart for Alan” (69). Yet, Opalia believes that by giving into such a “delicious” “dream,” 
she would “sink to the level of all those others whose very being seemed to begin and 
cease with passion” (70). Opalia wants to remain that “white-robed figure of Purity” of 
Alan’s painting because she is haunted by the other extreme portrayal of femininity: the 
fallen woman image—the wild, sensual woman whose insatiable appetite for passion 
corrupts and contaminates society. This is the crux of Opalia’s predicament; she is unable 
to accept the passion that she feels for Alan because she is influenced by the cultural 
understanding that associates sexual passion with the destructive nature of the fallen 
woman. However, Opalia is also burdened by her womanly duty to save Alan—to rescue 
him from sinking into sexual and moral depravity in his dishonorable relationship with 
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Lady Morris, and she knows that in order to “save” him, she will eventually have to 
relinquish the defining characteristic of her ideal womanhood—her purity. 
 Through Opalia’s ongoing conflict, The Woman Who Wouldn’t critiques the rigid 
binary structure that shaped nineteenth-century perceptions of femininity and exposes 
how the constructions of ideal femininity—woman’s “natural” inclination for purity and 
passionlessness—were at odds with the feminist social-purity agenda because, as 
illustrated by Opalia’s situation, her propensity to serve as Alan’s moral savior depends 
not on her heightened purity but on her willingness to sacrifice it. Thus, by confounding 
the distinctions between purity/passion, virtue/vice, spiritual/physical—the very 
oppositional pairings that regulated proper femininity—the text undermines the 
transformative power of feminist thought predicated on and highly invested in the  
preservation of such boundaries. Furthermore, The Woman Who Wouldn’t poses 
complicated questions about the capacity and implications of self-sacrifice as a natural 
feminine tendency which empowers women to transform the world around them. Opalia 
wonders how self-sacrifice serves as “woman’s mission” in life, especially when that 
sacrifice contradicts the very womanly ideal that she seeks to maintain (Cleeve 44). 
Additionally, Opalia confronts the ideological premise that is central to first-wave 
feminist thought as she questions whether or not a woman is able to purify society—to 
transform man’s morality—through her relentless selflessness; she asks, is man capable 
of realizing “the beauty of woman’s sacrifice?” and are “men taught anything by 
woman’s love?” (44). According to social-purity doctrines like those of Cobbe and 
Hopkins, a woman’s chief power to transform the relations between the sexes lies in her 
ability to assert her natural womanly virtues. Moreover, as demonstrated through 
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Hopkins’s establishment of male purity leagues, social-purity feminists also maintained 
that men were capable of adopting the same practice of passionlessness that was inherent 
to women. However, as Opalia examines the power and efficacy of womanly virtue as a 
questionable agent for change, the text reveals how the ideals of passionlessness and 
selfishness present conflicting interests in the lives of women. Furthermore, as Opalia 
begins to identify with Alan and recognize that she too has a propensity for passion, The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t momentarily positions woman on the same moral ground as man. 
Such analogous representation of male and female desire was certainly disadvantageous 
to feminist campaigns that insisted that women were naturally purer than men and 
therefore capitalized on woman’s difference in an effort to convince men to adopt her 
superior standards. As Opalia attempts to stifle her passion, she wonders, “Is woman so 
different to man? Is not the very rivalry of the sexes a proof of their similarity?” (Cleeve 
49), and although the narrative eventually reestablishes the distinction between masculine 
and feminine virtues and reasserts woman’s position as man’s moral savior, these issues 
that Opalia explores during her prolonged period of doubt (which comprises the majority 
of the narrative) are hardly resolved in the dubious and impetuous conclusion of the novel 
when all of Opalia’s “degradation” and “suffering” is “wiped out” in the “compensating 
joy” of maternity (225)24. 
 Whereas The Woman Who Wouldn’t critiques the limitations of social-purity 
feminist politics by highlighting Opalia’s internal struggles to mediate change without 
compromising her ideal femininity, Victoria Cross’s The Woman Who Didn’t also 
contributes to this intertextual and interdiscursive conversation but does so through the 
                                                 
24
 See the final chapter for a discussion of maternity. 
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portrayal of the male perspective. Thus, by using the male point-of-view in order to 
further develop the purity/passion virtue/vice binaries that structured the dominant 
discourses of female desire, The Woman Who Didn’t revisits the unresolved questions of 
The Woman Who Wouldn’t. Much as Alan is engrossed with the “perpetual worship” of 
Opalia—the “immaculate Madonna” whose “image haunted him” (Cleeve 152-153, 108), 
Evelyn experiences a similar attraction to Eurydice: “The thought of her filled my mind 
to running over, just as her presence, her image, seemed to weigh upon my physical 
senses” (Cross 25). During their journey on a boat to Marseilles, Evelyn, who is on leave 
from his six year post in India, befriends Eurydice Williamson after she boards the ship at 
Aden.  After they spend a week together aboard the ship, Evelyn becomes enthralled by 
Eurydice because, as he explains to his friend Dickinson, “she’s certainly totally different 
from any other woman I’ve ever met” (13). He admits, “I can imagine her carrying a man 
away into any folly—even marriage” (13). Surprised by Evelyn’s interest in marriage, 
Dickinson attempts to persuade him that Eurydice would not complement his lifestyle: 
“Yes. She is a divine creation, I admit, most impressive and very nice at a safe distance, 
but do you know I think she’d be rather an awful sort of person to marry! Fancy coming 
home late, drunk, and seeing her sitting waiting for one with that marble face and those 
level eyebrows” (14). Since Evelyn has just commenced a one-year leave from his post as 
a “hard-worked Indian officer,” Dickinson is familiar with Evelyn’s “irresponsible 
gaiety” and his bachelorhood existence (6). Thus, Dickinson reminds his friend of the 
appeal of frivolous women, and as they survey the women around them, Dickinson 
replies, “I daresay she’d do all right for you; the little one’s more my style, she’s a touch 
of barmaid about her; keep you cheerful” (14). However, Evelyn is not convinced by 
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Dickinson’s appeal and therefore responds by saying, “Surely when one marries one does 
not want a repetition of the women one may have known before marriage?” (14). Evelyn 
admits that he “should prefer a change”—a woman unlike the ones he is accustomed to, 
and he is convinced that Eurydice is certainly unique (14).   
 Evelyn’s fascination with Eurydice continues to grow as they spend their days 
sitting “side by side on the deck talking,” and he discovers that Eurydice definitely offers 
him that change that he desires (Cross 17). Evelyn is refreshed by their profound 
conversations. He boasts, “Two philosophers in ancient Athens could hardly have 
discoursed more indefatigably in one of their covered walks than she and I upon that 
covered deck” (17). Evelyn is so impressed by Eurydice’s wit and reasoned locution that 
he believes she is greatly affecting his intellect: “She roused it from the apathy into which 
it had sunk during six years of the empty, frivolous life of an army man in India” (17). 
Eurydice “seem[s] to reinfuse” Evelyn’s brain with “the vigour” it had once had when he 
was younger (18). Additionally, Evelyn also explains, “And her influence on my moral 
being was as great” (18). He elaborates, “In every word, in every sentence she uttered, in 
the whole length of those dispassionate conversations we had, there was gradually 
unfolded before me the beauty of an elevated, and yet extremely sympathetic character, 
and all the better part of my own was drawn irresistibly towards it” (18).  
 Evelyn’s avowal of Eurydice’s “elevated” character and her propensity to awaken 
his “better nature” echoes the perspectives of both Herminia’s Alan and Opalia’s Alan: 
all three male characters are enthralled by good angels who assert themselves as divine 
moral guardians. Herminia “had power in her purity to raise” Alan’s nature to “her own 
high level” (Allen 32), and Alan likens his encounters with Opalia to interchanges “with 
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angels on the heights of a mountain” (Cleeve 71). Thus, The Woman Who Didn’t joins an 
intertextual conversation with The Woman Who series, and, by emphasizing women’s 
heightened moral status and scrutinizing her ability to purify or elevate those with whom 
she comes in contact with, the text employs social-purity theories. Although much like 
The Woman Who Did and The Woman Who Wouldn’t, The Woman Who Didn’t provokes 
many questions about the practical application and potentiality of such theories.  
 After only a week of knowing Eurydice, Evelyn admits, “I knew that I loved her, 
and loved her with the best and noblest love one human being can feel for another, the 
love that has its roots in reverence and its fruits in devotion, the love that thinks only of 
the object, and will deny its own to gain its idol’s pleasure” (Cross 18). This confession 
suggests that Evelyn has undergone a moral transformation—that, because of Eurydice, 
he is able to harness his “best” nature—to become selfless and honorable for and because 
of this divine woman. Evelyn is convinced that Eurydice will accept his love, and in this 
climactic moment when Evelyn feels “the first fresh light of Love breaking into” his life, 
he ventures to find Eurydice. He sets out “with an uncertain [tremor]25 of feeling” 
because “for the first time a personal prayer” is on his lips (18).  At this moment, Evelyn 
also suggests that he is on the brink of a spiritual awakening—that his love for Eurydice 
has moved him to prayer. He searches the deck for Eurydice, and in the dark “the mast 
swung an electric light, pouring a shower of tremulous transverse rays through the 
cordage” (18). There, he finds Eurydice “sitting idly” beneath “the full flood of light, that 
                                                 
25
 The 2009 General Books edition of The Woman Who Didn’t contains the word pemor rather than tremor, 
which is an error. I consulted John Lane’s 1895 edition which is digitized on Google Books in order to 
locate the correct word. 
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seemed to descend upon her like a mantle of silver”; there, in his moment of 
enlightenment, Evelyn sees his angel adorned with a heavenly glow (18).  
 Evelyn’s description of Eurydice suggests he looks to her as his moral and 
spiritual savior—that her sympathetic and noble nature is leading him to a “heavenly 
awakening”—a “new era” of his life (Cross 15). This self-transformation that Evelyn 
envisions as the result of his relationship with Eurydice suggests that Evelyn is 
reinventing himself on various levels. Firstly, he proclaims that he is becoming more 
virtuous; he is ready to abandon his bachelorhood lifestyle and turn his attention to 
honoring and loving a woman. Secondly, Evelyn begins to reexamine his spiritual nature; 
he acknowledges an absence of spiritual devotion in his daily life but turns to prayer to 
aid him in his pursuit of the woman he perceives to be a divine angel. Additionally, 
Evelyn begins to reformulate his attitude about female companionship and about the 
intellectual capacity of women. Evelyn realizes that companionship with the “cheerful” 
“barmaid” type of woman—the pleasing but intellectually stunted “plaything”—is no 
longer appealing to him because through his “mental contact with a mind like 
Eurydice’s,” Evelyn begins to understand that woman may be man’s intellectual equal—
that he has been underestimating and undervaluing what women are able to contribute to 
a relationship. Not only is Evelyn surprised by Eurydice’s mental agility, but he also 
explains, “and her influence on my own intellect was very great,” which indicates that 
Evelyn recognizes her “tremendous power” (17). In this avowal, Evelyn credits Eurydice 
for his newfound insight in the same way that he aggrandizes her for cultivating his path 
to moral and spiritual reform. Thus, much as the other novels emphasize the “special 
ways in which women may use their power to purify and amend society,” The Woman 
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Who Didn’t portrays Eurydice as the ideal social-purity heroine—as Evelyn’s moral 
guardian and spiritual savior (Cobbe Duties 166).  
 In addition to Evelyn’s proclamations of his burgeoning self-transformation—his 
frank discussions in which he directly acknowledges a change in attitude and 
perception—the text also reiterates the materialization of Evelyn’s reform through the 
vivid descriptions of the natural setting around him. Upon Evelyn’s realization that 
Eurydice’s uniqueness is unprecedented, Evelyn reaches a turning point in his life and 
asks himself if she is possibly the “missing portion” of his own “broken and incomplete 
being” (Cross 14). As he contemplates whether or not Eurydice can “restore” his life,  he 
gazes out at the sea to watch “the rising of the Young Day” and sees “broken shafts of 
light” appearing “above the dark line in the horizon in the East” (14). Impressed by the 
“overhanging blackness of the night,” the “blackness” of the sea, and the “darkness of the 
sky,” Evelyn witnesses the coming of a new day (15).  In this symbolic sunrise scene, 
“bars of crimson light” disrupt the darkness, “transforming the uncertain, trembling pallor 
and shades of the water into one soft, subtle mysterious harmony of mauve” (15). Evelyn 
stares at the horizon as “unhesitatingly, triumphantly, with overpowering sovereignty, the 
great Day [rises] in its mantle of clear light;” the “shadows” and the darkness disappear 
into “one brilliance of purest gold” (15). Filled with a “confident gladness” in his heart, 
Evelyn concludes, “the ever marvelous mystery of the dawn was past. It was glad, 
joyous, certain Morning that smiled upon the sea” (15).  
 This passage metaphorically illustrates Evelyn’s transition from moral and 
spiritual darkness to a newfound consciousness—to a “heavenly awakening” facilitated 
by Eurydice’s divine influence and discernment (Cross 15). The “fresh day” ushers in 
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light, certainty, and harmony, and the invigorating imagery parallels Evelyn’s restorative 
journey that has resulted from his encounters with the enlightened Eurydice. Evelyn 
describes the forthcoming “new era” of his life as a time for personal, spiritual, and social 
progress, and through this characterization, The Woman Who Didn’t, appropriates the 
turn-of-the century social-purity discourse which positioned the New Woman as the 
catalyst for cultural, political, and social transformation (15). In “Is the New Woman a 
Myth?” published in Humanitarian in 1896, Mrs. Morgan-Dockrell echoes Evelyn’s 
sentiment in her depiction of the spirit of the age: “There is the breath as of a new spring 
in the moral and spiritual atmospheres, fraught with intimations of more abundant life 
and light to all mankind” (339). Furthermore, Evelyn’s “awakened enthusiasm” for life, 
for something new and unique, is, according to Morgan-Dockrell, the fashionable 
ideology (339): 
 The remnant of the old order stand aghast, clinging affrightedly to their 
traditions; meanwhile the new order hastens forth eagerly, heralding and 
welcoming the fuller entrance of the New Era. That very word “new,” 
strikes as it were the dominant note in the trend of present-day thought, 
present day effort and aspiration. (339) 
 Through Evelyn’s search for a new beginning, The Woman Who Didn’t illustrates 
this spirit of the age that Morgan-Dockrell identifies, and the text further exemplifies 
Morgan-Dockrell’s theory because Evelyn’s eagerness for change is circumscribed by 
Eurydice’s potential. At the center of all “these new facts and entities,” Morgan-Dockrell 
writes, “the new woman appears to be immeasurably the first in importance, the most 
abounding in potentialities and in common interest” (340).  According to Morgan-
Dockrell, the “genuine new woman”—the woman who warrants the interest of world 
because of her capacity to transform society—is she who “typifies and makes for, of all 
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things, regeneration and purification” (344). She embraces her womanhood in order to 
convince man “that in the intellectual sphere as in the physical there cannot be natural 
and healthy creation without the co-operation and amalgamation of all the mental 
attributes, male and female” (344). Morgan-Dockrell comments that the “genuine new 
woman” has joined forces with “some of the ablest men of the century” in order to 
cultivate the “forward movement” of society (344), but she concedes that “the new man 
has not as yet lifted up [an] announcing voice” (340). In other words, Morgan-Dockrell 
acknowledges that the new woman is still awaiting the arrival of her helpmate: the 
genuine new man who celebrates women’s potential and adopts her elevated moral and 
spiritual standards. This new man shares the new woman’s view that “the needs and 
desires of the world are not those of men alone,” and, therefore, he “harmoniously” 
works with her in order to facilitate “the world’s regeneration” (345). Morgan-Dockrell is 
certain that, “he [the new man] is coming; after whom, perhaps, the millennium followed 
by a new heaven and earth (340). Until that day, society is left with “a realistic picture” 
of “a nineteenth century man of the world” who, along with “hundreds of thousands like 
him are content for women to remain, of the poor doll they call a normal woman” (350). 
 Morgan-Dockrell’s depiction of the “the genuine new woman” combats the 
widespread, threatening images of the New Woman as a “source of contagion, of moral 
defilement, and corruption” (314). Much like social-purity feminists, Morgan-Dockrell 
upholds the rigid boundaries that constructed ideal femininity. She argues that women 
should be granted the human right to develop co-equally and exist with men in both the 
private and public sphere because society is in need of guidance with regard to religion, 
morality, and virtue—the very purifying correctives that women “naturally” are able to 
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provide. Thus, at the center of much first-wave feminist propaganda is the insistence on 
women’s equality for the benefit of mankind and the justification of women’s freedom to 
the extent that women exemplify traditional femininity and embrace natural womanly 
attributes in an effort to better serve as man’s “helpmate” (Morgan-Dockrell 345). 
Theoretically, first-wave feminism aimed at liberating women from the confines of 
patriarchy; however, discursively, first-wave feminism was heavily focused on appeasing 
patriarchal audiences—on convincing men to support women’s causes. In doing so, it 
promoted a message not of the “new” woman but of the under-valued, potential power of 
the “old” angel. She had not changed; she was just demanding a “new” helpmate, and she 
was convinced that she could make this happen—that all her persistence would 
eventually usher in “the new man.” 
 Herminia and Opalia both share a similar vision and initially believe that their 
chosen partners will function as helpmates and join them in their fight for emancipation. 
However, as each narrative discloses, neither Alan proves to be capable of occupying 
woman’s moral or spiritual ground. Nonetheless, many social-purity campaigns 
concentrated their efforts on transforming the typical “nineteenth century man of the 
world” (Morgan-Dockrell 350) into The New Man, a man who embraced the same moral 
and spiritual ideals as the angel. As illustrated through much of Hopkins’s teachings and 
her endorsement of purity leagues for men as well as through Cobbe’s doctrines that 
publicized the transformative power of “pure and noble-hearted” womanhood (Duties 
166), first-wave feminists were highly invested in preserving and propagating ideal 
feminine virtue. They embraced purity, selflessness, morality, and spirituality—
prescribed feminine ideals which for so long rendered them powerless and inadequate for 
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the public sphere, and in an effort to gain a voice in a patriarchal society, they recast 
these feminine virtues as agents of change—as weapons of emancipation not 
subordination. Despite much feminist effort to prove the efficacy of this ideological 
approach, the New Woman novels in this study perpetuated an intertextual and 
interdiscursive conversation that unveiled the shortcomings of a plan of action steeped in 
old feminine traditions. First-wave feminists promised new directions for women, but 
their efforts were misguided by an unwarranted anticipation of the New Man’s arrival. 
The Woman Who Didn’t further complicates this issue by putting the feminist program to 
the test; albeit a fictional account, Evelyn’s narrative actualizes the potential praxis of 
Cobbe’s and Hopkins’s theories on a micro-level. Through the male point of view, the 
text presents and investigates the process that first-wave feminists propagated as a means 
to reshape the world for their benefit: a woman’s power to reform the world one man at a 
time.  
 Throughout the beginning of the novel, Evelyn’s confessions lead readers to 
believe that he is a “new man” in the making—that he is as Morgan-Dockrell identifies, 
one of the men “sincere of soul and earnest of purpose” who welcomes “the New Era” as 
“a new spring in the moral and spiritual atmospheres” (339). Evelyn also distinguishes 
himself from the typical “nineteenth century man of the world”; unlike his emblematic 
friend Dickinson, Evelyn is no longer pleased with childlike, mindless women (Morgan-
Dockrell 350). In his love for Eurydice and in his acknowledgement of her intellectual 
and moral worth in his life, Evelyn affirms the efficacy of the feminist platform: men will 
greatly benefit from interactions with women who are no longer confined to the lives of 
“poor doll[s]” (Morgan-Dockrell 350). The New Woman—a woman who is afforded the 
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right to fully and freely develop “every power and faculty,”—is a “nobler human 
creature,” a “more useful citizen,” a “fitter mother of children,” and, most importantly, a 
“more loyal helpmate for a true man” (Morgan-Dockrell 350).  
 Thus, as Evelyn provides us with evidence that he is on the verge of reform 
because of Eurydice’s exemplary influence, The Woman Who Didn’t initially validates 
the theoretical approach that shaped feminist thought at the turn of the century.  However, 
when Evelyn learns that Eurydice is married, his spiritual and moral transformation—his 
journey to becoming a New Man—comes to a sudden halt. When Evelyn confesses his 
love to Eurydice, she is offended by his advance; she asks him, “How can you say that 
word [love] to me?” (Cross 19). She had no intention of deceiving him, and she thought 
he knew she was married, but Evelyn assures her: “No, I swear I did not know it” (20)  
Upon hearing the news, Evelyn is “paralyzed” and speechless (20). The word “married” 
jars his senses, and he begins his descent back to the meaningless life that he once knew: 
“All emotion was lost, all feelings made level in one sickening blank” (20). He also 
begins to abandon his newfound dedication to virtue: “The word stirred a mad 
unreasoning rebellion with me. A rebellion of all those finer, purer, more tender instincts 
that had sprung up round the main passionate impulse of love for her this girl as I had 
thought her” (20). Evelyn realizes that he cannot possess Eurydice as his “object” of 
“worship” (18), and, therefore, he re-evaluates the authenticity of his moral 
transformation: “The gentleness, the reverence, the consideration that ran through all my 
thoughts regarding her, and that I sedulously encouraged and cultivated for her sake, had 
been like delicate flowers growing on the sides of a volcano and co-existent with the 
subterranean flames” (21). Thus, Evelyn admits that his self-reform is somewhat 
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disingenuous because it was not self-motivated. Furthermore, he acknowledges that he 
has not fully abandoned his old ways and attitudes: they secretly coexist with the new 
appearance he has been cultivating.  
 Evelyn continues to describe this moment as the decisive end of his moral 
progress: “And as in eruption of the volcano the flowers perish, are annihilated and 
obliterated in the flow of boiling lava, so now all those holier, more tender impulses, sank 
submerged under the liberated tide of underlying passion” (Cross 21). Evelyn is 
overcome with passion, and although he realizes that “it is not the function of the sane 
mind to dwell upon a desire which is absolutely beyond its attainment,” his desire for 
Eurydice is heightened by the thought that he cannot have her (25). Thus, Evelyn reveals 
that the “better part” of his nature is overcome by his lust, and as a result, Eurydice is 
reduced to an object of Evelyn’s desire (18): 
It was extraordinary, the indefinable, irresistible fascination that the 
thought of her, the image of her, possessed for me. I resented it, wrestled 
with it, struggled under it in vain, the mind was passing through an 
inexplicable phase, completely subjugated, unnerved and unstrung by the 
abstract contemplation of pleasure which it fully recognised, absolutely 
impossible of attainment. (25)  
Although in this passage Evelyn describes his predicament as a psychological struggle, 
his active verb choices suggest that he is also experiencing a physical reaction in 
conjunction with his mental torment. That Evelyn both “[wrestles]” and “[struggles]” 
with the thought and image of Eurydice evokes the impression of a sexual encounter. 
(25). Coupled with the forceful volcanic imagery of flames, lava, and eruption, this 
passage depicts Evelyn’s insatiable sexual appetite. Without the promise of sexual 
finality—the physical “pleasure” that he ultimately seeks with Eurydice—he cannot 
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function (25). Furthermore, without the hope of “attainment,” Evelyn is no longer 
engrossed with his attempt to “cultivate” himself into a new man. During their final 
meeting aboard the ship, full of “holy determination and resolve,” Eurydice informs 
Evelyn that they must never see each other again (27). Evelyn marks this moment as the 
“death” of their “love” (27), and thus, this moment also marks the end of a short-lived era 
of self-reform. 
 After their departure, Evelyn explains, “I realized so keenly that I had done my 
duty in the matter by accepting my dismissal, that I could allow myself a little license 
now, for in the male moral code we make a little virtue go a long way” (Cross 30). Thus, 
he goes back to his old life and re-adopts “the male moral code”—an exclusively male 
standard that rationalizes vice as a “natural” response to life’s hardships. After six 
months, when Evelyn and Eurydice accidentally meet at the train station in Dover, 
Evelyn distinguishes his code from that of Eurydice:  
For six months she had been treading the clean narrow path of duty, 
temptations passed, difficulties overcome, and I for those same months 
had been wandering further into the mire of personal satisfaction, all 
temptations embraced, all difficulties avoided. I could see as in a mirror 
held up to me what her days had been, pure and clear, and filled with a 
wearying unsatisfying virtue, dragging after each other in intolerable 
tedium, which she had the strength to endure and the will to live through, 
and mine seemed lost, as I looked back, in a mist of mere degradation. 
(33)  
Here, Evelyn outlines the differences between men’s and women’s ethical standards, but 
his evaluation of these two diametrically opposed lifestyles is rather ambiguous as neither 
the male propensity for vice or the female propensity for virtue seems to offer any 
redeeming qualities or personal fulfillment.  Therefore, the text further develops its 
critical inquiry into the feminist potential of womanly virtue. Evelyn surely finds 
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Eurydice’s elevated morality and purity admirable and attractive; however, contrary to 
social-purity rhetoric, “the ideal of womanly virtue” falls short as an agent of change 
(Cobbe Duties 8). In The Woman Who Didn’t, feminine virtue fails to purify society, 
empower women, or induce men to reform. Furthermore, through its portrayal of 
Evelyn’s unyielding sexual desire, the text discredits the argument that men are capable 
of being held to the same moral and sexual standards as women. As illustrated through 
the imagery of the erupting volcano, in man’s natural world, “delicate flowers” of purity 
and morality cannot “[co-exist]” with “the subterranean flames” for long (Cross 21). 
 Moreover, all three of The Woman Who intertexts challenge the construct of ideal 
femininity by dismantling the binary structures (pure/fallen, purity/passion, virtue/vice) 
that regulated the distinction between the proper, worthy angel and the improper, 
dishonorable woman. Consequently, because first-wave feminist philosophy extolled the 
image of the angel as its agent of change, these intertexts also developed a complex 
critique of feminist ideology.  As I examined earlier in this chapter, in The Woman Who 
Did, Herminia revises notions of feminine purity and merges the pure/fallen feminine 
constructs into an unthinkable version of ideal womanhood. Likewise, The Woman Who 
Wouldn’t examines the purity/passion dichotomy in order to reveal the ambiguous border 
between the ideal and the fallen woman, and, through the exploration of Opalia’s desire, 
The Woman Who Wouldn’t also undermines how the purity/passion binary serves as a 
marker of sexual difference between women (asexual) and men (sexual).    
 The Woman Who Didn’t develops another thread of this conversation through its 
inquiry into the nature of virtue and vice. Near the end of the novel when Evelyn hopes 
that Eurydice has changed her mind—that she has finally “given way, yielded” her 
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principles—Evelyn asks himself, “Could it be…that both Virtue and Vice are essentially 
tiring in their nature? Could it be that the human being is not fitted to sustain an extended 
course of either one or the other? In a natural state, he would alternate one with the other, 
and in this mixed existence his moral character perhaps most fully develops and expands 
itself” (Cross 36). Here, rather than reestablishing the virtue/vice dichotomy as the ideal 
ethical organizing principle—as the border that separates woman from man or the ideal 
woman from the fallen one—Evelyn suggests another ethical model, one in which 
individuals pursue a “mixed existence” rather than one that is culturally prescribed for 
them.  Whereas Evelyn initially admired Eurydice’s unwavering virtue and even sought 
to emulate her angelic example, he now develops a new theory: 
Perhaps there is something attenuating to the mental fibres in long 
continued virtue: the soul, the heart, the moral muscles become cramped 
by it: they are deprived of all that movement and exercise natural to them, 
in the fervours of repentance, passionate remorse and agonized regret 
consequent upon error, and they degenerate as the body does, of which all 
its muscles are not brought properly into play. (37) 
Plainly, Evelyn’s discussion of individual freedom here stands in direct opposition to 
first-wave feminist philosophy. For nineteenth-century feminists, unfaltering virtue was a 
mandate for all women, and they were convinced that the dispersal of feminine virtue 
would purify society and emancipate women from the confines of patriarchy. However, it 
is here in this radical idea that The Woman Who Didn’t presents its most feminist 
premise—one which envisions a path for women that is without culturally constructed 
moral obligations. As Evelyn imagines a “mixed existence” for women—an approach 
which no longer relegates women to the confines of the virtue/vice, pure/fallen, or 
good/evil pairings—the text discredits the monolithic model of womanhood that 
informed traditional cultural values and that fuelled the first-wave feminist agenda. Thus, 
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it momentarily exposes the fictitiousness of the angel and rejects the singular definition 
of women as inherently virtuous and pure.  
 Furthermore, much like The Woman Who Did and The Woman Who Wouldn’t, 
The Woman Who Didn’t presents another scenario in which the angel fails to reform man 
or purify the world around her. In the end of the narrative, Evelyn realizes that he has 
once again misinterpreted Eurydice’s intentions. She has most certainly not transitioned 
from “virtue to vice” as he had imagined; she has only befriended him in order to exert 
her “higher moral nature” over him (Cross 37). Unsatisfied with friendship and wearied 
by his efforts to lead an “exemplary” life in order to please an unattainable woman, 
Evelyn admits that he has been duplicitous:  “But the reform was not a radical or deep-
seated one, since no reform enforced or induced by outside circumstances can be so. The 
very soul of all true self-reform is in a personal revolutionary ardour which can prompt 
and sustain the reformation, independent of and in spite of outside influences. All other 
self-reform is a mere counterfeit” (43).   
 As I will examine in the following chapter, the narratives of Herminia, Opalia, 
and Eurydice illustrate that “true self reform” is manifested from within an individual; 
these New Woman heroines actively and independently shape their identities and their 
ideas about marriage based solely on personal principle. However, as I have indicated in 
this chapter, the crux of the problem that hindered first-wave feminism was insistence on 
the idea that feminine virtue could “prompt and sustain the reformation” of society (Cross 
43). The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Wouldn’t and The Woman Who Didn’t 
pinpoint this dilemma: Herminia, Opalia, and Eurydice embrace their duties as moral and 
spiritual guardians, but their purifying missions are unsuccessful in transforming the lives 
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of their male partners, and more significantly, their efforts do nothing to empower 
women. The Woman Who intertexts devise narratives in which the heroines attempt to 
actualize social-purity theories, and as these narratives trace the transition from theory to 
practice, they uncover not the transformative power of ideal femininity but its many 
limitations and inconsistencies. Consequently, as these novels produce a critical 
intertextual and interdiscursive conversation about the transformative potential of social-
purity feminist ideology, they also foster a complex investigation into the very 
boundaries that constructed ideal womanhood. They suggest that feminism may need to 
look to some other agent of change, to some other theory which recognizes women’s 
“mixed existence” because the angel may not be as powerful or as stable as she seems. 
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CHAPTER 2 “EXACTLY AS SHE WILLS”: MARRIAGE REFORM AND THE 
NEW WOMAN’S SEARCH FOR AUTHENTIC LIBERTY26 
 
In “The Modern Woman and Marriage,” published in The North American Review 
in June of 1895, Elizabeth Bisland writes, “Criticism of the marriage relation is in the  
air . . . . Every book-stall is heavy with similar discussions in dialogue, carried on by the 
puppets of fiction” (753). In an effort to evaluate the “significance of this criticism,” 
Bisland explains that for generations woman has “fought polygamy with incessant hatred; 
not only for its injury to herself but for its constant menace to her children” (753, 754). 
Thus, Bisland argues, “to-day the world is a woman’s world,” because she has been 
victorious in her “conquest”; “Monogamous marriage is the foundation stone on which 
has been built her power” (754). The logic that she follows, then, is that “it would be 
natural to suppose” that women would devote their energy to protecting “this jewel, so 
hardly won” and “so long toiled for”; Bisland also presumes that a woman would “cling” 
to marriage “all the more as education broadened her capacity for reflection and 
deepened her consciousness of self” (754).  
 By 1895, feminists had won many “conquests” through campaigns to legally 
reform marriage laws in order to grant women more economic and political equality. But 
even after the passage of The Infant Custody Acts of 1873 and 1886, the Married 
Woman’s Property Acts of 1870 and 1882, and the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1878, 
marriage was certainly no “jewel,” and the world was far from “a woman’s world” as 
Bisland had maintained. These legal reforms, which resulted from feminist campaigns 
structured on liberal principles, were, as Mary Lyndon Shanley points out, “crucial 
prerequisites for the reconstruction of gender relations in both the family and the state,” 
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 The phrase “exactly as she wills” is from Mona Caird’s “Marriage” (1888). See page 136. 
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but these legislative victories did not procure the egalitarian model of marriage or the 
male-female equality that feminists sought to establish (19). Throughout Feminism, 
Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England, 1850-1895, Shanley illustrates that the 
Victorian feminists’ preoccupation with legal reform and their use of “the liberal 
principles of freedom and equality” as a means to emancipate women obscured the social 
and economic factors responsible for the subjection of women (12). Thus, it is not 
surprising that New Woman novels showcased the discriminatory sexual politics and 
cultural injustices of the marriage system, and in an effort to uncover the “real cause” of 
women’s slavery, New Woman novels expanded the marriage debate into complex 
territories outside of the political realm (“The Woman Who Did” RSY 6).  
These New Woman novels, like The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Didn’t, 
and The Woman Who Wouldn’t exposed these real predicaments; they suggested that 
legal reform alone could not alter the dominant ideological structure that enslaved 
women27. These texts simultaneously enlarged nineteenth-century feminist arguments 
about marriage reform and challenged the dominant feminist ideologies that fueled such 
arguments. In doing so, The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Didn’t, and The Woman 
Who Wouldn’t offer convincing arguments about the necessity of changing the public’s 
attitude about marriage reform and highlight the limitations of feminist reform rooted in 
conservative sexual politics. The heroines of these texts employ a variety of feminist 
positions, and their fluidity illustrates the complex and at times restrictive nature of 
                                                 
27
 By 1895, many legal reforms designed to protect a married woman’s physical, property, and custody 
rights had been passed; however, as A. James Hammerton points out in Cruelty and Companionship: 
Conflict in Nineteenth Century Married Life, the “resistance” that “became central to the formulation of 
larger visions of feminist change” was less preoccupied with legal reform and more focused on exposing 
the “private protests” of women (n.pag.). This approach to remedying marital injustice by way of 
ideological reform (rather than by legal reform) is illustrated by The Woman Who texts, which seem to 
overlook some complications regarding marriage law.  
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feminist politics at the turn of the century. The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who 
Didn’t, and The Woman Who Wouldn’t model alternatives to and challenge patriarchal 
marriage, although I do not suggest that any of these texts independently provided an 
ideal solution to the marriage crisis. Instead, this chapter situates these novels in the 
multidimensional context of the marriage debate in order to uncover how in the very act 
of imagining new romantic ideologies and marital situations, these texts shaped an 
intertextual critique of the patriarchal values that limited feminist progress. The narratives 
of Herminia, Opalia, and Eurydice were dynamic in enlarging the imagined possibilities 
for feminist thought and women’s actions in the marriage debate and beyond. 
 Antifeminists like Bisland were quick to denounce marriage reform on the 
premise that the advancement and education of women “[seem], as usual, a dangerous 
thing” because these developments have facilitated erroneous theories about marriage 
(754). She purports that the modern woman uses “the loud cry for ‘the development of 
her individuality’” to obscure her underlying motives (755). According to Bisland, 
women abuse the liberal feminist creed of self-development in order to claim their right 
to “every thing pleasant” and justify their exemption from duties (755). She closes her 
essay with a severe remark: “This enmity to and destructive criticism of that fair temple 
of life called marriage—built by women’s hands out of women’s hearts—seems like a 
madness” (755).  
 Bisland contends that with the dismantling of polygamy and the establishment of 
marriage, the relations between man and woman have transformed from “a mere contract 
of sensuality or convenience” to “the happiest of bonds” based on “mutual love and well-
being” (754). She fails to consider how this companionate model in which both man and 
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woman are equally happy and fulfilled—very possibly an ideal “built” by women—does 
not adequately represent the dominant customs and practices of the marriage system. 
What Bisland defends is not the institution of marriage but an ideal that is not widely 
practiced. This is precisely the discrepancy that many feminists drew on to argue for 
marriage reform. For example, in “Marriage: A Retrospect,” (1896), sexual radical and 
woman’s rights advocate Edward Carpenter begins by pointing out the distinctions 
between “the real marriage”—the union of “two hearts in lifelong dedication and 
devotion”—and  “the actual marriage”—what most individuals know and experience 
each day (78, 79). Carpenter compares actual marriage to “the wretched idol of the 
savage to the reality which it is supposed to represent” (79).  Carpenter’s aim, much like 
the aims of feminists concerned with marriage reform, is to debunk the myth that current 
marital customs ensure that marriage is, as Bisland describes, a “fair temple of life.”  
Liberal feminist ideology at the turn of the century did not disparage unions of 
mutual love and development. Instead, it exposed the ways in which the current 
patriarchal and sexist practices of marriage impeded such relations. Because, as Philippa 
Levine explains, “marriage, for the nineteenth-century woman, was perhaps the single 
most profound and far-reaching institution that would affect the course of her life,” it is 
not surprising that the Woman’s Movement concentrated on the political and social 
ramifications of marriage (“So Few Prizes” 150). Anti-feminists denounced the need for 
marriage reform on the basis that it was “madness”—an absurd, unachievable 
expectation. As Bisland bluntly states, “woman simply may not eat her cake and have it 
too”; she must make some sacrifices for the “tenderness, protection, and support” of her 
husband (755). Additionally, as Levine points out, individuals critical of the “feminist 
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perspective” misrepresented feminist campaigns designed to “realign the rights of 
partners” within the institution as a crusade to “undermine the practice or prevalence of 
marriage” (Victorian Feminism 141). Levine clarifies that “the feminist assault... was not 
on marriage, and indeed many looked forward to a time when the situation allowed real 
harmony and equality between the married couple” (Victorian Feminism 141).   
Yet, according to Bisland in “The Modern Woman and Marriage,” such ‘assaults’ 
on marriage needed to come to an end. She solicits the public to witness the outcry 
against marriage as the mere “madness” of “the half-baked, shrieking sisterhood,” and in 
making this call to action, she taps into the cultural anxieties that surrounded the feminist 
movement and literary representations of the New Woman (755).  Bisland warns the 
public that if a woman focuses too much on her desire for equality and independence, she 
will be unable to properly care for her offspring. Thus, Bisland argues that questioning 
the current system of marriage puts the survival of the race at stake: “To adequately 
supply the new generation with health, brains and nerve force she must husband her 
resources and yield herself to the generosity and tenderness of the man and trust to his 
care” (755). Bisland warns the public that the marriage debate is dangerous in its 
potential to unfit women for motherhood and, in turn, produce physically and mentally 
defective future generations. Bisland and other critics with similar views recognized that 
marriage reform threatened gender roles in the private sphere but that it also had the 
potential to transform social and sexual conventions in the public sphere. Thus, in an 
effort to preserve the “Eternal Feminine,” Bisland associates feminist ideals with 
degeneration and regards marital reform as an unhealthy mania. 
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In “Shattered Nerves”: Doctors, Patients and Depression in Victorian England, 
Janet Oppenheim discusses how at the turn of the century, “degeneration, allegedly 
spreading outward from the individual bearer of disordered nerves, placed the family in 
the very front ranks of its victims” (277). Degeneration theory, she explains, emphasized 
that “the family was an institution at risk,” and this notion “lent moral urgency to the 
antifeminist campaign of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” (277). 
Antifeminists suggested that if women were more concerned with self-development or 
reform than with the well-being of their children, they shirked their social responsibility 
and compromised national security.  According to Ruskinian notions that pervaded 
Victorian perceptions of femininity, the safety of the Victorian family was dependent on 
obedient and fulfilled wives who are sheltered from the “anxieties of outer life” and who 
take pride in their domestic functions of “sweet ordering, arrangement, and decision” 
(77). In “Of Queens’ Gardens,” John Ruskin maintains that “terror, doubt, and 
division”—forces that should not contaminate the home, the wife, or the children—lurk 
outside the family dwelling (77). Antifeminist campaigners coupled Ruskin’s well-known 
standards with degeneration theories in order to emphasize how feminist ideas and 
aspirations polluted homes and minds; women’s rights campaigns threatened the very 
structure of the patriarchal marriage and family, and, therefore, feminist thought 
compromised the health of the nation. As Chris Willis explains, “it is not the social 
problem but the campaign against it which is seen as unhealthy: feminism is seen as an 
illness for which marriage and maternity are the cure” (63).  
In addition to the charges that feminist thought would be physically damaging to 
the future generations, many critics proclaimed that the scrutiny of marriage in New 
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Woman fiction would trigger the moral degeneration of the English people. In 
“Tommyrotics,” published in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine in June of 1895, Hugh E. 
M. Stutfield urges the public to beware of and suppress the “morbidity” of “new” 
literature—popular novels of the day that are called “modern” simply because they 
challenge “commonplace and old-fashioned notions” (841). He labels Grant Allen one of 
these “erotomaniac authors” filled with “the anarchical spirit” of the age (“Tommyrotics” 
839, 837). Stutfield writes, for Allen, “the sacredness of the marriage-tie is apparently 
mere old-fashioned Tory twaddle in the eyes of our révoltés” (839-840). Allen’s 
“contempt for conventionalities” and parading of the sexual instinct are symptoms of 
what Stutfield refers to as a “moral cancer”—a disease that is sure to spread if individuals 
do not fight for what is natural and decent, if they do not cling to “the old ideals of 
discipline and duty, of manliness and self-reliance in men, and womanliness in women” 
(843, 845).  In order to prevent a moral epidemic and preserve the minds of “cultivated 
people whose instincts are still sound and healthy,” Stutfield urges the public to boycott 
“nasty books and plays” (845, 844). If not immediately diffused, “the modern spirit of 
revolt” against marriage, against traditional femininity, against conventional decorum 
found in the “new” fiction of the day could incite a moral apocalypse (844). According to 
Stutfield, it is better for individuals to accept and not “fear” what has been “natural” for 
so long unless they are willing to accept the ramifications of their queries: an appalling 
nation devoid of ethics, honor, and decency (“Tommyrotics” 844).  
Victorian ideologies insisted that the welfare of the nation, the well-being of 
future generations, and ideal femininity were dependent on traditional marriage practices. 
For antifeminists and traditionalists, it was crucial that the public be protected from 
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messages that challenged or rejected the institution of marriage because such messages 
also threatened the prominent domestic ideology which saturated the nation after the rise 
of industrialism. At the core of the ideology of separate spheres was the concept that 
wives and mothers were ‘naturally’ fit to serve as the moral guardians of the home, and in 
order to maintain this ideology that was responsible for ordering the lives of many 
individuals, traditionalists argued that marriage-reform literature and unconventional 
thoughts about relationships and the family compromised the image of “the angel.”  
Thus, it is not surprising that the public was outraged by Herminia’s gospel of 
free love and denouncement of marriage in The Woman Who Did. Overpowered by the 
radical anti-marriage premise of the novel, even feminist critics were unable to evaluate 
The Woman Who Did as a contribution to turn-of-the-century marriage debate—to 
analyze the ways in which it expanded the liberal feminist platform of marriage reform. 
According to such critics, the text had one central purpose—to dismantle the institution 
of marriage. Because Herminia blatantly argues against marriage, some critics 
disregarded the possibility that The Woman Who Did contained any valid points about 
marriage. In Marriage Questions in Modern Fiction, and Other Essays on Kindred 
Subjects (1897), conservative feminist and marriage theorist Elizabeth Rachel Chapman 
states: “one of our best known and most popular men of letters is openly and deliberately 
heading a literary crusade for the abolition of marriage and the family” (33). Millicent 
Garrett Fawcett, a well-known suffrage advocate and liberal feminist, makes a similar 
claim in an 1895 review in Contemporary Review: “The central idea of Mr. Grant Allen’s 
book is that marriage means slavery” (631). Feminists like Fawcett and Chapman labeled 
Allen an “enemy” of the woman’s movement in order to reiterate that real New Women 
101 
 
 
wanted to reform marriage and divorce laws to ensure women’s social and legal equality. 
Furthermore, as Patricia Stubbs explains, “orthodox feminists condemned the novel and 
its author” because, “as usual, they were afraid that public discussion of sexual questions 
would give the suffrage campaign a bad name” (118).  
The Woman Who Did, by openly presenting an attack on marriage to the public, 
incited a discussion of the private issues that many feminists thought best to ignore. The 
central focus on marriage and its connection with sexuality and maternity could 
potentially shift feminist discussion into what Stubbs refers to as “more crucial areas of 
oppression” (118).  Indeed, women objected to Herminia’s purported feminism and 
argued that she was an idealistic representative of a free woman, but the majority of the 
feminist backlash against The Woman Who Did was based on the premise that the 
destruction of marriage in fiction is immoral and lawless. In turn, many feminists, who 
embraced their purity and roles as moral guardians in order to fight for women’s rights, 
maintained that Herminia was immoral and damaging to their cause. Thus, the free-love 
scenario of The Woman Who Did is indicative of the “unstable ethical thinking” of the 
times (Chapman 13). Chapman proclaims that “true art,” is dependent “upon sound 
morality”; it must not “appeal to the lower instincts” of nature (13). Similarly, liberal 
feminists, working within the confines of domestic ideology, promoted the image of the 
true woman whose moral superiority would purify the licentiousness of the public sphere.  
For liberal feminists, The Woman Who Did and its mouthpiece Herminia represented the 
very public “lower instincts” that the woman’s movement sought to suppress. 
In his analysis of the reception of  The Woman Who Did, Ruddick writes, “That 
Herminia, a lady, might actually welcome and enjoy sexual activity unsanctified by 
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marriage so contravened the Victorian conception of respectable femininity that it was 
almost impossible in 1895 for female critics, regardless of political affiliation, to endorse 
the novel” (26).  Thus, most female critics agreed with Fawcett’s notion that the “social 
revolution” sketched in the text “would amount in its practical result to libertinage, not to 
liberty” and would ensure the degradation and subjection of women (Fawcett 630).  On 
this point, the new generation of women’s rights activists and the old generation inclined 
to support conservative feminine values generally agreed: without the constraints of 
marriage, women would fall prey to their sexual instincts. For example, Margaret O.W. 
Oliphant, whom Philip Davis and Brian Nellist describe as “a natural rather than 
ideological feminist” who often demonstrated her sympathy for “the individual female 
predicament” in her works of fiction, much like many liberal-minded feminists, reiterates 
the destructive potential of Allen’s social revolution (“Introduction” Hester xv, xiv)28.  In 
“The Anti-Marriage League” (1896), Oliphant suggests that Herminia’s anti-marriage 
stance results not from her aspiration for independence and reform but from her desire for 
uninhibited sexual activity. According to Oliphant, both Allen and Herminia are 
“sowing” sentiments “like seed among the fools” (146).  Oliphant contends that there is 
no justification for the immodesty of the novel and claims that Allen’s “false theory” of 
female sexuality “corrupts the morals, debases the conversation, and defiles the thoughts” 
of proper young women (144). Like Fawcett and Chapman, Oliphant argues that fiction 
must uphold moral standards and maintain a tradition in which the “sacredness and 
mystery” of “the wonderful origins of life are instinctively shrouded” (149). Through a 
                                                 
28
 My reference to Oliphant’s “The Story of a Wedding Tour” (1894) in Chapter 1 reveals that Oliphant 
was certainly sympathetic to the injustices that women faced in marriage; however, as depicted by 
Oliphant’s muted discussion of sexual matters in “The Story of a Wedding Tour” (the narrator alludes to 
Rosendale’s unwanted sexual advances but does not elaborate or dwell on this issue), Oliphant maintained 
that writers needed to tactfully approach such sacred subjects, not promote or celebrate free love. 
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free-love scenario, The Woman Who Did  unveils the “private” issues that were shrouded 
by marriage, challenges the Victorian understanding of sexual purity, and makes young 
women readers susceptible to the destructive potential of their “lesser passion” (Oliphant 
144).  
The aforementioned reviewers object to Herminia’s anti-marriage stance because 
they associate free unions with the dissolution of the family, the overthrow of morality, 
and the base celebration of promiscuity. However, The Woman Who Did contests these 
accusations through the traditional marriage-like relationship of Herminia and Alan, 
through its insistence on and glorification of motherhood, through its commitment to 
revised concepts of morality and purity, and through the assertion of Herminia’s ideal 
femininity. Consequently, critics who recognized these conservative elements were more 
supportive of the text because they maintained that The Woman Who Did cleverly 
presented a case for free love in order to undermine it and expose its follies.  For 
example, in “Recent Novels,” the reviewer from Spectator argues that the book is very 
effective in enlisting “feeling in favour of the institutions which Mr. Grant Allen intends 
to attack” (215).  Similarly, in Review of Reviews, W.T. Stead writes that individuals with 
“the saner view of the relations of the sexes will rejoice that what might have been a 
potent force for evil has been so strangely overruled as to become a reinforcement of the 
garrison defending the citadel its author desires so ardently to overthrow” (208).  Other 
critics disagreed with Allen’s theories but applauded the audacity of the novel. In 
Academy, Percy Addleshaw writes of Allen: “He is so eager to offend our most sacred 
prejudices…. [He] has looked for our weak places so assiduously, and probed them with 
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such malicious energy, that we cannot but regard him with a certain uncomfortable 
suspicion” (209). 
Whether critics condemned or endorsed The Woman Who Did, their reactions 
suggest that in some way or another the text transgressed moral and sexual boundaries—
it “probed” the marital issues that were off limits to both feminists and antifeminists. The 
results of this exploration may very well be inconclusive; The Woman Who Did hardly 
solves the marriage problem. Yet as a pioneering enterprise into “weak places,” The 
Woman Who Did, in conjunction with The Woman Who Didn’t, and The Woman Who 
Wouldn’t, initiates a crucial investigation into the dynamics of liberal feminism and 
sexual inequality.  
In The Woman Who Did and The Woman Who Wouldn’t, Herminia and Opalia 
devise marital experiments with the goal of reinventing the relations between the sexes. 
In The Woman Who Didn’t, Eurydice upholds the traditional standards of marriage, but 
all three heroines, regardless of their goals, expose the complex and contradictory nature 
of late-nineteenth century feminist politics. Theoretically, Herminia’s arguments are 
founded on liberal ideas of individualism and reason. She describes herself as a rational 
being who is capable of making informed decisions about her life. When Alan questions 
her views regarding marriage and claims that she has not fully considered the 
consequences of her “dangerous conclusion,” Herminia responds: “Why, Alan, haven’t I 
had my whole lifetime to think of it? What else have I thought about in any serious way, 
save this one great question of a woman’s duty to herself, and her sex, and her unborn 
children? It’s been my sole study” (Allen 38).  Although, as Levine points out, many 
first-wave feminists at the end of the nineteenth century chose marriage over free union 
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or single life, the general stance of the woman’s movement “had been to encourage 
choice among women and to free them from considering marriage as the only or highest 
aspiration of their lives” (“So Few Prizes”172). By approaching the issue of marriage in 
this way, first-wave feminism sought to dismantle the stereotype of women as passive, 
irrational beings. Implicit in the argument that women could choose if, to whom, and 
under what conditions to marry is the larger aim of the woman’s movement at the turn of 
the century: to show that women, like men, could be independent and free-thinking 
citizens. However, as illustrated by the feminist reactions to The Woman Who Did and by 
the strategies of the woman’s movement, this new identity of active, rational femininity is 
acceptable only to the extent that it coexists with the old image of the pure and proper 
Angel. 
Herminia, Opalia, and Eurydice exhibit many characteristics associated with this 
new image of femininity. Neither Herminia nor Opalia passively enters into relationships; 
they both have spent a considerable amount of time thinking about love, about marriage, 
and about what they want to accomplish in life. This convention, a hallmark of New 
Woman literature, can be traced back to many nineteenth-century marriage novels that 
feature similar moments wherein the heroine ponders the direction of her life with regard 
to marriage. In the New Woman novel, however, the heroine’s introspection is prevalent, 
central, and public. Furthermore, the New Woman novel plots new potential outcomes 
for the heroine: she not only spends time contemplating marriage and love, but she also 
acts on her thoughts by pursuing a path other than traditional marriage. Many New 
Woman plots and heroines reiterate the ideals of first-wave feminism in the way that 
these texts are concerned with recreating female identity and displaying women as active 
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agents who are interested in and intend to shape their own futures based on personal 
principle.  
The marriage plots of the Victorian period are replete with heroines who 
acknowledge and feel oppressed by the cultural standards which dictate their life options, 
and although these narratives critique Victorian marriage practices while attentively, and, 
at times, sympathetically incorporating feminist concerns, many of these narratives only 
scratch the surface of the women’s rights issues that later saturate New Woman novels at 
the turn of the century. Anthony Trollope’s Can You Forgive Her? (1864/1865) for 
example, serves as one of these Victorian texts that is both fueled by marriage plots and 
also attentive to the female characters’ dilemmas generated by the process of marriage. 
The text highlights Alice Vavasor’s question—“What should a woman do with her 
life?”—as the female predicament that drives Alice’s narrative and the narratives of the 
other female characters in the text. (Trollope 110). Alice, much like Herminia and Opalia, 
feels that there is “something to be done” beyond marriage (110). Although Alice is 
pressured to secure a respectable marriage, she constantly searches for purpose in her life 
and spends years contemplating whom she should marry, while her cousin Glencora is 
coerced into accepting a loveless marriage because it will grant her social mobility. 
Alice’s questioning of a woman’s position and direction in life serves as a thematic 
element that weaves into the subplots of Glencora, Kate Vavasor, and Arabella Greenow, 
and this critique of female agency with regard to marital issues is one that resonates in 
many other Victorian novels reiterating the significance of marriage in the lives of 
women and signaling women’s growing discontent with the traditions of the Victorian 
marriage market. 
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 Can You Forgive Her? dabbles in some liberal feminist ideals through Alice’s 
propensity to challenge marriage practices and Victorian domestic ideology, and like the 
general ideology of first-wave feminism, the text emphasizes the importance of a 
companionate marriage founded on mutual love and suggests that  women’s active 
involvement in the marriage process plays an important role in ensuring this ideal 
marriage. The bulk of Alice’s narrative, much like the narratives of Lucilla Marjoribanks 
in Margaret Oliphant’s Miss Marjoribanks (1866) or Perdita Winstanley in Eliza Linton’s 
The Rebel of the Family (1880), is shaped by her pre-marriage introspection—by a 
necessary period of private contemplation and public dilemmas which lead her to chose 
the right husband. Charles Dickens’s Hard Times (1854) and George Eliot’s 
Middlemarch (1871-72) also examine the dynamics of ideal femininity and a woman’s 
purpose in life to the extent that these texts emphasize the unfavorable marital outcomes 
that materialize as a result of the heroine’s misguided decision and disregard for her own 
desires. For example, in Hard Times, when Mr. Gradgrind presents Louisa Gradgrind 
with Mr. Bounderby’s marriage proposal, she tells her father that she has never even 
considered the idea that her “aspirations and affections” would play any role in shaping 
her future (Dickens 98). Surprised by her father’s query as to if she had “entertained in 
secret any other proposal,” Louisa replies, “what other proposal can have been made to 
me? Whom have I seen? Where have I been? What are my heart’s experiences? (97). 
Louisa admits that she has been denied the opportunity to play an active role in her own 
life and therefore resigns herself to what she knows best: duty, submission, and “needed 
to assert agency in the same manner real-life women did: they needed to experience a 
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transformation of consciousness to realize their condition, articulate their condition 
through spoken word sacrifice29.    
Middlemarch’s heroine Dorothea Brooke chooses to marry Mr. Casaubon because 
she believes that her marriage to this man will illuminate her life. She reasons, “what 
lamp was there but knowledge? Surely learned men kept the only oil; and who was more 
learned than Mr. Casaubon?” (Eliot 80). Fueled by her desire for knowledge and by her 
yearning for a life filled “with action at once rational and ardent,” Dorothea is soon 
disappointed when she realizes “her feeling of desolation was the fault of her own 
spiritual poverty” (180). Much like Louisa, Dorothea realizes that her “brief narrow 
experience of her girlhood” (180) has not prepared her for “the monotonous light of an 
alien world” (181). Although Dorothea reasons that she “had married the man of her 
choice” and had “the advantage over most girls” in “that she had contemplated her 
marriage chiefly as the beginning of new duties,”  Middlemarch emphasizes that 
Dorothea’s life decisions were “the mixed result of young and noble impulses struggling 
amidst the conditions of an imperfect social state” (784). In Dorothea’s second marriage 
to Will Ladislaw, she finally finds a life “filled with emotion” and the “beneficent 
activity” (782) that was missing in her marriage to Mr. Casaubon, but this second, 
companionate union is also depicted as a sacrifice of Dorothea’s selfhood—as a failure to 
generate the social change that she envisioned. The narrator explains, “Many who knew 
                                                 
29
 Louisa’s decision to marry Mr. Bounderby is also motivated by her brother Tom. Tom encourages Louisa 
to accept the proposal because it would be a “splendid thing” for him if they “might be so much oftener 
together” (Dickens 92, 91).  Tom also suggests to Louisa that she should marry Mr. Bounderby because it 
would grant Tom a bit more freedom in his working environment. Tom’s influence over Louisa reiterates 
her sense of duty and sacrifice: she is willing to enter an unfulfilling marriage in order to benefit her 
brother. 
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her, thought it a pity that so substantive and rare a creature should have been absorbed 
into the life of another, and be only known in certain circles as a wife and mother” (783).  
In this brief examination of these two Victorian heroines and their confrontations 
with the limits of choice with regard to marriage, we can notice two contrasting 
trajectories. Louisa agrees to marry Mr. Bounderby because it seems to be the only 
logical choice: she has not cultivated any personal desires that would be subjugated by 
marriage. On the other hand, Dorothea does aspire to reform “conventional life,” but she 
relinquishes her aspirations twice and eventually settles for the “hidden life” of a woman 
as prescribed by society through conventional marriage (Eliot 785). Thus, as Laurie 
Langbauer discusses in Women and Romance: The Consolations of Gender in the English 
Novel, “Dorothea’s characterization engages our feminist sympathies” because she 
possesses a nontraditional vision—one that challenges the feminine position and 
longingly gazes toward the masculine sphere (227). As Langbauer suggests, Dorothea is 
“torn between the desire to be different from her world and her recognition of the 
impossibility of being so,” yet “she accepts her ordinariness” (227). Through the 
character of Dorothea, Eliot displays “the limits of the possibilities for directly willed 
feminist change” (Langbauer 231).  
As Jeanie Thomas aptly observes, “Middlemarch makes no claim to be a sacred 
text for a new feminist ideology” (394); instead, by focusing on women’s “evolving 
understanding of limitation,” (392) Victorian texts such as Middlemarch begin to shape a 
vision of how the possibility of real feminist change is hindered by a cultural 
commitment to ideal womanhood—by the compulsion to maintain an image of the 
selfless and pure angel. The New Woman heroine is still undoubtedly plagued by the 
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sexual stereotypes that the Victorian heroine begins to recognize and challenge, but if we 
trace the fictional portrayal of feminist ideals from the traditional marriage plot to that of 
a New Woman heroine like Herminia or Opalia, we find that not only do New Woman 
narratives contain aspects that seek to position women as active agents in shaping their 
destinies, but that New Woman heroines personally tailor destinies which could 
potentially exist outside the constraints of traditional marriage.  Many New Woman 
heroines begin to reject the “conventional life” that subsumes Dorothea. The New 
Woman heroine cultivates a new tradition wherein the mere “understanding of 
limitations” (Thomas 392) is simply not enough. She devises experiments in order to 
overthrow such restrictions—to transcend the “ordinariness” of a woman’s lot in life; she 
privileges her personal convictions and aspirations in an effort to eradicate the social 
restrictions that bind her.  
Much like the ideology of first-wave feminism, neither The Woman Who Did or 
The Woman Who Wouldn’t completely abandons the prescribed gender roles associated 
with “natural” femininity and with the traditional marriage plot of the Victorian period, 
but in comparison with earlier texts, these New Woman novels forcefully anticipate the 
new sexual politics that will accompany a new romantic ethos. Joseph A. Boone explains 
that “a definition of marriage as the union of fundamentally opposite, rather than simply 
different, sexual beings who need each other’s ‘halves’ for ‘completion’ has infiltrated 
nearly all traditional literary representations of romantic love” (“Modernist” 375). He 
suggests that “the effect of such dichotomization of the sexes in life, as in fiction, has 
been to uphold as “natural” mutually exclusive definitions of masculinity and femininity 
that inevitably fall into a hierarchical pattern of dominance and subordination supporting 
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patriarchal values” (“Modernist” 375). The Victorian courtship plot emphasizes that 
regardless of their attempts, women cannot resist what is most “natural,”—the eventual 
submission to male authority.  In Can You Forgive Her?, Alice’s rejection or challenge of 
traditional femininity comes to an end in marriage; she overcomes what the text portrays 
as momentary confusion and reasserts her natural temperament. In the classic Victorian 
marriage plot, Boone explains, “the idealized outcome in marriage may be attained or 
deferred, celebrated or abused,” but the trajectories of these texts “almost always move 
toward a final stasis that…cuts short any serious or prolonged questioning of the social 
ethos of marriage underlying the fictional construct” (“Modernist” 376). As a result, 
Boone argues, such texts “help sustain the reader’s belief in the social mythos, or fiction, 
of an analogously ordered system governing social reality and cultural convention”; they 
present “the illusion of the finality of the end”—social and cultural stability in the “closed 
‘truth’ of the marital ideal” (“Modernist” 376). Unlike the traditional courtship plots of 
the nineteenth century, which, as I have suggested, evaluate and criticize marital practices 
and gender stereotypes to some extent, The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Wouldn’t, 
and The Woman Who Didn’t challenge the illusion of marriage as inevitable or definitive 
and open the conversation to account for the contingent aspects of relationships.  
The polemical nature of these texts and their indignant heroines alienated first-
wave feminists, and it is not surprising that present-day feminist critics are equally 
irritated by Herminia’s resentful feminist attitude and overemphasized purity. In 1895, 
Fawcett writes of Herminia, “She converses in set speeches several pages in length, and 
she repeats with tiresome iteration on every alternate page or so, that she is the one 
woman in the whole world who is really free” (627). Fawcett concludes, “There is indeed 
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nothing human about her,” and this opinion has endured as a valid conception of 
Herminia, especially in comparison with the aforementioned heroines who are indeed 
multifaceted characters of the realist tradition (629). However, just as The Woman Who 
Did, The Woman Who Wouldn’t, and The Woman Who Didn’t dispute the inevitability of 
the marital ideal, these texts also challenge the literary tradition of courtship plot. The 
Victorian heroine of Trollope or Eliot may be more complex and therefore more “human” 
by both late-nineteenth century and present-day literary standards, yet, as I previously 
discussed, their narratives serve the purpose of offering “insight into the restrictions on 
women’s development and the complex social and psychological dynamics that maintain 
those restrictions” (Thomas 393-394). Conversely, The Woman Who Did, The Woman 
Who Wouldn’t, and The Woman Who Didn’t function as propaganda tools in the marriage 
debate. They depict immediate feminist change and new female identities rather than 
alluding to the necessity of such transformations. Despite their unbelievable heroines and 
narrative inadequacies, these polemical New Woman novels were successful in 
publicizing and popularizing the very real issues stifled by the structure and ideology of 
the traditional social system in place. As Fawcett contends The Woman Who Did, The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t, and The Woman Who Didn’t do not uphold the literary tradition 
of realism that readers appreciated and expected; they did not provide readers with the 
“human” heroines of the great Victorian novel. However, the popular narratives of these 
newly formulated (unpolished), polemical heroines offered readers a new approach to the 
social and cultural problems of their predecessors by confronting a society that was 
staunchly resistant to change and by challenging a feminist ideology that was moving 
toward change much too timidly.  
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In The Woman Who Did, the narrative is shaped by Herminia’s drawn-out 
questioning of and resistance to marriage, and although many scholars have read 
Herminia’s continual resistance as a means for Allen to fictionalize his evolutionary and 
hedonistic theories, I contend that we can also see Herminia’s desire to restructure 
romantic practices as a productive confrontation with first-wave feminism. Victorian 
feminists campaigned for marriage reform on the basis of liberal principles. In “Marriage: 
As It Was, As It Is, and As It Should Be” (1882), Annie Besant, woman’s rights activist, 
freethinker, socialist, and Theosophist, draws on Jean Jacques Rousseau’s doctrine of The 
Rights of Man (1789) in order to compel her audience to realize how this “accepted 
doctrine” of universal rights excludes women (392)30. She reiterates the common 
nineteenth-century feminist standpoint by pointing out how society endorses “sexual” 
rights, not “human rights” insomuch as “they are only rights of man, in the exclusive 
sense of the word” (392). Thus, in an effort to establish that “women, as well as men, ‘are 
born and remain free and equal in rights,’” feminist campaigners like Besant exposed 
how marriage laws violated the human rights of women (392). She quotes Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (9th ed, bk. I, pg.129) in order to reiterate “that 
the first of the ‘absolute rights of every Englishman’ is ‘the legal and uninterrupted 
enjoyment of his life, his body, his health, and his reputation’” (396).  “The second 
right,” Besant continues, “is personal liberty” (“Marriage” 396). First wave feminists 
embraced these tenets of classical liberalism to the extent that these doctrines aided in 
their campaign for parliamentary reform, and they focused their attention on how the 
state was responsible for the oppression of women.  
                                                 
30Besant echoes Mary Wollstonecraft’s critique of Rousseau’s paternalistic theories. See pages 157 and 
158. 
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The feminist reaction to Herminia’s proclamation of personal liberty, though, 
reveals the limits of first-wave feminism—an ideology which was still deeply immersed 
in the patriarchal culture of the angel. Although feminists concentrated on the 
establishment of women’s legal and personal rights within marriage, Herminia’s idea of 
personal liberty, because it rejects patriarchal standards of femininity and the institution 
of marriage, is invalid and unacceptable. Herminia’s concept of freedom that she 
describes to Alan transgresses the oppressive social and cultural conventions unaltered by 
the political gains of the feminist movement. In an effort to justify her anti-marriage 
stance to Alan, Herminia explains, “If I love a man at all, I must love him on terms of 
perfect freedom. I can’t bind myself down to live with him to my shame one day longer 
than I love him; or to love him at all if I find him unworthy of my purest love, or unable 
to retain it; or if I discover some other more fit to be loved by me” (Allen 74). In theory, 
Herminia reiterates the liberalist view that an individual deserves “uninterrupted 
enjoyment” in life, and as Herminia points out, in order to ensure such a life, an 
individual may feel the need to make provisions for the unforeseen in romance.  
For Herminia, marriage “compels” a woman to “promise what no human heart 
can be sure of performing,” to feel what one might not always feel (Allen 74).  Thus, 
Herminia’s approach is not only radical because of the way she links freedom with moral 
autonomy but also because she blatantly discredits the institution of marriage based on 
the logic that it cannot guarantee the “happily ever-after.” Herminia suggests that the 
trajectory of love is uncertain and that each individual’s experience varies; true liberty 
includes one’s right to make provisions for an unpredictable future.  Here, Herminia’s 
argument in support of free union over marriage is unsettling because she challenges the 
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nineteenth-century construct of ideal romantic love. As Joseph Boone explains, the 
middle class supported the image of the companionate marriage as “not only an 
imaginative but also a practical necessity”; romantic companionate marriages became 
“intrinsic to personal and societal well-being alike” (“Modernist” 375). Fundamental to 
this image of the harmonious romantic union was the popular belief in love (and therefore 
also marriage) as the fulfillment of one’s destiny: man and woman, once incomplete 
halves, now complete each other forever. Albeit not the tenderest way to convince Alan 
of her love and commitment to him, Herminia’s approach is sensible in that she is wary 
of love as it has been culturally constructed. She remains honest with herself and with 
Alan, and she does not allow romantic idealism to cloud her judgment.  
Through its attack on marriage, The Woman Who Did guides the courtship plot 
into unknown territory and emphasizes the very contingencies that the traditional 
romance novel would dissolve in marriage. The text makes an argument that marriage is 
not the closure that unites two “fundamentally opposite, rather than simply different, 
sexual beings” (Boone “Modernist” 375) and even goes further to question the 
permanence and validity of the companionate model itself. Herminia realizes that one day 
she may find another “very dear” friend and create another “kind of friendship that nature 
makes possible” with another man, and, by doing so, she refutes the idealized romantic 
trajectory and discourse that structured public life (Allen 72). The text’s attack on 
marriage coupled with its proclamation of a liberal romantic ethos alarmed many critics, 
who, by 1895, had definitely encountered a host of anti-marriage and marriage-reform 
literature. Unlike its precursors, The Woman Who Did pushed the boundaries in “the 
crusade against marriage” (Oliphant “Anti-Marriage” 144). Oliphant warns the public 
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about the underlying purpose of this anti-marriage message:  “It is to displace love 
altogether, that faithful union of Two upon which pure and progressive society is built, 
which is expressed not in one action but in a hundred, which means the perfect fellowship 
of joy and sorrow, of interests and hopes, of mutual help, support, and consolation, which 
is more certainly to be obtained in marriage than in any other connection or 
companionship on earth” (“Anti-Marriage” 144). 
Oliphant’s contention, that the institution of marriage is responsible for creating 
and maintaining a “pure and progressive society,” was a popular argument in many anti-
free love publications. For example, Bisland contends that the “foundation stone” of 
monogamous marriage is the very institution that has enabled women to tame “the 
sensual dominant brute”—the savage, uncivilized man of the past (754). Chapman, who 
supported marital reform but condemned “the practical” and “the theoretical rejectors of 
marriage,” writes, “What blindness does it appear not to see that, in the actual state of 
society, to throw discredit upon marriage is not to progress, but to relapse, by leaps and 
bounds, into bygone levels of civilizations” (122). According to Chapman, free love is 
not a “progressive” practice but a “barbaric” reversion—a degenerative force with the 
potential to “let loose the forces of disorder” and incite a moral apocalypse (122-123).  
To such critics, the only romantic option, regardless of an individual’s outlook, was legal 
marriage. Legal marriage would ensure the betterment and moral purity of society.  Free 
unions, on the other hand, had a dangerous potential to dissolve the timeless values of 
romantic attachments and to obliterate the human bonds of love, understanding, and 
companionship.  
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Although many staunch marriage supporters portrayed free love as a means to 
transform individuals into erotomaniacal, selfish, savages, the faction of feminists who 
promoted free love maintained that free unions would facilitate the development of a 
purer, just, and advanced society. Jeffreys reminds modern readers that although “the 
words ‘free love’ are likely to conjure up an image of casual promiscuity,” some first-
wave feminists chose free love “because it could give them more power to control access 
to their own bodies” (Spinster 43).  For example, in “Women of the Future” published in 
1899 in Westminster Review, Arabella Dennehy describes marriage as “a mere piece of 
social mechanism for subjugating women,” and opts for free union because it would grant 
“each sex an equal voice, and make love the only law regulating the relationship between 
the sexes” (43). She argues that “the franchise is really of secondary consequence as 
compared with individual freedom,” and she asserts, “until it is recognized that a woman 
has moral rights as extensive as those of man, the mere enlargement of legal rights will 
be of little value” (43). For individuals like Dennehy, it was imperative that women’s 
rights activists strive to transform women’s lives beyond the political spectrum, and free 
love unions offered some women a way to reconceptualize individual rights in this 
manner. Dennehy’s approach is similar to that of Mona Caird, who also anticipates that 
“if the progress of society gradually raises women to independence . . . we shall have a 
totally different kind of people to deal with from the men and women today” (Morality 
142).  Much like other feminists who supported the free love tradition, Caird envisions a 
future of monogamous unions based on “internal” or personal law and “social sentiment” 
instead of the “artificial or legal tie” of the State (Morality 125). Caird’s goal in 
advocating a new ideal of free unions is to suggest that “the principle of liberty” is 
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without a “rational limit” (Morality 124). She argues that couples who create a “real 
bond” based on “affection and friendship” will foster “a higher form of society, a higher 
level of morality, and, above all, a more progressive tendency,” and that “it is probable 
that unions may exist outside the law but inside society” (Morality 125). 
Despite the negative publicity that it received, nineteenth-century feminist free-
love philosophy was rooted in the very values of progress and morality that critics 
claimed were threatened by the practice and ideas of free love.  The basis of free-love 
ideology, as demonstrated by the aforementioned publications as well as by The Woman 
Who Did, offered society a way to reexamine the interrelationship between marriage and 
personal liberty, and it did so by developing new avenues of woman-centered thought and 
feminist potential. As much as Caird argues against marriage practices, she allows that 
her vision of unrestricted liberty with regard to free unions is in a nascent state. In 
“Marriage,” published Westminster Review in 1888, Caird writes, “First of all we must 
set up an ideal, undismayed by what will seem its Utopian impossibility. Every good 
thing that we enjoy to-day was once the dream of a ‘crazy enthusiast’ mad enough to 
believe in the power of ideas and in the power of man to have things as he wills” (196). 
The radical scenarios devised in many New Woman texts seem to echo Caird’s 
assertion—that the exploration of options that society may label impractical or even 
ridiculous may, after some trial and error, prove to be a productive task.  
The Woman Who Did participates in this forward-looking dialogue by presenting 
radical romantic possibilities for Herminia’s future, and in doing so, the text privileges 
personal sovereignty over the dominant monolithic concept of love. Herminia does not 
accept the romantic outlook of the masses; instead, she develops an individualized 
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“philosophy”—one that best suits her life and her purposes (Allen 60). At all costs, 
Herminia defends her right to be true to herself; thus, she creates and manages the terms 
of her relationship with Alan. Herminia is self-reliant and is willing to defy cultural 
conventions for the sake of her convictions. In theory, Herminia reiterates many of the 
liberal arguments of first-wave feminism; she wants to prove that women are self-
sufficient, free-thinking individuals. Levine reminds us that “the common view within the 
movement had been to encourage choice among women,” and, after all, Herminia’s 
message to Alan and to readers alike is that she has the right to formulate options and 
exercise her personal choices (“So Few Prizes” 172). Yet the diverse feminist reactions to 
The Woman Who intertexts show how first-wave feminists devised a concept of freedom 
limited by angelic parameters.  Herminia propagandizes the right to sexual autonomy and 
endorses the right to sexual freedom, but she also upholds the monogamous values 
promoted by free-love feminists and traditionalists alike. Herminia never exercises her 
free-love right to choose another partner; even after Alan’s death, she remains single and 
never fully asserts the personal liberty that she claims to have.  Her radical principles 
exist as, to borrow from Caird, “the dream of a ‘crazy enthusiast’” (“Marriage” 126); 
however, for most feminist critics, Herminia’s individual credo is too extreme and 
inharmonious with the collective feminine ideal of nineteenth-century feminism. First-
wave feminists encouraged and supported liberty for women to the extent that 
emancipation resulted from “womanly”—not individual—choices, and because of the 
theoretical free-love premise of the novel, readers were unable to view the novel as the 
propaganda tool that it was. 
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The reviews of The Woman Who Did and the series of marriage-debate articles 
published in America in The Conservator in 1895 illustrate the tension between 
proclaimed liberal feminist ideology and a social reality heavily governed by traditional 
cultural conventions. In her review, Charlotte L. Abbey reiterates the feminist stance on 
women’s liberty and marriage and calls readers’ attention to how women have gained 
some basic human rights in that they own their bodies and manage the direction of their 
lives.  Abbey explains, 
 
At a time when it is generally recognized as introducing the institution of 
marriage, men obtained possession of women by force, and established the 
system in order to hold those whom they called their own. In the course of 
evolution, however, our conceptions of right have become so modified 
that women have now the privilege of choosing whether they will marry or 
not marry. (36) 
 
Thus, much like many of the feminist reviewers of the novel, Abbey maintains that the 
next course of action is to “reform the marriage contract,” not to, as Allen’s novel 
suggests, sanction free love as an alternative model (37). Abbey echoes other feminist 
theories in proclaiming that “evolution demands the marriage sacrament” (37). She 
equates free love with “promiscuous intercourse” and argues that such immoral behavior 
“would not be in the interest of health and progress” and would not aid in the protection 
of the “family relations” (37).  Abbey’s position in the marriage debate, like that of many 
first-wave feminists, is shaped by the very theories responsible for women’s oppression. 
However, her commitment to social eugenics and uncompromising moral standards is, 
like that of many of her contemporaries, coupled with liberal principles that suggest 
radical feminist potential.  She writes, “woman must own her own body as much in 
marriage as out of it” (37), but first, she establishes that “the path to true freedom is only 
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through the subordination of the animal self in man and its transmutation into the human” 
(37). Thus, a woman’s right to control her own body is dictated by the very act of 
denying that she has a body. For feminists, the liberal principle of bodily ownership is 
reserved for good women who make good choices, for angels who “see beyond the 
physical and the sensuous to the eternal” (38).  In an age when contraception was most 
uncertain and women were without access to sexual education, free-love philosophy—
although informed by liberal principles and armed with feminist potential—was a risky 
venture. As illustrated by The Woman Who Did, free love generated tragic social and 
personal consequences; thus, for the majority of first-wave feminists, the most appealing 
method for securing women’s bodily rights was through strict adherence to traditional 
modes of feminine purity and sexuality.  
Thus, it is not surprising that the feminist reaction to The Woman Who Didn’t and 
The Woman Who Wouldn’t was both less prevalent and less severe than the outcry against 
The Woman Who Did. Like Herminia, Eurydice and Opalia defy traditional feminine 
stereotypes, but unlike Herminia, these two heroines, regardless of their doubts about 
marriage practices, ultimately make good “womanly” choices that maintain the cultural 
standards of femininity. Furthermore, neither Eurydice nor Opalia challenges marriage 
customs to the extent that either denies its permanence or sanctity; thus, both heroines 
reiterate a faith in the dominant romantic ethos and in the companionate-model ideal. In 
comparison to the reviews of The Woman Who Did, the critical reception of The Woman 
Who Didn’t and The Woman Who Wouldn’t suggests that these female-authored New 
Woman texts hardly threatened the institution of marriage or compromised the image of 
the angel. For feminists and traditionalists alike, The Woman Who Didn’t and The 
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Woman Who Wouldn’t were considerably safer responses to a lethal parent text, and these 
reactions indicate the complex nature of the larger cultural debate that surrounded the 
first-wave feminist movement and the figure of the New Woman. 
Because of the efforts of scholars like Shoshana Milgram Knapp and Melisa 
Brittain, present-day feminists recognize the work of Victoria Cross as feminist literature. 
However, Knapp argues that in 1895 The Woman Who Didn’t was “misleadingly 
marketed” alongside of The Woman Who Did, and reviewers of the novel “uniformly 
miss the point” and its psychological or ethical engagement with feminism 
(“Revolutionary” 9). In response to Knapp’s claim, Brittain aptly points out, and I agree, 
that it is more productive to examine the implications of Cross’s reviews than to reiterate 
how Cross’s critics “misunderstood the writer’s intentions” (76-77). Brittain suggests that 
her approach enables “feminists studying the 1890s New Woman” to “examine the forms 
of social production particular texts both supported and challenged” (79). Through her 
analysis of imperialism and interracial marriage in Cross’s Anna Lombard (1901), 
Brittain emphasizes how “particular representations of the New Woman often 
simultaneously challenged and reinstated hegemonic ideologies of white middle-class 
femininity” (79). Herminia, Eurydice, and Opalia serve as such models—liminal heroines 
who figure as both New and Old Women—but in the context of the marriage debate and 
in the afterglow of Herminia’s “unwomanly” individualism, we can read the reception of 
The Woman Who Didn’t and The Woman Who Wouldn’t as a testament to the public’s 
investment in marriage and in the angel. 
Even if the public, as Knapp argues, overlooked the feminist dimensions of The 
Woman Who Didn’t, the handful of underdeveloped reviews do suggest that Cross’s 
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bestseller did not alarm conservative critics or outrage feminists.  As indicated by The 
Critic in 1896, readers were a bit baffled by the “weird happenings in the story” but were 
ultimately reassured by its “moral lesson,” which reiterated the sanctity of marriage and 
the feminine ideal: “the woman (who did not) professes herself, as she is expected to do, 
satisfied with the path of duty” (56). Eurydice holds that marriage is “a glorious 
institution” and, despite her developing friendship with Evelyn, she keeps her 
commitment to her unfaithful husband (Cross 24). Certainly readers would have 
identified Eurydice’s independence, eloquence, and latchkey as signs of her New 
Womanhood, but traditionalists were satisfied by what they perceived as the restoration 
of Victorian femininity. Eurydice resists the temptation to fall, and despite some of her 
more unconventional qualities, her individualism does not displace the social and sexual 
responsibilities that society demands of “true women.” 
The scanty reviews of The Woman Who Didn’t suggest that the novel’s 
endorsement of marriage and emphasis on true womanhood pacified conservative critics. 
The feminist critical response to the novel was also nondescript because The Woman Who 
Didn’t fictionalized the philosophy of first-wave feminism—the development of new 
femininity, of women’s liberty and individualism, articulated through traditional feminine 
ideals of self-sacrifice and duty. As I previously discussed, feminists were appalled by 
The Woman Who Did because Herminia’s individual choices compromised her sexual 
purity and challenged the dominant romantic ideal. Yet we find that all three texts feature 
heroines who are autonomous and who emphasize the importance of making decisions 
based on personal principles, not cultural standards.  Like Herminia, Eurydice is not 
concerned with generalized morality or with society’s opinion. She justifies her decision 
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to remain married in the same way that Herminia justifies her decision to refuse marriage. 
Eurydice explains to Evelyn, “I don’t live for the world’s sympathy, I live for my own 
duty. To be true to myself is my principle and the only guide I have” (Cross 23). By 
framing Eurydice’s commitment to her position as a married woman as an individualized 
choice rather than a cultural mandate, the text idealizes passivity when it is actively 
chosen by the free-thinking New Woman. In other words, self-sacrifice and purity—two 
hallmarks of the passive Victorian heroine—are the very characteristics that ensure 
Eurydice’s personal liberty. Eurydice does not wish to abandon the patriarchal values that 
are associated with her position as woman and wife; instead, she internalizes these 
oppressive standards and clings to them as personal duties. Feminists accepted The 
Woman Who Didn’t because Eurydice represented what Rita Krandis refers to as the 
“ideal heroine” of the feminist novel at the turn of the century: “a composite of a 
traditional type and an enlightened, rebellious nonconformist, a feminist” (89). As 
Krandis explains, “the true feminist heroine has experienced gender-based oppression,” 
sees “her relation to systematic sexism,” and “gains a new subjectivity, one that makes 
her own oppression apparent to her” (90).  Krandis also reminds us that this new feminist 
heroine has “severed some (although not necessarily all) attachments to Victorian 
patriarchal valuations of women” (90).  
It seems then that Herminia would fit Krandis’s description of a new feminist 
heroine, yet, as I have previously discussed, many reviews claimed that Herminia 
damaged the feminist cause. Thus, as much as the ideal heroine was a liminal figure, a 
conglomeration of the eternal feminine and the liberated New Woman, she was, first and 
foremost, an angel. Such a heroine could, as Eurydice does, recognize her subjugated 
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position and freely share her opinions and time with the opposite sex, but the heroine of 
the first-wave feminist tradition was not ready to sever her attachment to Victorian sexual 
politics and conventional romantic ideology. Like Eurydice, she can only temporarily 
dream of such things. Although she is tempted to leave her bleak marriage in hopes of 
finding “the most satisfying sphere in which two love-inspired minds can move,” 
Eurydice realizes that this action would severely compromise her integrity (Cross 24). 
She is a heroine who illustrates the liberal values that fueled the woman’s movement: 
physical integrity, individuality, and the freedom to make decisions.  Eurydice vocalizes 
her personal credo to Evelyn—“Always to do that which I consider right and honourable, 
independent of loss or gain, or praise or condemnation”—and thus portrays herself as 
self-reliant (23)31. Eurydice also maintains that she is independent, unaffected by the 
dominant cultural and social codes that govern most women. She explains, “Others may 
say what they please, for their opinion I care not at all, but my own good opinion I must 
have. I could not live without it” (23).  Much like Herminia, Eurydice argues that she 
must “be true” to herself at all costs, yet the feminist reaction to each of these heroines 
reveals the way in which first-wave feminism promoted liberal values to the extent that 
women’s choices reflected proper moral and sexual behavior.  
In a response to Dr. Abbey’s review of The Woman Who Did, E.C. Walker 
distinguishes himself as a critic who recognizes the arbitrariness of women’s freedom, 
like that presented through Eurydice’s example. Walker writes,  
 
                                                 
31
 In Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre (1847), Jane offers a similar response to Rochester: “I care for myself. 
The more solitary, the more friendless, the more unsustained I am, the more I will respect myself. I will 
keep the law given by God; sanctioned by man…Laws and principles are not for the times when there is no 
temptation: they are for such moments as this, when body and soul rise in mutiny against their rigour; 
stringent are they; inviolate they shall be” (270). 
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When Dr. Abbey declares that ‘women have now the privilege of choosing 
whether they will marry or not marry,’ she apparently forgets that that 
privilege—as all other privileges—is hedged about with conditions. If a 
woman chooses to be a lover or a mother without marrying she quickly 
discovers that this asserted freedom of choice is a ghastly mockery. Being 
the mother of the most healthy and bright children outside of marriage, she 
is a pariah; being the mother of diseased and stupid children within 
marriage, she is a virtuous woman, whom other women teach their 
children to respect. She is free to choose only the part in life that her 
neighbors think that she ought to choose. Such freedom is merely the 
counterfeit of real liberty. (73) 
 
In his rebuttal of Abbey’s statement, Walker offers an accurate representation of a 
woman’s position in society should she assert her right to act as Herminia does. Just as 
none of the New Woman heroines is free to choose, in the sense that her decisions could 
potentially grant her comfort and happiness, women found that the costs of asserting 
freedom beyond what was socially acceptable tended to negate the very contentment that 
liberty should provide.  
 What Walker notices about the social and cultural limitations of women’s 
freedom also manifests itself in the critical reception of The Woman Who intertexts and in 
their contributions to the ongoing marriage debate. In The Woman Who Didn’t, Eurydice 
is free to choose what is socially permissible, and, therefore, as Walker points out, her 
freedom is “the counterfeit of real liberty” (73). Nevertheless, Eurydice prevails as an 
ideal heroine—a New Woman who chooses to embrace her inner angel. Herminia, on the 
other hand, tests the limits of a woman’s privilege of choice and asserts “real liberty” in 
making bold, truly individual choices about sexuality, marriage, romantic ideology, and 
maternity. Just as Herminia’s resolve is rejected by her peers and by her daughter, her 
example is condemned by feminists and conservatives alike. As Walker explains, 
women’s decisions regarding sexual matters were hardly free choices, and the intertextual 
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conversation provoked by Allen, Cross, and Cleeve reveal how society was hesitant to 
attack the restrictive conditions of women’s freedom when they included issues 
pertaining to sexual liberty. As Oliphant explains, referring to the discussion of sexual 
matters in literature, such a subject “has been proved to be the most damaging in the 
world as a subject for thought and for the exercise of the imagination” (“Anti-Marriage” 
145).  
 The Woman Who Did and The Woman Who Didn’t enlarge the marriage debate by 
challenging the authenticity of first-wave feminist liberal values beyond the realm of 
what society considered proper choices for women. The reaction to these texts illustrates 
how first-wave feminism devised a concept of liberty that was fashioned by a sexual 
double standard; there exists a collective cultural understanding that a woman’s freedom 
to choose translates into a woman’s right to choose only what is morally acceptable. 
Cleeve’s The Woman Who Wouldn’t further examines the illusory nature of women’s 
liberty and hastily concludes by suggesting that in order for women to find peace in 
marriage and fulfill their Godly duties as “the keeper of man’s soul,” they must relinquish 
their newfangled ideas and aspirations of emancipation (217). However, throughout the 
majority of the text, Opalia challenges the parameters of personal liberty by asserting her 
right to opt out of sexual activity with her husband. Opalia’s experiment to alter existing 
marital practices, much like Herminia’s, coincides with what Levine identifies as a major 
issue in the women’s movement: “the feminist accent on participation and decision” (“So 
Few Prizes” 159). Levine cites the efforts of feminist women who focused their attention 
on expanding women’s freedom to include “choice about the form of marriage,” and she 
argues that “in essence, such women were enacting a formative and critical change in 
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women’s participation in marriage” (159). In The Woman Who Wouldn’t,  Opalia 
eventually conforms to traditional marital sexual practices and reasserts her “natural” 
feminine position as purifier of man’s soul, but prior to this conventional narrative 
closure, the text explores liberal feminist ideas that, unlike Opalia’s “degradation” and 
“suffering” are not subsumed by the “compensating joy” of maternity (Cleeve 225).   
 As much as I have examined how these three intertextual literary representations 
of the New Woman illustrate the conglomeration of ideas and discourses that constructed 
the woman’s movement at the turn of the century, I have also, for organizational 
purposes, attempted to distinguish between each of these links to some extent. Therefore, 
in Chapter 1, I examined the ways in which these 1895 novels functioned in connection 
to the social-purity movement, and thus far in this chapter, I have positioned these texts 
in the liberal feminist arguments of the marriage debate. However, all along, I have also 
been analyzing the mounting tension between old standards of Victorian respectability 
and morality idealized by the image of the angel and new visions of active, independent 
femininity captured by the phenomenon of the New Woman. The marriage debate 
provided an arena for all of these elements to commingle and disperse, and specifically 
The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Didn’t, and The Woman Who Wouldn’t sparked a 
productive intertextual dialogue through the confrontation of social-purity sexual politics 
and liberal feminist ideas. Previously, I have examined the ways in which The Woman 
Who Wouldn’t highlights many social-purity feminist ideals through Opalia’s “crusade 
against passion,” but at the same time, Opalia’s asserted celibacy is also indicative of the 
liberal feminist concern for the bodily integrity of married women—the human right over 
one’s own body.  
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 Opalia, like many feminists at the turn of the century, does not reject marriage 
altogether, but she is very much invested in reforming marital customs in order “build up 
the future” (Cleeve 19) where relationships are built on true love, friendship, and mutual 
respect.  Opalia takes her purifying role to extreme measures and appropriates social-
purity discourse to argue that ideal marriages are celibate ones. Opalia believes physical 
passion robs couples of their emotional and intellectual ties and degrades a wife to the 
position of her husband’s slave (13).  Girton-educated and “instinctively” “ahead in the 
fashions of the day,” Opalia predicts that women will gain freedom and power when they 
join men “to resist certain encroachments which had been instituted by men” (35). 
Opalia, who is searching for a way to generate the emancipation of women, formulates 
new ideas about sexuality and maintains that sexual activity infringes on the rights of all 
women regardless if they are single or married. Through an allusion to The Woman Who 
Did, Opalia positions her philosophy and her plan as a productive alternative to 
Herminia’s impulsive and indulgent behavior and believes that she has discovered the 
best way to transform the relations between the sexes.  She tells Alan, “I read a book 
once . . . in which the heroine would not go through the form of marriage in church for 
fear she should lose her liberty, yet every action of her life showed that her liberty had 
gone, whether she defied the conventional laws of society or not. Her life was an utter 
failure” (17).  Ironically, the driving force behind Opalia’s mission, much like 
Herminia’s, is a woman’s right to exercise sexual authority over her own body. However, 
Opalia, who is adamant that she will control the terms of her relationship and rightfully 
reject marital sexual conventions, is also convinced that  Herminia’s life was “an utter 
failure, because it was defiance, not sacrifice” (17). Opalia’s reaction to The Woman Who 
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Did further illustrates the quandary at the core of women’s movement: first-wave 
feminist politics were often contradictory. In the same way that a woman’s “right to 
choose” the terms of her marriage was hemmed in by social and moral conditions, liberal 
notions of a woman’s right to bodily autonomy were severely limited by pervasive moral 
and sexual standards and by the limited and secretive distribution of birth-control 
information. 
As Lucy Bland demonstrates throughout Banishing the Beast, first-wave feminists 
were “not easily compartmentalized” into “social purity feminists and feminists 
supporting sex reform” (xix). She argues that “many feminists moved between positions; 
on some occasions where they deemed it useful, they used the language of sex reform, on 
other occasions they deployed a language and politics of social purity” (xix). Opalia’s 
emphasis on sacrifice rather than defiance as the tool women should rely on in order to 
assert their freedom reflects the influences of social purity. Opalia is driven to purify 
marital relations through self-control and self-sacrifice, by resisting the sins of the flesh, 
by being passive rather than defiant, and by serving as a moral guardian to her future 
husband, and all of these practices are easily identifiable as social-purity customs. 
Insomuch as Opalia exhibits all the feminine attributes of an ideal heroine—the perfect 
blend of Victorian angel and inspired New Woman—she also challenges the patriarchal 
values and conventional marital practices intrinsic in maintaining this ideal image.  
Many feminists argued for a woman’s right to have control over her own body, 
and this issue became a major issue in feminist politics following the Contagious 
Diseases Acts of 1864, 1866, and 1869. After the efforts of social-purity campaigns 
fostered the repeal of the acts in 1886, feminists continued to focus their efforts on ways 
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to ensure the personal autonomy of single and married women.  They addressed issues 
related to sexual violence, divorce, economic independence, and sexual education for 
women. Bland explains that “feminists strove to construct a new and inspiring vision of 
the ideal marriage in which the sexes were equal, an equality that included female bodily 
autonomy and a sexual relationship of the highest morality” (Banishing 134). In order to 
distinguish the concept of marital sex from its associations with prostitution, unwanted 
pregnancy, and sexual exploitation and transform marriage into a moral, respectful, and 
just experience for women, many feminists, much like Opalia, looked to develop 
relationships that provided mental and spiritual, rather than physical passion. Shelia 
Jeffreys argues that “continence and psychic love” were “mainstream” responses that 
feminists used to devalue sexual activity and promote equality for women within 
marriage (Spinster 40).  In an effort to highlight a woman’s worth aside from her 
reproductive function and combat the stereotype of man as a sexual beast, feminists 
realized that they had to develop alternatives to patriarchal practices in their private, 
married lives. Today, it is doubtful that feminists would find a sexless marriage or a life 
void of sexual pleasure as viable tactics for asserting women’s rights, but in 1895, 
philosophies of celibacy and sexual continence posed many threats to prevailing 
constructions of femininity and masculinity. The Woman Who Wouldn’t explores the 
limits of these popular feminist responses.  
Feminist politics at the turn of the century were heavily infused with the ideology 
of the angel—the image of woman as a pure, moral, and asexual being, and in keeping 
with this feminine stereotype, feminists also recognized their duty to make sacrifices for 
the good of others or for the welfare of the nation. The majority of the psychic love and 
132 
 
 
continence philosophies that surfaced as a means to safeguard the bodily integrity and 
personal autonomy of women suggested that wives should designate the frequency of 
sexual activity in order to avoid unwanted advances and unwanted pregnancies. Feminists 
promoted chastity and continence in their effort to ensure the protection and individuality 
of married women, yet they did not completely reject their sexual duties to their husbands 
or assert their right to celibacy. By 1895, feminists had significantly challenged many of 
William Acton’s patriarchal theories on sex and gender, yet it is evident that Acton’s 
vision of the “perfect ideal of an English wife and mother” still permeated the feminist 
perception of womanhood (214). In the 1875 edition of Functions and Disorders of 
Reproductive Organs, which was first published in 1857, Acton describes model wives as 
“kind, considerate, self-sacrificing, and sensible”; she is “so pure-hearted as to be utterly 
ignorant of and averse to any sensual indulgence, but so unselfishly attached to the man 
she loves as to be willing to give up her own wishes and feelings for his sake” (214). 
According to Acton, good wives must overcome their “natural repugnance for 
cohabitation” and fulfill their marital duties to their husbands (214). Acton was 
unsympathetic to women’s complaints about traditional sexual customs in marriage and 
even urged women to stop “exaggerating their supposed grievances” when they are 
“called upon to fulfill the duties of wives” (214).  
In the feminist campaign for marital reform, compulsory sexual activity and the 
oppressive physical and mental conditions it created for women were actualized and not 
“supposed grievances,” and, for most feminists, marriage signaled an inevitable sexual 
self-surrender. Insomuch as feminists attempted to challenge Acton’s theories and bring a 
female point of view to the public’s perception of women’s marital experiences, the 
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general feminist attitude toward sexual activity within marriage was still heavily 
influenced by traditional concepts of Victorian femininity and wifehood. Of course, 
feminist arguments opened a conversation about the links between sexual objectification 
and the oppression of women, but even the more radical feminists that I will discuss in 
the following chapter—feminists who directly tackled the dominant philosophy of sex 
and campaigned for sexual education for women—did not openly and completely 
endorse the practice of celibacy in marriage as Opalia attempts to do. Most feminists, in 
some way or another, embraced their womanly duties and continued to promote an image 
of the chaste wife and mother, an image that, as Oppenheim states, “stood at the very 
center of middle-class social relations” (202). Frances Power Cobbe captured this 
feminist attitude in her 1882 series of lectures entitled Duties of Women, and by 1895, it 
is evident that the feminist understanding of wifedom still maintained the image of pure 
and dutiful angel. Cobbe explains, “The perfect human life, as conceived by the 
cultivated moral consciousness, is essentially a life of chastity, not, of course, of 
celibacy…but of real chastity, fidelity in marriage or a pure single life” (Duties 59). 
Cobbe contends that “the mutual promise of Conjugal Union” and “a mutual engagement 
of exclusive fidelity” of each partner are among the “natural” obligations of the formal 
marriage contract and “the one essential promise among monogamous races” (Duties 
119). Cobbe definitely believed that marriage was not the only or proper destiny of all 
women and that some women “are better suited for friendship than marriage,” but she 
adds that when a woman does chose to marry, she must accept her sexual duty (Duties 
170). Cobbe’s “course toward a free and ennobled womanhood,” in which she envisions 
a future where women are “infinitely happier,” “infinitely nobler” and “infinitely more 
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useful,” is, much like other first-wave feminist visions, founded on what Cobbe identified 
as “the eternal principles of morality”( Duties 24, 25, 26).  
Although first-wave feminists were intent on revising and reconsidering “the 
application” of these everlasting moral duties, they were not eager to confront the basis or 
validity of the moral structure itself or examine how this commitment to morality and 
duty was eternally at odds with unrestricted human rights (Cobbe Duties 26). The Woman 
Who Wouldn’t exposes the contradictions inherent in the Victorian construct of female 
sexuality and morality. Opalia inquires into the moral and social development of women 
and presents a logical case: if women are conditioned and expected to be pure, sexless, 
and extremely moral beings, then how can they justify and embrace the sexual 
requirement of marriage—what Opalia calls a “terrible sacrifice,” a surrendering of 
“everything in the world” (Cleeve 15, 14). Opalia is determined to take a stand, to be a 
wife who rejects what has been culturally constructed as the natural obligation of 
marriage—conjugal union. In devising a strategy in which she refuses the “natural” duty 
of marriage, Opalia creates an alternative “unnatural” image of femininity; she becomes a 
deviant and abnormal wife in the very act of upholding the moral standards, that, prior to 
marriage, served as the very indicators of proper femininity.  
The Victorian era stressed that women were naturally inclined to self-sacrifice, 
and first-wave feminism embraced self-sacrifice as a womanly privilege and duty, as 
women’s secret weapon which would enable them to transform and purify society. Rather 
than rejecting Acton’s idea of the model wife, feminists argued that society would greatly 
benefit if women were given the right and the opportunity to share their benevolence with 
the public sphere. In theory, Opalia supports this traditional feminine ideal, and this is 
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most apparent when Opalia identifies her dignified plan as “sacrifice” in contrast to 
Herminia’s lowly scheme of “defiance” (sacrifice being the preferred and proper means 
for women to be successful in their efforts). However adamant Opalia is to distinguish 
her life choices from that of Herminia, it is evident that Opalia also pursues an 
undeniably rebellious marital trajectory. In her commitment to marital celibacy, Opalia 
tests the limits of equality and freedom for women; she explores the possibility of 
formulating a personal life plan uninfluenced by traditional cultural practices and gender 
stereotypes. Opalia maintains that marriage does not alter a woman’s right to complete 
and uninterrupted power over her physical body and mental well-being. Her theories 
seem to develop from social-purity traditions, but even social-purity feminists like Cobbe 
acknowledged that sexual intercourse within marriage was integral to the physical health 
and moral fitness of their husbands. They believed that a conjugal relationship, as 
Oppenheim describes, helped a man to “master his own debasing instincts” and curb his 
appetite for unsanctioned sexual activity with prostitutes (202). Yet Opalia is hopeful that 
she can serve as Alan’s moral guardian solely through her extreme emotional and 
spiritual commitment. She believes that a companionate, loving marriage is not 
contingent on her sexual self-sacrifice.  
Opalia’s marital experiment is theoretically informed by social-purity ideals, but 
when put into practice, her personally-tailored marriage plans illustrate a liberal approach 
to the marriage question, one that Caird publicized in 1888.   In “Marriage,” Caird 
announced that “the ideal marriage” should be a “free” one, designating that “the idea of 
a perfectly free marriage would imply the possibility of any form of contract being 
entered into between the two persons, the State and society standing aside, and 
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recognizing the entirely private character of the transaction” (196). Caird, unlike Cobbe, 
dismisses the notion that marriage is wrought with natural obligations; it is a personal 
matter and is not subject to cultural traditions or social expectations. Caird writes, “even 
the idea of ‘duty’ ought to be excluded from the most perfect marriage,” which illustrates 
a radical vision marriage—one in which prescribed gender roles, traditional sexual 
practices, and dominant romantic ideologies are insignificant (“Marriage” 196). Caird’s 
outlook on marriage is informed by the “fundamental principle” of human rights; within 
ideal marriages “there must be a full understanding and acknowledgment of the obvious 
right of the woman to possess herself  body and soul, to give or withhold herself body 
and soul exactly as she wills” [emphasis in original] (“Marriage” 196).  
Caird’s vision for “freedom in marriage” entails many interconnected elements, 
and I will expound on some of these ideas in the following chapter,  I revisit here Caird’s 
philosophy in order, once again, to point out inconsistent and, at times, self-defeating 
approaches to women’s rights at the turn of the century. Caird, unlike the majority of 
first-wave feminists, promoted a more authentic message of women’s rights wherein a 
woman’s freedom of choice materializes beyond what Walker identified as fabricated 
liberty. The first-wave feminist movement campaigned for women’s freedom of choice 
and right to bodily integrity, but, as I have emphasized, it did so through the glorification 
of women’s natural characteristics and abilities—through the very sexist social theories 
that naturalized separate-sphere ideology. Caird admits what other feminists were wary to 
accept: the diverse and individualized manifestations of women’s liberty—female 
responses that may not coincide with “acceptable” social practices. Caird’s approach to 
marriage is notably similar to modern feminist thought because her theories were founded 
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on the understanding that feminine nature was socially constructed. Before she turns to 
the subject of marriage in her essay, Caird writes, “it is necessary to clear the ground for 
thought upon this subject by a protest against the careless use of the words ‘human 
nature,’ and especially ‘woman’s nature’” (“Marriage” 185). Recognizing that “the 
eternal law of being” is a myth, that “woman’s nature” is wrought with “innumerable 
contradictory dogmas,” Caird suggests that marriage must be free from “all social 
philosophies” (“Marriage” 185). Thus, in marriage, there need not be a self-sacrificing 
angelic wife whose freedom is dictated by a pervasive standard of moral and social duty. 
Caird’s feminist vision—that a woman’s freedom actually entails the liberty for 
her to do with her body “exactly as she wills”—exemplified the general feminist cry for 
women’s rights to bodily integrity and autonomy, but, as I have argued thus far, The 
Woman Who intertexts fictionalize and test the limits of this liberal philosophy in the 
context of the marriage debate. The Woman Who Wouldn’t entertains the possibility that 
marital love and commitment can exist without physical passion—that men can value 
women as equal companions rather than as defeated sexual objects and that women 
actually possess the right and the power to, if they will it so, “withhold” their bodies, 
even from their husbands. Opalia is determined to create and maintain a relationship 
which highlights the “true vocation of women”—to illustrate the potential for woman to 
“live out her own life without being bound by the horrible bestial ties that degraded other 
women” (Cleeve 161, 162). As much as The Woman Who Wouldn’t focuses on the 
emancipation of women and Opalia’s determination to create an alternative marital path 
for women, especially through sexual education and awareness, it ultimately undermines 
Caird’s philosophy and refigures the position of women by naturalizing their socially 
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constructed roles. Opalia’s resolve to withhold herself from her husband—to do exactly 
as she wills in marriage—cannot withstand the pressure she feels to give way to what 
society identifies as woman’s “natural” duties as wife and moral guardian. When Alan is 
finally seduced by Lady Morris, it is Opalia who is overcome with “the sense of 
failure,”—she takes responsibility for his infidelity, for his “transitory passion, a 
temptation from which it behooved her to save him” (Cleeve 195, 194). In order for 
Opalia to find happiness, she must accept the conditions of liberty. As Lady Neath 
explains to Opalia, “God has made woman the keeper of man’s soul. Till woman 
recognizes that her whole mission in life is the redemption of man’s soul either by the 
education of the sons or by the winning of her husband, there will be no peace, no 
happiness in the world” (Cleeve 217-218). Opalia’s sexual surrender suggests that 
women must settle; they can only be emancipated to the extent that they accept the social 
and natural conditions which eternally dictate female behavior.  
The Woman Who Wouldn’t, The Woman Who Did, and The Woman Who Didn’t 
merge radical and conservative feminist politics with the unpublicized issues of the 
marriage debate and weave an intricate web that showcases the circumstantial approach 
to and conditional nature of women’s freedom at the turn of the century. As much as I 
have focused on how Herminia, Eurydice, and Opalia reflect the angelic restrictions that 
constructed the ideal New Woman heroine and guided the feminist agenda, it has also 
been my purpose to show how these three texts, through intertextuality and 
interdiscursivity, aided in exposing that such parameters were at odds with liberal 
principles and counterproductive in the protection of a women’s basic human rights. As 
contributions to the marriage debate, The Woman Who intertexts hardly offer any 
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concrete direction for legal reform; instead, they imagine new marital trajectories and 
devise alternative romantic ideologies, and in doing so, they confront the limits of liberal 
thought at the turn of the century.  
These texts are shaped by the diverse voices in the marriage debate, and they 
intersect and shape one another. In these dynamic encounters, the issue of authentic 
freedom collides with its fraudulent substitute. The conversation provoked by this 
dialectic reflects what Walker identifies as a major impediment to the progress of 
marriage reform in 1895. He argues that “the bulk of mankind will not permit the 
modification of institutions in the direction of liberty and justice” because “the old is 
clung to with stupid persistence until the evils it generates become so oppressive that 
their victims must revolt or perish” (73). Walker, who claims to represent “the radical” 
position of his generation, asserts that society must focus on reform that “advances 
towards freedom of choice”—genuine, free choice uninhibited by an “unnatural and cruel 
social code” (73, 74).  As I have demonstrated in this chapter, The Woman Who Did, The 
Woman Who Didn’t, and The Woman Who Didn’t accentuated and complicated the 
notion of free choice with regard to the marriage debate, and as I will examine in the next 
chapter, these texts also centered in on the reticent sexual politics of the marriage 
debate—feminist issues that needed to be unveiled to procure social and cultural reform 
“in the direction of liberty and justice” (Walker 73).  
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CHAPTER 3 INDIVIDUAL PASSIONS AND COLLECTIVE VIRTUES: FIRST-
WAVE FEMINIST SEXUAL POLITICS AND THE SEXUAL EDUCATION OF 
THE NEW WOMAN 
 By contextualizing The Woman Who intertexts in both the social-purity mission 
and the marriage debate, I have illustrated how these texts confront the limits of the 
angelic and therefore unveil the ideological and cultural constraints that thwarted the 
progress of first-wave feminism and infringed upon the authentic liberty of women. 
Through the fictionalization of social-purity practices and through the projection of new 
romantic trajectories, The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Didn’t, and The Woman 
Who Wouldn’t destabilize the homogeneity of ideal femininity and reconceptualize the 
social and cultural position of women, interrogating the opposition between the ideal and 
the fallen woman as well as the opposition between woman and man. As demonstrated by 
the critical backlash against the premises and heroines of these New Woman novels, 
traditionally minded members of late-nineteenth century society were hesitant to rethink 
the standard monolithic definition of womanhood or to reevaluate marriage practices 
because such interrogations would inevitably facilitate an investigation into the 
problematic construction of female sexuality and desire. In this chapter, I turn my 
attention to how The Woman Who intertexts facilitate this threatening investigation as 
they interrogate the reticent sexual politics of the late-nineteenth century in protofeminist 
ways. As these popular texts publicized and investigated what Margaret O.W. Oliphant 
identified in “The Anti-Marriage League” (1896) as “instinctively shrouded” topics, they 
did not unveil definitive answers nor did they assemble a unified image of female 
sexuality to replace the old (149). Instead, they uncovered a multitude of questions and a 
multiplicity of representations; thus, they began to project a new, plural image of 
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womanhood—one that discredited the consolidating power of the angel and permeated 
the (pure/fallen, virtue/vice, purity/passion) borders that constructed and confined her 
sexuality.  
 In order to better understand how The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Didn’t, 
and The Woman Who Wouldn’t contribute to this process of exposure and transformation, 
we must first contextualize these texts in the critical conversation which sought to 
consolidate traditional ideology and reaffirm that the angelic mandates of purity and 
virtue are equally applicable to both life and literature. As illustrated by much of the 
literary criticism published by women in the late-nineteenth century, writing was yet 
another vehicle for purifying society. Thus, as Mrs. H. R. Haweis describes in Words to 
Women: Addresses and Essays (1900), women writers must understand their 
responsibility and “take a much more serious view of their power over men” (69). 
Women writers “have the strength and courage and polish of men,” but what 
distinguishes them from men is their ability to “keep those qualities for the spiritual and 
not the animal level” (Haweis 68). Haweis draws on social-purity rhetoric in order to 
urge women writers to distinguish themselves from men—to assert their moral 
superiority on the page because so much is at stake:  
I do think we ought never to forget that not only the eyes of our immediate 
and closest men are upon us—but the eyes of the whole world just now; 
that every book and article and paragraph we women write, is going to do 
something to push the world on or to push the whole world back into 
animalism. We are all mothers, as it were, of the whole world, and our 
teaching and our example are going to make or mar those who listen to us. 
(69) 
According to Haweis then, the woman writer must uphold her “feminine” duties and 
embrace the lofty mission that has been prescribed for her. Although Haweis recognizes 
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the power of  a woman to write “from the woman’s special point of view,”—to harness 
her “inner” and “earnest” thoughts and disclose the unknown—Haweis suggests that 
these individual practices are permissible only if they coincide with a collective 
“womanly” vision and uphold conventional feminine ideals (68).32 
 As I have examined in Chapter 1, Frances Cobbe contends that “the one only safe, 
true way of progress” is paved with purity and virtue (Duties 8), and Haweis echoes these 
social-purity ideals in order to show how this dictum is also applicable to the writing 
practices and textual content of women writers. As Haweis distinguishes between female 
and male writers, she reiterates the opposition between elevated spirituality (feminine) 
and base animalism (male) in order to highlight the privileged position of women. 
Additionally, she reiterates the pure/fallen dichotomy through her (either/or) depiction of 
“good” and “bad” women writers. The ideal woman writer uplifts society because she is 
dedicated to “holy work, cleansing, repairing, [and] beautifying,” and the fallen woman 
writer is “like the proverbial penny-a-liner, soiling, and blackening the ephemeral white” 
(Haweis 71).33 As Haweis explains, the text of the women writer must be pure and holy: 
“Let us write on enduring parchment—that will take no ink till it is washed—let us so 
cleanse, so beautify the page, and take the pen in hand only to be Recording Angels” (72).  
In literature as in life, women are confined by their angelic duties to purify society. They 
                                                 
32
 The logic that Haweis follows here is very similar to the line of reasoning that informed the feminist 
approach to “free choice” in marriage, which I discuss at length in Chapter 2. Haweis presents what appears 
to be a liberal argument in that she recognizes a woman’s right to literary self-expression—her propensity 
to record her “inner” and “earnest” thoughts (68); however, this liberty which allows a woman to disclose 
what she thinks or how she feels, much like her liberty “to choose” a romantic trajectory, is fraught with 
limitations. She is free to express herself as long as her individual ideas are conditioned by and coincide 
with the acceptable feminine “point of view” of the collective. 
33
 Here, Haweis’s derisive representation of the Penny-a-liner (a Victorian term for a writer who is paid one 
penny per line) coincides with the popular view of these journalists and popular fiction writers. Penny-a-
liners were often described as shameless and vulgar hacks who disregarded decorum in an effort to make a 
living.  
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are only permitted to express “women’s special point of view” as long as that viewpoint 
serves to naturalize and celebrate ideal femininity (Haweis 68).  The woman writer who 
strays from this lofty purpose and pursues a special individualized point of view that may 
not coincide with the collective construct of womanhood is, much like the fallen woman, 
a deviant who defiles society. Her works are called “inaccurate, ill-digested” and “ill-
natured”—dirty and impure by traditional standards—not because they are actually 
fallacious or obscene but because they recast female sexuality and explore alternative 
modes of female desire (Haweis 68). Haweis contends that such women writers are 
threatening because they deviate from the literary practices of the “Recording Angel”; 
they boldly attempt to record the very ideas that the angel could never explore. 
 As Haweis reiterates first-wave feminist discourse in order to focus on the 
privileged ability of women writers to “clean” the world and purify society through their 
publications, she also upholds traditional notions about the function and content of 
literature in general and participates in a larger discussion in which conservative 
feminists and non-feminists alike adamantly fought to preserve moral principles in both 
male and female-authored texts. Maintaining the ideology of Victorian respectability, 
many critics asserted that the direct or indirect discussion of sexual matters in literature 
would foster devastating effects on lives of the nation’s youth, especially on the lives of 
young, impressionable girls. As I touched upon in the last chapter, the public outrage 
against The Woman Who Did was not entirely fueled by the novel’s attempts to expose 
the injustices of the marriage market; many proto-feminist Victorian novels had certainly 
tackled this issue prior to the New Woman novel. The backlash against the novel was 
predicated on the claims that Allen’s evaluation of marital practices was vulgar and 
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immoral because his discussion was immersed in sexual topics, and the public was 
unwilling to entertain a conversation that permeated such “private” borders. 
 This anxiety about the threatening potential of “unclean” literature is illustrated in 
Margaret Oliphant’s staunch criticism of Allen’s The Woman Who Did insomuch as she 
is reluctant to “sully” her lips and directly refer to the aforementioned topic (“Anti-
Marriage” 138, 144). Nonetheless, Oliphant contends that Grant Allen is terribly 
misguided in his portrayal of marriage alongside “the lesser passion” (sex) because such 
a combination minimizes the many manifestations of the “union of Two” to one 
“supreme incident,”—to one “narrow” and “degrading” “false theory” (144). Oliphant 
forecasts the damage that such a reductive theory can bring: “it corrupts the morals, 
debases the conversation, and defiles the thoughts” of readers (144).  Mrs. Amelia E. Barr 
offers a similar warning in The North American Review in 1890:“Words are realities: 
they have the power to evoke ideas, which shall evoke facts” (458). Both Barr and 
Oliphant assert that the “sacredness and mystery” of “the wonderful origins of life” 
should remain “shrouded” (Oliphant 149)—that “immoral conversation” threatens to rob 
women of “the bloom of innocence that men have always respected as the great charm of 
maidenhood” (Barr 458). Reading “immoral books” leads to “unwholesome brooding” 
which leads to “sin” (Barr 462).  
 Proper women and pure girls must be protected from sensual literature because it 
arouses “a prurient curiosity” and “open[s] for imagination the door into forbidden 
ground” (Barr 459). This “forbidden ground” is paved with alternative representations of 
female sexuality and desire, and, as skeptics like Barr and Oliphant recognize, such 
textual territories “have the power to evoke ideas” (Barr 458).  Thus, both Oliphant and 
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Barr contend that a woman’s innocence is best maintained by her ignorance—by 
protecting her from the discussion of any sexual matters, and therefore they both object to 
literature that might provoke such discussions. Yet, Oliphant acknowledges that to some 
extent the damage is done—sexual politics have already seeped into the domestic sphere 
and altered the dynamics of family discussion: “The conversation of the drawing-room is 
already most sensibly affected. Things are discussed freely and easily which it would a 
few years ago have been a shame to mention or to think of” (“Anti-Marriage” 149).  And 
although Oliphant realizes that the conversation has become more candid, she is also 
confident that the threat is contained, that The Woman Who Did may have altered the 
rules of conversation, but it will not alter the impenetrable rules that fashion a woman’s 
life. Oliphant remarks that she does not “imagine” that any woman would actually 
attempt to follow Herminia’s example, and in this respect, Oliphant is pretty accurate, 
especially given Herminia’s struggles and tragic fate (“Anti-Marriage” 145).  
 As Oliphant had predicted, The Woman Who Did did not directly or 
independently transform the sexual behavior of young women; however, as Oliphant also 
concluded, the novel, in conjunction with its intertexts and the various initiatives of first-
wave feminism and social-purity organizations, did contribute to the changing dynamics 
of the drawing-room conversation. And it was precisely this dissemination of ideas, 
possibilities, and knowledge into the domestic sphere—the publication and 
popularization of the very forbidden issues that were previously unknown or inaccessible 
to women—that eventually enabled women to create and explore a discourse of sexuality 
beyond the traditional patriarchal lens that had normalized the binary structuring of 
womanliness and that had naturalized sexual determinism. 
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 As I discussed in the first chapter, feminist social-purity campaigns of the late-
nineteenth century focused their efforts on the purification of society and on the 
elimination of the sexual double standard in order to empower women and improve the 
relations between the sexes. First-wave feminists embraced conventional notions of 
female purity and glorified their angelic potentials rather than promoting sexual freedom 
and sexual pleasure for women, and thus it would seem that their contributions to the area 
of sexuality were rather retrogressive. However, as Shelia Jeffreys argues, we must 
reevaluate our understanding of the area of sexuality in the context of the nineteenth 
century: “we must look at the area of sexuality not merely as a sphere of personal 
fulfillment but as an area of struggle in which male dominance and women’s 
subordination can be most powerfully reinforced and maintained or fundamentally 
challenged” (“Free From” 629). Moreover, it is vital that we distinguish between what we 
identify as contributions to the area of sexuality today and what actually enabled women 
to participate in and reshape the conversation then, when feminists had to convince a 
patriarchal society that they not only had a right to join a public conversation but also that  
their opinion mattered. 
 The development of a feminist discourse of sexuality certainly precedes and 
expands beyond the nineteenth century, and its genealogy encompasses a multitude of 
cultural and historical events and influences; however, many scholars who examine how 
first-wave feminism contributed to the area of sexuality pinpoint the significance of the 
1870s campaigns to repeal the Contagious Diseases Acts34 and the efforts of the Ladies 
                                                 
34
 The Contagious Diseases Acts (originally passed in 1864, expanded in 1866 and 1869) were a series of 
three statues which granted the state with the power to regulate prostitution and compel prostitutes (as well 
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National Association (LNA), which was founded by Josephine Butler in 1869.35 The 
political maneuverings and campaigns of feminist and social-purity organizations like the 
LNA as well the relationship between first-wave feminism and the social, cultural, and 
legal politics of prostitution in England have served as the sources of many late-
nineteenth century feminist studies; therefore, I do not intend to reproduce a full account 
of these genealogies.36 My purpose here in examining the first-wave feminist responses 
to the Contagious Diseases Acts and first-wave feminists’ concern with the rights of 
prostitutes is to examine why and to what extent The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who 
Didn’t, and The Woman Who Wouldn’t utilize the discourse of prostitution, engage with 
the feminist issues prompted by anti-vice social purity campaigns, and reshape the 
discourse of sexuality in proto-feminist ways.   
                                                                                                                                                 
as any woman who the police suspected of being a prostitute or of having a venereal disease)  to undergo 
demeaning medical examinations.  
35
 See Judith R. Walkowitz’s “Male Vice and Feminist Virtue: Feminism and the Politics of Prostitution in 
Nineteenth Century Britain” (1982) and City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-
Victorian London (1992); Emma Liggins’s “Prostitution and Social Purity in the 1880s and 1890s” (2003); 
Shelia Jeffrey’s “’Free From all Uninvited Touch of Man’: Women’s Campaigns Around Sexuality, 1880-
1914” (1982) and The Spinster and Her Enemies: Feminism and Sexuality 1880-1930 (1997);  Lucy 
Bland’s “’Purifying’ the Public World: Feminist Vigilantes in Late Victorian England” (1992) and 
Banishing the Beast: English Feminism and Sexual Morality 1885-1914 (1995); Joy McGibben’s 
“Josephine Butler and the Social Purity Feminists: Their Relevance at the End of the Twentieth Century” 
(1995); Anne Summers’s “’The Constitution Violated’: The Female Body and the Female Subject in the 
Campaigns of Josephine Butler” (1999); and Philippa Levine’s Victorian Feminism: 1850-1900 (1987).  
36
 See Paula Bartley’s Prostitution: Prevention and Reform in England, 1860-1914 (2000); Paul McHugh’s 
Prostitution and Victorian Social Reform (1980);  Judith R. Walkowitz’s “The Politics of Prostitution” 
(1980), Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class, and the State (1980),  “Male Vice and Feminist 
Virtue: Feminism and the Politics of Prostitution in Nineteenth Century Britain” (1982) , and City of 
Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London (1992); Emma Liggins’s 
“Prostitution and Social Purity in the 1880s and 1890s” (2003); Shelia Jeffrey’s “’Free From all Uninvited 
Touch of Man’: Women’s Campaigns Around Sexuality, 1880-1914” (1982) and The Spinster and Her 
Enemies: Feminism and Sexuality 1880-1930 (1997);  Lucy Bland’s “’Purifying’ the Public World: 
Feminist Vigilantes in Late Victorian England” (1992) and Banishing the Beast: English Feminism and 
Sexual Morality 1885-1914 (1995); and Philippa Levine’s Victorian Feminism: 1850-1900 (1987); 
Margaret Hunt’s “The De-Eroticization of Women’s Liberation: Social purity Movements and the 
Revolutionary Feminism of Shelia Jeffreys” (1990); Joy McGibben’s “Josephine Butler and the Social 
Purity Feminists: Their Relevance at the End of the Twentieth Century” (1995); Melissa Raphael’s “J. 
Ellice Hopkins: The Construction of a Recent Spiritual Feminist Foremother” (1996).  
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 When women began to speak out against the Contagious Diseases Acts in the 
1870s, they asserted their right to debate in a public forum, and, more so, they asserted 
their right to acknowledge, discuss, and analyze the oppression of prostitutes—to 
challenge the male-dominated sexual discourse that constructed female sexuality. As 
Judith Walkowitz points out, this public crusade to overturn the Contagious Diseases 
Acts marked a pivotal moment in the history of feminism because women “opposed the 
sexual and political prerogatives of men” and “started a discourse on sex” (“Male Vice” 
80).  She explains that the public was “shocked” by the many “middle-class ladies” who 
participated in the campaign and “mounted public platforms across the country” in order 
to openly denounce the sexual and class discrimination that the acts perpetuated (“Male 
Vice” 80).  The C.D. Acts-repeal campaign opened up a new forum in which women 
began to address and analyze the very sexual issues that were considered off limits for 
proper ladies. They began to openly debate the bodily rights of prostitutes, which, in turn, 
mobilized a more complex critique of female sexuality and of the injustices of the sexual 
double standard that affected all women. As first-wave feminists entered this male-
controlled and male-constructed territory of sexuality, they declared that they would no 
longer accept the code of sexual ignorance that patriarchy had inscribed for them. As 
C.D. Acts-repeal campaigner Josephine Butler noted in An Appeal to the People of 
England on the Recognition and Superintendence of Prostitution by Governments (1870), 
“let it not be supposed that it has cost us little to break through the rule of silence 
imposed by society upon women, when such matters are to be treated; nor that it has been 
at a small cost to ourselves that we have gone into the matter in all its details” (146 The 
Sexuality Debates).   
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 In an effort to curtail the spread of venereal diseases, the C.D. Acts set up a 
process in which prostitutes had to undergo invasive physical examinations, confinement, 
and possible medical treatment or be subject to criminal charges and imprisonment for 
their refusal to comply with such measures. Emphasizing the way that the law singled out 
prostitutes as agents of vice and disease and ignored the culpability of the male patrons, 
Butler contended that the C.D. Acts perpetuated “the rule of silence” by publicly and 
legally validating the very myths that women were trained to tolerate and respect: that the 
subjection of women was necessary for the maintenance of men’s sexual well-being and 
that the double moral standard was indeed justified by men’s propensity for sexual 
activity. As Butler describes in 1870, such a system does little to “stamp out disease” 
because it authorizes the immoral behavior of men: “Its effect upon those large classes of 
men to whom, in default of religious principle or a high moral training, the laws of the 
country are a guide to conscience, is to teach them to look upon fornication not as a sin 
and shame, but as a necessity which the State takes care that they shall be able to practice 
with impunity” (An Appeal 111). Because the C.D. Acts failed to mandate equal 
measures on both the female prostitute and the male patron, Butler argued that the 
legislation  excused the sexual immorality of men and avowed that men “are utterly and 
hopelessly the slaves of their own passions” (111). 
 Rather than silently and passively accepting that the C.D. Acts were founded on 
solid ideological principles, repeal campaigners embraced their social-purity mission and 
sought to undermine the notion that men were ‘naturally’ lustful and  animalistic and 
instead promoted a new ethical model in which both of the sexes would be bound by the 
same moral and sexual standards. As I examined in Chapter 1, first-wave feminists 
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advocated that all men and women should adopt the moral and sexual standards of the 
ideal woman and that each sex’s equal commitment to sexual and spiritual purity would 
serve to remedy society’s problems. Thus, in order to transform the moral and sexual 
behaviors of men, social-purity feminists (such as Hopkins) advocated the formation of 
male-purity leagues and popularized a new masculine ideal—the cultivation of a new 
man who would serve as woman’s moral and spiritual equal and support her intellectual 
development. To address the threatening sexual and moral behaviors of women, feminist 
campaigners sought to reclaim and reform prostitutes who had become victims of 
seduction and/or of poverty. This philanthropic approach to the reformation and rescuing 
of prostitutes was a typical practice of many charitable women throughout the nineteenth 
century; however, the C.D. Acts-repeal campaigns of the 1870s, which empowered 
women to “break through the rule of silence” and openly engage in a frank discussion of 
male and female sexuality (Butler An Appeal 146), engendered a way of conceptualizing 
the victimization of prostitutes in conjunction with the collective sexual oppression of 
women. Although Butler and her followers waged an attack on the C.D. Acts and 
therefore directly critiqued how the double moral standard unfairly influenced 
prostitution-related legislation in the public sphere, this campaign indirectly incited a 
larger-scale evaluation of the sexual injustices that infringed upon the private lives of 
women. As Butler realized, the social and legal implications of the C.D. Acts reached far 
beyond the public streets of the prostitute: it is a social issue that “threatens the purity and 
stability of our homes” and “degrades all womanhood through foul associations of 
thought and feeling” (An Appeal 127).  
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 LNA members rallied behind Butler, crusaded to protect their fallen sisters from 
“a system” that authorized  “wholesale and legalised indecent assaults upon women,” and 
their efforts eventually led to the repeal of  the C.D. Acts in 1886 (Butler An Appeal 127). 
In addition to successfully overturning the acts, the LNA campaigns were instrumental in 
providing women an opportunity to develop a female-centered discursive tradition in the 
male-dominated arena of sexual politics—to assert their influence and their demands in 
the public sphere. As Mary Lyndon Shanley describes, “Parliament was not used to 
hearing arguments concerning sexual hierarchy in the domestic and public realms, much 
less that public policy systematically sanctioned men’s sexual exploitation of and 
economic power over women” (81). Not only was Parliament unaccustomed to women’s 
political opposition, but even more so, women’s effort in the repeal campaign generated 
other concerns for a traditionally minded public who were accustomed to societal, 
cultural, and political conventions informed by the dominant patriarchal structure. 
Women’s mobility in the public world, as well as their propensity to discuss “private” 
issues in public, threatened to erode the borders between the public and the private 
spheres. As women entered what Butler described as a “chamber of horrors” (An Appeal 
146)—the forbidden sexualized world of the prostitute and of man—they directly 
mobilized a conversation about the sexual double standard as it manifested itself in the 
injustices of prostitution. As a result of this initiation into sexual politics on behalf of 
their fallen sisters, first-wave feminists cultivated sexual knowledge, an interrogatory 
mode, and a discursive tradition which enabled and empowered them to address their 
sexual subjection in the private sphere—to unveil the “chamber of horrors” that haunted 
their domestic lives.  
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 Thus, as Oliphant had feared, “the conversation of the drawing room” was greatly 
altered in that women were no longer adhering to ‘proper’ feminine decorum to the extent 
that they vocalized private issues in the political arena and reevaluated the implications of 
these issues in the private sphere (“Anti-Marriage” 149). As Walkowitz describes, 
women used “the feminist politics of prostitution” as a way to “speak publicly about 
sexual passion and about sexual danger”; however, their approach which elevated 
women’s ‘natural’ ability to purify and reform society, “reinforced assumptions of sexual 
difference, particularly the prevailing Victorian association of sexual desire with 
maleness” (City 6, 9, 7). In other words, feminists tended to view prostitutes as victims of 
male vice and economic pressure. Linda Gordon and Ellen DuBois explain that although 
first-wave feminism battled against the sexual oppression of women, it did so by 
perpetuating a conservative view of female sexual morality (48). Instead of reevaluating 
the dominant perception of women’s asexuality and passionlessness and exploring 
alternate possibilities which allowed for a more radical view of female sexuality, 
“feminists consistently exaggerated the coerciveness of prostitution. They insisted that 
the women involved were sexual innocents, helpless young women who ‘fell’ into illicit 
sex” (Gordon and DuBois 43). Thus, as Gordon and DuBois assert, “feminists remained 
committed to the containment of female sexuality within heterosexual marriage and 
maintained that men should adhere to women’s higher standards of sexual morality (47).  
 Although feminists capitalized on their greater morality and modesty as 
justification for their political and social involvement in ‘public’ affairs, many 
commentators still believed that it was best for women to remain at a safe distance from 
any such “immodest” discussions and that middle-class women’s direct involvement with 
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the prostitution debate magnified and unveiled the very improper conversations that 
women ought to avoid.  In the beginning of this chapter, I described some of these 
journalistic critiques which urged the public to protect women from the threatening 
potential of “unwholesome” literature and “degrading” conversations. Now I turn my 
attention to how these patriarchal sentiments also shaped some of the public’s response to 
the C.D. Acts-repeal campaigns. In Annie Besant’s The Legalisation of Female Slavery 
in England (1876), she commences by analyzing the source of the public’s disapproval: 
“Reaction from Christian cant upon this subject, and the rightful recognition of the 
sacredness and dignity of human nature, physical as well as mental, have to a great extent 
prejudiced many of the Secular party against the society agitating for repeal” (91-92). 
Besant asserts that this “bitter indignation” against the leaders of the repeal movement is 
groundless because “there is nothing in the speeches made at the meetings of the society 
to which the most prudish could object, unless, indeed, they object to the question being 
dealt with at all” (92).  Barr’s position in “Conversational Immoralities” validates 
Besant’s conjecture, for Barr contends that not only should the issue of prostitution be 
suppressed but also that the charitable missions to help the prostitute—what she refers to 
as “dark-life studies”—are “dangerous” because encounters with such “haunts of sin” 
threaten to defile a proper woman’s moral and sexual purity (460).  Although Barr finds 
rescue work to be very problematic, she momentarily suspends her critique and offers the 
following statement to relate her support for charity work: “to seek and save the lost is 
truly a noble mission” (460).  She follows up this declaration by saying that “if moral 
scavenging is to be done” in order to “seek and save the lost,” it is a job primarily for 
men associated with the church and secondarily for women who are mothers or widows; 
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it is not to be undertaken by unmarried girls (460). However, the reference to charitable 
work as “moral scavenging” seems to be disingenuous attempt at encouraging 
philanthropic efforts and at empathizing with “the lost,” and as illustrated by the 
following passage, it is evident that Barr finds nothing “noble” or advantageous about 
one’s charitable work with or sympathy for the prostitute: 
The present laxity in the morals of conversation has come from various 
causes. One has certainly been an imprudent and perhaps in many 
instances, an unclean and spurious charity. Never before in the history of 
Christendom have unchaste women been the subjects of so much 
attention. The broad Saxon names designating them, unsparing in their 
condemnation, unmistakable in their meaning, have been put aside for 
others euphemistic enough for good society, and thus unnamable things 
have been made namable. It is a very significant breaking-down of decent 
barriers. The “whore” and the “courtesan” have become “fallen sisters” 
and “unfortunates,” “Magdalens” or “lorettes”; and a sentimental 
sympathy has familiarized young girls with conditions of which they 
ought absolutely to know nothing. (460) 
 What Barr sees as threatening—the dismantling of “decent barriers” between the 
prostitute and the middle-class woman and the naming of “unnamable things”— are the 
very arguments that first-wave feminists used to fight against the sexual oppression of 
women and the distinct tactics that enabled women to reshape the dominant sexual 
discourse. Butler’s approach in soliciting public support for the rights of prostitutes was 
to reveal how the borders between the public and the private spheres were imaginary—
how, contrary to public beliefs, the home and the proper middle-class family was in no 
way protected from the physical and psychological effects of prostitution. As Butler 
reminds the public, “the innocent” are suffering as a result of the diseases transmitted by 
the “intermediate class”—the “adulterous husbands and fathers, who are dispensing 
disease and death in their families” (An Appeal 123). Butler’s depiction of men’s 
culpability in the contamination of the home distorts the traditional Ruskinian image of 
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the ideal Victorian husband and father—the man who “encounter[s] all peril and trial” in 
the “rough work” of the “open world” and who “guards the woman from all this” in order 
to maintain his home as refuge from the horrors of the public world (Ruskin 77).  And as 
Butler points out, “certain persons resent, as if it were an indelicacy, any allusion to the 
most important link”: the unfaithful husbands who are responsible for defiling the 
sanctity of the home (An Appeal 123). The women who were involved with the repeal 
campaigns began to assert their roles as intermediaries between the public and private 
spheres, but contrary to Barr’s contention, it was not their encounters with the vice of the 
public world that caused the “breaking-down of decent barriers”; instead, their 
“sentimental sympathy” for prostitutes—their mission to seek justice for women in the 
public sphere—revealed the fictitiousness of these borders (460).  
 The transmission of disease from the street to the home offered undeniable proof 
that the home was directly susceptible to the damaging effects of public vice and 
immorality; therefore, campaign leaders like Butler and Besant reminded their 
adversaries that “discussions to which they object only become necessary through the 
existence of the evil attacked, and that the lack of modesty lies in the commission of the 
evil, and not in the endeavor to rescue the victims of it” (Besant Legalisation 92). Thus, 
they claimed it was their duty to intervene in the politics of prostitution because as Butler 
describes, the issue “directly strikes at the physical and moral life of tens of thousands of 
women” [emphasis in original] (An Appeal 127). In addition to the rationale that it was 
vital that women intervene in order to protect their “fellow sisters” from the injustices of 
the law, feminist repeal campaigners began to examine the ideological implications of 
prostitution on a larger scale and argue that it “degrades all womanhood” (An Appeal 
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127). Thus, as feminists articulated an argument about how the C.D. Acts infringed upon 
the prostitute’s “absolute sovereignty over her own person,” they reconceptualized the 
prostitute as a rightful member of the female collective (Butler An Appeal 126). As a 
result of this initiative which focused on the human rights of prostitutes, first-wave 
feminists also further dismantled the public/private divide as they turned their attention to 
how this legally-sanctioned subjection of women and public encouragement of the double 
sexual and moral standard also infringed upon women’s rights in the private sphere.  
 The feminist rhetoric used to describe the prostitution crisis in nineteenth-century 
England often depicted prostitution as a system of slavery in which “the souls and bodies 
of tens of thousands of women are deliberately, and under the direction of the 
government, sacrificed to a supposed necessity” (Butler An Appeal 112). Specifically in 
reference to the mandatory medical exams sanctioned by the C.D. Acts, Butler argues 
that “women who are terrified to submission again and again to the ordeal which this law 
requires them to submit to, are reduced by it to the character of wild beasts” (An Appeal 
112). According to such repeal publications, the C.D Acts promoted “the institution of 
the slavery of women” because of its “open denial…of the sacredness of the individual 
human being” (Butler Social Purity 39). Butler purposely incorporated the language of 
“the Great Abolition movement,” 37(Personal Reminiscences 227) into her appeals for the 
rights of the prostitute, and, by association, feminists utilized the rhetoric of slavery in 
arguments beyond the prostitution debate in order to portray how all women were 
                                                 
37
 In Personal References of a Great Crusade (1896), Butler acknowledges how William Lloyd Garrison 
has inspired and guided her: “he started me on the study of the great Abolition movement, a cause which, 
indirectly, has done much for our own” (227). Throughout her autobiography, Butler also makes numerous 
references to “the abolition” of the C.D Acts. These examples, along with the many references to “the 
slavery” of women illustrate how first-wave feminist arguments often paralleled those of the abolitionists. 
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enslaved by the injustices of patriarchy.  In Personal Reminiscences of a Great Crusade 
(1896), Butler contends that women’s identification with the prostitute empowered their 
cause and solicited public fear: “Such a proclamation, coming from the woman’s sides, 
strikes a kind of terror in the hearts of our adversaries, such as even the noblest man’s 
voice does not inspire. Why? Because it is the voice of the slave herself, and her 
oppressor, with the abettor of oppression, fears, saying to himself, like Herod, ‘It is John 
the Baptist whom I have beheaded; he is risen from the dead!” (280) 
  In this passage, Butler conflates the distinction between the prostitute and her 
middle- class sister campaigner as they speak with one voice: that of the slave. This 
slavery imagery alludes to Mary Wollstonecraft’s arguments as outlined in A Vindication 
of the Rights of Woman (1792), and the merger of private and public sexual politics that 
resulted from the repeal campaign at the end of the nineteenth century revived and 
expounded on these liberal feminist claims that Wollstonecraft had explored at the end of 
the eighteenth century. Wollstonecraft’s radical depiction of marriage as a form of legal 
prostitution resurfaced as a standard premise of the marriage-reform debate at the turn of 
the nineteenth century. The poetics of prostitution granted feminists a language to 
facilitate a direct, and, at times, hostile attack on marriage, and, thus, many New Woman 
novels appropriated and amplified this rhetoric in productive ways. This transfer of 
expression from first-wave feminist politics to New Woman fiction is yet another 
illustration of how the New Woman novel functions as an intertext of social-purity 
feminist politics, and it also demonstrates how the New Woman novel participates in an 
interdiscursive conversation that was responsible for reshaping Victorian sexual politics.  
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 The parallel between prostitution and marriage became pivotal to many first-wave 
feminist arguments and New Woman narratives as a result of the repeal campaign; 
however, this theme had certainly been developed well before the late nineteenth century.  
As mentioned, most scholars agree that Wollstonecraft was the first liberal feminist to 
define marriage as legalized prostitution;38 however, it is worth noting that this analogy, 
which had become a keystone of late-nineteenth-century feminism, had been propagated 
in many other examples of British art and literature, especially through portrayals of 
marriage which critiqued the mercenary practices of matchmaking and espousal39.  
Additionally, according to Lucy Bland, the marriage/slavery analogy that saturated many 
first-wave feminist arguments “was not new” (Banishing 131)40. Prior to the New 
Woman Novel, many authors (both men and women) had criticized the mercenary quality 
of marriage and challenged the notion of a husband’s ownership of his wife, and these 
contributions culminated in the marriage debate that ensued at the turn of the century. As 
Susan Kingsley Kent explains, by the late nineteenth century, feminists’ “adoption of a 
commercial idiom to speak about the institution most exalted by Victorians” united 
“feminists and even avowedly anti-feminists” in their position about the state of 
marriage: “marriage, finally, was only a legal form of prostitution” (249, 250). It was the 
public circulation and acceptance of this understanding that finally enabled first-wave 
feminists to take a crucial step forward and do more than just expose the marital 
                                                 
38
 In Banishing the Beast, Lucy Bland notes that according to Wollstonecraft’s biographer Claire Tomalin, 
Wollstonecraft was the first to use this phrase (see pages 132 and 338).  
39
 For example, William Hogarth’s series of paintings Marriage à-la-mode (1743-1745) explored the 
devastating effects of marriages that resulted from commercial contracts instead of mutual affection and 
attraction. 
40
 See pages 131-132 in Bland’s Banishing the Beast for specific examples. 
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injustices that plagued women: they were finally positioned to demand and enact legal 
reform41.   
 In Allen’s The Woman Who Did, Herminia’s evaluation of marriage is saturated 
with prostitution and slavery phraseology, and she insists on a free union with Alan so 
that she is able to evade the injustices that plagued married women. Following Alan’s 
suggestion that he and Herminia should get married, Herminia offers him a rather 
dramatic explanation of why she cannot accept his offer:  
Think how easy it would be for me, dear friend…to do as other women 
do; to accept the honorable marriage you offer me, as other women would 
call it; to be false to my sex, a traitor to my convictions; to sell my kind for 
a mess of pottage, a name and a home, or even for thirty pieces of silver to 
be some rich man’s wife, as other women have sold it. [emphasis in 
original] (41) 
Here, Herminia emphasizes the ways in which traditional marriage is like a business 
transaction because women carelessly “sell” themselves and relinquish their principles in 
exchange for all the benefits of a marital union: social status, propriety, and financial 
security. The “mess of pottage” allusion depicts how women are often shortsighted 
because they are lured by the seemingly immediate profits of marriage and ignorant of 
the sacrifices that they will have to make in return for such artificial gains. As Cicely 
Mary Hamilton identifies in Marriage as a Trade (1909), because women have “always 
been far more completely excluded from direct access to the necessities of life,” marriage 
serves as their only means of self-preservation (17).  Hamilton asserts that for a woman to 
secure domestic stability and property, she only has “one form of payment” at her 
                                                 
41
 In Chapter 2, which provides a thorough examination of the marriage debate, I argue that in comparison 
to the feminocentric marriage novels of the Victorian period which focus on the exposure of marital 
injustice, the New Woman novel is more invested in facilitating change and does so by devising 
experiments and imagining alternative possibilities. 
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disposal: “it was demanded of her that she should enkindle and satisfy the desire of the 
male…In other words, she exchanged, by the ordinary process of barter, possession of 
her person for the means of existence” (17).  
 This is precisely the “ordinary process of barter” that Herminia is adamant about 
avoiding; she is unwilling to enter into a conventional marriage because she views it as “a 
commercial trade or undertaking” (Hamilton 18).  Thus, Herminia and Alan’s “irregular 
compact” is devoid of all the monetary customs that accompany conventional marriage—
the very customs which enable men to purchase and enslave women in marriage : “Not 
for worlds would she import into their mutual relations any sordid stain of money, any 
vile tinge of bargaining. They could trust one another; that alone sufficed for them” 
(Allen 76).   The narrator explains, “She had always been self-supporting…and she 
would be self-supporting still. To her mind, that was an essential step towards the 
emancipation of women” (73).  In the future, in a community of “perfect liberty” (74), 
Herminia envisions a society in which “prospective mothers” could be “relieved as far as 
possible from the stress and strain of earning a livelihood,” (75) but she acknowledges 
that in the “present barbaric state of industrial slavery” (74), “economic liberty” and 
“self-support” serve as the only defenses against patriarchal tyranny. The economic 
superiority of man functions to preserve his social superiority over women and is thus 
“irreconcilable with the perfect individuality of woman” (70). Herminia wants to share 
her life with Alan because they are “friends and lovers” (76); she is determined to 
abandon all the oppressive traditions of “the régime of the manmade patriarchate, where 
the woman and the children were the slaves and chattels of the lord and master” (70).  
Herminia will not be bought or sold in a series of “settlements” or “business 
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arrangements” (76); she wants to “freely” give herself to Alan in order to maintain full 
possession of her body and her principles.  
 By highlighting how marriage is unprofitable for women,  The Woman Who Did 
directly challenges the Victorian romantic ideal—the model in which, as Joseph Boone 
describes, marriage functions as the “most desirable end of existence” because “lovers 
are rewarded with the bliss of matrimony” (“Wedlock” 65).  Additionally, by 
emphasizing the transactional nature of marriage, the text interrogates another aspect that 
was vital to the preservation of conventional marital ideology: the opposition between the 
ideal and the fallen woman. That prostitutes were players in a commercial system of 
sexual barter was a social actuality—a widespread occurrence in the seedy public world. 
Correspondingly, marriage and domesticity served as the ideal woman’s safeguards—as 
the very mechanisms of stabilization that distinguished the position of the proper middle-
class woman from that of the fallen woman. Thus, as I have examined throughout this 
chapter, traditionalists made many attempts to thwart the efforts of the C.D. repeal 
campaigns because the presence of middle-class women in the public sphere and the 
revised definition of womanhood that it produced—one that embodied both the ideal and 
fallen woman—threatened to erode the very polarizations that upheld the patriarchal 
traditions and dominant sexual dynamics of society.  Beyond the political arena and the 
activity of the C.D. repeal campaigns, the threats continued in the form of the bold New 
Woman heroine, who, like Herminia, unabashedly defends her position that “honorable 
marriage” is nothing more than domestic slavery and prostitution [emphasis in original] 
(Allen 41).  
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  In addition to The Woman Who Did redefining marriage as a monetary enterprise 
and thus alluding to the shared experiences of wives and prostitutes, the language that 
Herminia uses to describe marriage—a system of “vile slavery” “sustained” by “unholy 
sacrifices” and “buttressed” by “unseen horrors”—further develops this connection and 
destabilizes the distinctions between wife/prostitute and private/public (Allen 41). 
Although Herminia does not directly identify the marital atrocities of which she speaks, 
the narrative’s incorporation of the first-wave feminist discourse of female slavery in 
conjunction with the way that the text actively engages in the late-nineteenth century 
marriage debate draws attention to the issue of women’s bodily and sexual rights. 
Feminist concerns over the physical rights of women arose in response to the C.D. Acts. 
They argued that the acts permitted women to be “sacrificed to the ‘necessities of men’” 
and legalized a process in which women “be literally made slaves, equally obedient to the 
call of the doctor who heals and to that of the man who infects, holding their bodies at the 
hourly order of each class, with no right of self-possession, no power of self-rule 
permitted to them” (Besant Legalisation 95).  This passionate evaluation of the laws and 
social attitudes that enslaved prostitutes by robbing them of their human right to assert 
control over their own bodies, enabled women to publicly discuss taboo issues and 
empowered them to further scrutinize how women were sacrificed to the demands of men 
in other aspects of life. 
  When Herminia informs Alan, “I know what marriage is, from what vile slavery 
it has sprung; on what unseen horrors for my sister women it is reared and buttressed; by 
what unholy sacrifices it is sustained, and made possible,” she relies on the same 
arguments and phraseology that feminists used to shape their philosophies about 
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prostitution (Allen 41-42). In doing so, the text blurs the distinctions between the 
experiences of prostitutes and wives: both are oppressed, and both are victimized by the 
unjust systems and patriarchal principles that perpetuate the emotional and bodily 
enslavement of women. This provocative correlation that Herminia develops and 
reiterates is certainly a radical premise—one that induced the criticism of many of 
Allen’s contemporaries.  For example Millicent Garrett Fawcett’s review of the novel 
scrutinizes Herminia for her many lengthy “set speeches” in which “she regards marriage 
as ‘a vile slavery’” because Fawcett claims that Herminia’s arguments are much too 
contrived and her position is “preposterous” (627, 626, 630). Fawcett contends that 
Herminia has no merit as a “real or human” character because of her many nonsensical 
and rehearsed “speeches” about the cruelty of marriage (627). With regard to the literary 
development of Herminia as a dynamic fictional character, Fawcett’s assertion is 
certainly validated by the heroine’s “tiresome” and didactic delivery of her views (627); 
however, beyond the novel’s literary shortcomings, Herminia’s “set speeches” (627) tap 
into a very “real” and thriving polemic about the slavery of women—of both prostitutes 
and wives alike. 
 The first-wave feminist campaigns that focused on sexual subjection of prostitutes 
created a woman-centered discourse of sexuality, and this critical discourse enabled 
women to extend their critique of the enslavement of women as it existed in the private 
sphere. This examination of “marital tyranny” as Frances Power Cobbe identified it 
included a number of interrelated issues42, yet many of these evolving arguments 
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 First-wave and social-purity feminists were involved in numerous reform campaigns throughout the late-
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that were designed to improve the relations between the sexes and 
the position of women by focusing on suffrage, education, temperance, abolitionism, violence against 
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accentuated the ways in which womanhood as a whole was degraded by the public 
politics of prostitution because traditional marriage practices also perpetuated the double 
moral and sexual standard and justified the objectification of women in the private world 
(Wife-torture 225). Thus, when Herminia identifies marriage as “vile slavery” and refers 
to the “unseen horrors” and “unholy sacrifices” that it supports, she expands her critique 
of marriage and offers a fuller definition of marriage as slavery—one which accounts for 
both the mental and the physical abuse that women encounter as a result of marriage. 
Herminia further develops this analogy when she boldly tells Alan, “I know on what vile 
foundations your temple of wedlock is based and built, what pitiable victims languish and 
die in its sickening vaults; and I will not consent to enter it” (Allen 48). Here, Herminia 
depicts wedlock as a material place—as a “temple” of captivity wherein “victims” are 
subjected to intense suffering and death—and in presenting this graphic illustration of 
marriage as a site of women’s bodily harm and mortality, the text offers a heightened 
view of the sexual dangers of marriage and alludes to the very physical threats that 
feminists were finally beginning to speak out against. 
 Fawcett criticized Allen for reiterating that “marriage means slavery” without 
“attempting to prove it,” (631) and although Herminia’s speeches do not identify specific 
examples in order to support this definition, the public had certainly become familiar with 
the popular feminist rhetoric of slavery and with how feminists employed the 
marriage/slavery argument in order to campaign for the physical protection and bodily 
integrity of married women. For example, as Jeffreys points out, Elizabeth C. 
                                                                                                                                                 
women, property rights, and child custody rights. See Philippa Levine’s Victorian Feminism: 1850-1900 
(1987) and Shelia Jeffrey’s The Spinster and Her Enemies: Feminism and Sexuality 1880-1930 (1985) for a 
thorough historical account of these interrelated issues.  
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Wolstenholme Elmy was one such feminist campaigner whose publications do “not 
distinguish between the experience of bodily slavery for women, whether it is in marriage 
or prostitution” (Spinster 34). In Phases of Love (1897) for example, Wolstenholme Elmy 
asserts that women’s subjection stems from man’s “general vision” which classifies a 
woman as “a due offering to his own sensual propensities,” and, as a result, he focuses on 
“checking and crushing out any effort or aspiration of hers to a fuller mental status or 
personal independence, which might prove not so submissive to his baser scheme” (348).  
Wolstenholme Elmy contends that the entirety of a woman’s life is filled with such horror 
because she never fully possesses her own body: she is “a slave, a spoil in warfare, a 
concubine…to be used as a convenient item for matrimonial sale or barter” (348). This 
pattern of subjection, what Herminia alludes to when she refers to “unseen horrors” and 
“unholy sacrifices,” is, according to Wolstenholme Elmy heightened in a woman’s 
espousal:  
Frequently, however, and shamefully, woman is left to enter upon 
marriage without true knowledge or any warning as to the real nature of 
the wife’s so-called ‘duties’ therein; its possible physical relations, of 
perhaps the most repugnant or even perilous character to herself—abuses 
and excesses, resultant often in misery and suffering or premature death—
but which she finds to be assumed as part of the ‘iron contract.’ (350) 
 Insomuch as The Woman Who Did appropriates this emerging feminist 
phraseology and alludes to the physical suffering and death that wives endure as a result 
of “continual unwelcome intimacies,” “unjust marital conduct,” and sexually transmitted 
diseases, Herminia’s proposed solution, unlike the rhetoric that she uses to describe it, is 
difficult to historically contextualize in feminist tradition because it is comprised of 
theoretical contradictions with wide-ranging implications. In keeping with traditional 
first-wave feminist sexual discourse, Herminia asserts that marriage is a system of 
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slavery that robs women of their physical and civic rights; however, she does not 
encourage marriage reform or embrace celibacy as a means to remedy the relations 
between men and women.43 The text also does not locate a solution in feminist social-
purity politics by maintaining that the only way to secure equality for women is to purify 
society—to erase the double sexual and moral standard and encourage all men to emulate 
the standards of feminine morality and purity. Instead, The Woman Who Did provides a 
model of women’s liberty in which radical and conservative projections of female 
sexuality converge—a pathway for women’s emancipation that is initiated by Herminia’s 
unconventional sexual politics yet sustained by conventional maternal ideals. It imagines 
a heroine who is both sexualized and “stainless,”  “passionate” and principled (Allen 223, 
56). Thus, The Woman Who Did confronted the public with a disconcerting image of 
female sexuality. As Dr. C. Willett Cunnington writes in Feminine Attitudes in the 
Nineteenth Century (1936), it was precisely this “Exhibitionism” of the novel “that 
provoked so much alarm”: “The whole basis of Victorian family ethics was disputed; was 
Woman entitled to regard the instincts of sex as though they were mere physical faculties 
to be utilized at her own pleasure, when Authority had definitely pronounced them to be a 
moral incubus?”  (301, 299).  
 During the late nineteenth century when many feminist campaigners sought to 
discredit the notion that male sexuality was ‘naturally’ aggressive and animalistic, the 
prospect that a woman could exhibit the same type of unrestrained sexuality for the 
                                                 
43Although feminists were concerned with issues of sexual and moral inequality in marriage, they did not 
generally support free union as a viable remedy. Instead, they embraced their roles as moral guardians and 
attempted to purify the institution of marriage rather than completely abandon it. See Chapter 2 for a fuller 
discussion of dominant first-wave feminist marital ideology. Other feminist responses included promoting 
the empowerment of women through marital celibacy, but as I discussed in Chapter 1, this was certainly 
not a mainstream approach.  
167 
 
 
purposes of pleasure was certainly a radical assertion, and it was also an issue that, 
according to many conservative critics, respectful authors had no business exploring. Yet, 
despite many initiatives to “keep the conversation pure” in order to preserve the sexual 
innocence and morality of young women, the New Woman novel emerged as a site where 
writers and the public readership challenged the traditional construct of female sexuality 
and attempted to produce representations of women that deconstructed the social, 
medical, and scientific discourses that ‘naturalized’ women’s inferior but morally-
valuable positions as wives and mothers44. In “The New Woman, Childbearing, and the 
Reconstruction of Gender, 1880-1900,” Loralee MacPike argues that the project of 
“rethink[ing] human nature and human relations through restructurings of the sexual roles 
                                                 
44
 The intertextual and interdiscursive connections between first-wave feminist ideology and New Woman 
fiction that I focus on in this chapter illustrate one late-nineteenth movement to reform sexual attitudes; 
however, it is worth noting the study of sexuality in the 1880s and 1890s was influenced by many other 
contributions. As Lesley Hall describes in “Hauling Down the Double Standard: Feminism, Social Purity 
and Sexual Science in Late Nineteenth-Century Britain,” some sex reform movements shared similar 
theoretical positions with those of social- purity feminists in that sexologists like Edward Carpenter, 
Havelock Ellis, Patrick Geddes, and J. Arthur Thomson “were definitely opposed to the double moral 
standard” (49). Yet as evidenced in the publications of Carpenter, his attempt to, as Stephen Brooke 
explains, “liberate the body and sex from the shame in which both were cloaked,” (20) depicts a vision of 
sexual education which is far afield from the first-wave feminist agenda. For feminists, sexual education 
was vital to women for the sake of preserving purity, and for reformers like Carpenter, sexual education 
was a means to publicize how sexual pleasure “was the foundation of a regenerated body politic” (Brooke 
20). Thus, feminists and sexual scientists like Carpenter supported the eradication of the double sexual 
standard, yet they had very different ideas about what sexual and moral standard should take its place.  
Whereas feminists sought for men to adopt the purified moral and sexual that characterized ideal 
femininity, Carpenter’s vision of sex reform was much more radical in that it looked to abandon classic 
moralism altogether to the extent of promoting homosexuality as the “the possible lifeblood of a new 
world” (Brooke 21). Also See Edward Carpenter and Late Victorian Radicalism (1990) edited by Tony 
Brown.  This radical argument for sexual reform was also illustrated by Havelock Ellis and John Addington 
Symonds in the 1897 edition of Sexual Inversion. Loralee MacPike argues that Ellis’s redefinition of 
“homosexuality as part of a normal continuum of human sexuality” had radical potential in that it allowed 
him to reconstruct “same-sex activity within a larger realm of normal sexuality independent of 
childbearing”; however, by privileging the notion that “women’s sexuality was inherent rather than socially 
conditioned,” Ellis’s new sexual taxonomy, as well as that of Carpenter, were both limited by traditional 
definitions of female sexuality that  privileged “the power of biology” (375).  Although this study primarily 
focuses on what scholars have categorized as “feminist ideas on sexuality” (Shelia Jeffreys, for example, 
uses this phrase to refer to first-wave feminist contributions to sex reform like those of Elizabeth 
Wolstenholme Elmy and Frances Swiney) and, more specifically on how these feminist movements were 
manifested in The Woman Who series, I acknowledge that many other areas of sex reform emerged at the 
turn of the century and that first-wave feminist politics and sexology responded to and shaped one another 
in multiple and complex dialectical exchanges.  
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of the New Women,” was contingent on the development of a revised concept of 
motherhood that was never fully realized (374).  Thus, MacPike points out, the New 
Woman novel actualized “the collision between women’s rights and childrearing,” (380) 
by either using “the New Woman as a negative backdrop against which “real” womanly 
behavior, as defined by childbearing, can be foregrounded and validated” (379) or by 
“destroying the New Woman through childbearing” (381). In either instance, this 
inability to “disentangle” the New Woman from the pervasive ideology of the family 
which “is the foundation of Western civilization and which expresses itself through 
compulsory motherhood,” renders the New Woman’s world “unimaginable” (MacPike 
387).   
 As a treatise on free love, The Woman Who Did anticipates the New Woman’s 
potential to reshape the discourse of sexuality, but it also proves to be a problematic task 
in view of society’s longstanding commitment to the Victorian maternal ideal. Prior to 
motherhood, Herminia is an independent, determined, and proud New Woman. She is 
wholly committed to securing “perfect liberty of choice and action” for women, and, in 
an effort to do so, she demonstrates the radical extent of her beliefs by embracing her 
sexual freedom and openly engaging in sexual activity with a man who is not her legal 
husband (Allen 74).  However, aside from the scene of their consummation which depicts 
Herminia’s active role in their sexual encounter (she awaits Alan’s arrival and “frankly” 
welcomes his sexual advances) — Herminia’s sexuality is subdued, not radical or 
revolutionary (Allen 77). As MacPike explains, The Woman Who Did depicts a model of 
female sexuality that coincides with the traditional feminine construct: it is 
“nonthreatening” because it is “monogamous,” and Herminia exhibits her passiveness 
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through her “willingness to subordinate herself to her lover’s superior mental ability” 
(380). Additionally, Herminia’s adherence to the conventional sexual standards of 
passivity and purity is contrasted with the text’s many references to Alan’s ideal 
masculinity, and this structure reiterates typical gender constructs: “Deep down in the 
very roots of the idea of sex we come on that prime antithesis,--the male, active and 
aggressive; the female, sedentary, passive, and receptive” (Allen 82). Alan is virile, 
strong, and dominant, and Herminia is “woman enough by nature to like being led” as 
long as it is “the right man”—the man of her own choosing (58).   
 Despite the narrator’s traditional portrayals of Herminia’s sexuality, the narrative 
itself is constituted on the reader’s acknowledgement of her active female sexuality—by 
what Herminia boldly “did.” Furthermore, the text is fueled by Herminia’s attempts to 
de-stigmatize what she did by projecting a new model of women’s sexuality which 
replaced the sinful and shameful sexual deviance of the fallen woman with the potentially 
transformative and empowering sexual freedom of the New Woman. These alternative 
depictions of female sexuality were certainly threatening because they disconcerted the 
construct of the ideal woman—the passive and passionless Angel of the house—and if 
the sanctity of the feminine ideal was eroded, then the patriarchal structure of the middle-
class family was also at risk.  However, as MacPike describes, the threat of Herminia’s 
discordant sexuality is mitigated through her devotion to the Victorian ideal of 
motherhood (380-381). Herminia’s radical sexual theories exist alongside her very 
traditional understanding of women’s ‘true’ function: “Herminia was far removed indeed 
from that blatant and decadent sect of ‘advanced women’ who talk as though motherhood 
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were a disgrace and a burden, instead of being, as it is, the full realization of woman’s 
faculties, the natural outlet for woman’s wealth of emotion” (Allen 138).  
 The figure of New Woman was inextricably linked to public debates about 
women’s ‘natural’ functions and ‘natural’ instincts, and as Herminia’s distinction here 
illustrates, feminists were also divided about the issue of maternity.  As Emma Liggins 
explains, “the relationship of maternity to female fulfillment in 1890s fiction remained 
uncertain, variously represented as a burden and a source of regenerative female power” 
(“Bad Mothers” 27). One such example of what Herminia identifies as the “advanced 
woman[‘s]” position on maternity materializes in Mona Caird’s Daughters of Danaus 
(1894) (Allen 138). Hadria (Fullerton) Temperley, the novel’s New Woman heroine, 
boldly asserts that motherhood is both biologically and culturally oppressive, and she 
rejects the essentialist argument that women are ‘naturally’ equipped for and emotionally 
fulfilled by the duties of motherhood. Hadria does not reject “motherhood per se” (Caird 
342) but motherhood as it serves as a “means and method of woman’s bondage” in the 
“present social state” (341). Hadria contends that “for thousands of women,” the “birth of 
their children is an intolerable burden,” and rather than sentimentalizing the child as a 
joyful reward for the “fierce misery” of childbirth, Hadria purports that “a woman with a 
child in her arms” is a “symbol of abasement, an indignity”—a reminder of her past 
“humiliation” and present “chains” that have been forged “of her own flesh and blood” 
(342, 341). Hadria discloses these radical ideas to her sister-in-law Henriette, and because 
Henriette views women as ‘naturally’ self-sacrificing and instinctively maternal, 
Henriette finds Hadria’s notions “insane” (342).  In an effort to redirect Hadria away 
from such insulting accusations and reassert the sanctity of motherhood, Henriette 
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reminds Hadria of the “potency” of the “maternal instinct.” In her response, Hadria 
delineates how even that which is seemingly ‘natural’ is “shamefully presumed upon”: 
“Strong it [the potency of the maternal instinct] obviously must be, if industrious 
cultivation and encouragements and threats and exhortations can make it so! All the Past 
as well as the weight of opinion and training in the Present has been at work on it, 
thrusting and alluring and coercing the woman into her man-allotted fate” (Caird 342). 
 Caird’s theories which identified maternity as women’s “man-allotted fate” rather 
than her “Nature-allotted” one, were certainly nuanced ideas that probed beyond the 
conservative scope of mainstream feminist positions [emphasis in original] (Daughters 
342). First-wave feminists reshaped notions of women’s bodily rights, privileged the 
notion of voluntary motherhood, and asserted that women should have the right to abstain 
from sexual intercourse with their husbands except for the purposes of procreation; 
however, they maintained conventional perceptions of the social role of women and of 
female sexuality as it was dominantly configured within the context of motherhood.  In 
addition, many feminists embraced motherhood as their special function and used 
essentialist theories in order to create solidarity among women. Even George Egerton 
(Mary Chavelita Dunne), whom Elaine Showalter describes as being “seen as one of the 
most sexually-charged of the New Women writers,” (“Introduction” xii)  elevated 
maternity as a source of agency for women: “Woman is, if she could only realize it, 
man’s superior, by reason of her maternity—the negation of that is her greatest 
cowardice” (Egerton 2). In a similar fashion, Herminia contends, “every woman should 
naturally wish to live her whole life, to fulfill her whole functions”—to fully realize and 
proudly accept “the orbit for which nature designed her” (Allen 73-74). According to this 
172 
 
 
prevailing understanding of women’s special maternal function, if a woman considers 
herself too “advanced” to embrace this customary trajectory, then she is not brave enough 
to seize her power.  
 Through its clearly-depicted essentialist theories about maternity, The Woman 
Who Did inscribes a familiar pathway for women—a ‘naturalized’ route in which the 
Angel is rewarded for fulfilling her maternal and moral duties. However, through its 
investment in free love and sexual freedom, the text carves a second pathway, and this 
alternative route is uncustomary in that it is both ‘unnatural’ and unideal by cultural and 
social standards. Therefore, the text reasserts that Herminia (and all “good” women) 
should adhere to a collective identity of womanhood through maternity, but this message 
is at variance with Herminia’s insistence on free love as the only means to protect her 
“individuality” and “freedom” (Allen 42). According to Herminia’s theories, which she 
expresses to Alan, she must reject “the ordinary terms of civilized society” (42) and avoid 
“the beaten way” that other women blindly follow (47) in an effort to forge and follow 
her own solitary route: “I choose rather to be free. No fear of your scorn, no dread of your 
bigotry, no shrinking at your cruelty, shall prevent me from following the thorny path I 
know to be the right one. I see no temporal end” (47). As noted by many literary critics at 
the turn of the century as well as today, it is precisely these antithetical sexual politics 
which convolute Herminia’s feminism and the feminist potential of the text. Allison 
Cotes astutely identifies this contradictory nature of the text that troubled audiences then 
and continues to do so now: “Grant Allen…wants to have it both ways”; the “full 
consequences of the plot” can only be materialized through Herminia’s unconventional 
sexuality, “but at the same time, Grant Allen insists on the conventional male/female 
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relationship” as well as on “the old Victorian ideal of the sanctity of motherhood” (8, 10) 
Cote further adds, “This kind of disparity between theory and plot is one of the things 
that makes The Woman Who Did such an unsatisfactory novel” (8).  
 To end the analysis here and attribute this disparity to the structural deficiency of 
The Woman Who Did is to ignore the text as a site that reproduces dominant cultural, 
social, and political structures. Additionally, if we do not contextualize these oppositional 
politics of the text in the historical and cultural practices that shaped them, then we run 
the risk of overlooking how The Woman Who Did, by engaging in an interdiscursive and 
intertextual conversation, unveils and challenges the ideological constraints of a feminist 
tradition rooted in the existing patriarchal structures. That The Woman Who Did fails to 
invent a radical representation of woman is not surprising because it attempts to do so by 
converging new notions of sexual freedom with old notions of Angelic maternity. When 
Herminia discovers that she is pregnant, she must envision herself as both sexually 
liberated New Woman and mother; she must determine a way to continue along on her 
self-made “thorny path” where she can maintain her freedom and autonomy despite her 
transition into motherhood—into a collective feminine experience that is traditionally 
constructed on the precepts of conformity and submission rather than on emancipatory 
feminist politics of self-development and individual fulfillment. Additionally, after Alan 
dies of typhoid, Herminia must rethink her role to be “father and mother in one”—to take 
on all of the parental responsibilities of her daughter Dolores (Dolly). Thus, the text 
draws attention to what Ann Taylor Allen describes as “the maternal dilemma,”—the 
predicament of merging individuality and motherhood that she explores in her book 
Feminism and Motherhood in Western Europe, 1890-1970. Ann Taylor Allen explains 
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that “the conception of motherhood as a dilemma” surfaced in the 1890s as a result of 
feminist efforts to promote “freely chosen motherhood” as a “realistic—though still often 
unattainable—aspiration” (1). As this predicament became a central focus for many 
women, feminists attempted to create solutions by  “extol[ing] motherhood as woman’s 
distinctive contribution to society” and by developing a “maternalist ideology and 
practice” founded on “utopian visions of a world where motherhood would enhance 
rather than limit women’s freedom” (Taylor Allen 13).  
  In order to create arguments that privileged motherhood as a source of agency 
and power, feminists often appropriated the discourse and theories of eugenics. As Lucy 
Bland posits in Banishing the Beast, eugenics offered feminists “the potential of scientific 
validation and reinforcement of moral purity beliefs” (230).  “Genetic purity and moral 
purity” proved to be a productive pairing in that they “mutually” reinforced one another 
in their alleged philanthropic aims (Bland 230). In addition to these benefits, feminists 
looked to eugenics to capitalize on their motherly duties: “But within the Eugenic 
Programme women were not simply the objects of eugencial direction, they were also the 
subjects of eugencial didactics” (230). Thus, in their role as educators to other women, 
feminists “were to be at the forefront of pronouncing on ‘responsible motherhood,’” and 
this potentially offered women “substantial power—power to dictate to others—not 
dissimilar from that exercised within philanthropy” (Banishing 230).45 My purpose in 
                                                 
45
 Although a more in-depth discussion of eugenics, feminism, and population control is beyond the scope 
of this project, it is worth noting a few contextual elements here. First, as Lucy Bland points out, even non-
eugenist feminists appropriated the discourse of eugenics.  Second, although feminists were focused on 
issues related to moral and sexual purity, by incorporating the rhetoric of eugenics (the production of ‘fit’ 
offspring and the purification of the race), they implicated themselves in the miscegenous ideals of the 
eugenics movement, and as Bland describes, this is certainly upsetting to feminists today. Third, eugenics 
may have appealed to feminists, but as Bland mentions, “in many cases, eugenists were explicitly anti-
feminist in their accusations against the women’s movement as the promoters of sterility” (234). See 
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providing this brief description of the relationship between feminism and eugenics here is 
to reiterate how a tradition of elevated motherhood permeated the cultural landscape and 
informed the late-nineteenth century feminist agenda. Liberal feminist politics cast new 
light on the physical and emotional struggles of mothers; however, feminist claims for 
women’s rights to individuality, personal fulfillment, and influence in the public sphere 
drew on the rhetoric and imagery of women’s privileged and empowered role as mothers. 
This model imposed restrictions on feminist progress, for it was framed in contradictions 
and ambivalence. How could society recognize the New Woman as an autonomous 
individual if she continued to resort to her collective identity as mother? 
 As illustrated in The Woman Who Did, Herminia, who realizes that her original 
“mission had failed” because of Alan’s death, actualizes this predicament when she 
embraces motherhood in order to cultivate her utopian feminist vision (Allen 138). The 
narrator explains that motherhood will grant Herminia “social and moral salvation,” and 
initially, when Dolores (Dolly) is still a child, motherhood affords Herminia personal 
strength, a renewed sense of faith in her cause, and a means to re-actualize her mission 
(Allen 138). She projects her hopes onto her daughter, who will become “the world’s true 
savior” by “tak[ing] up the task” that Herminia is unable to complete (138, 128). 
Herminia reasons that Dolly’s “noble birthright of liberty” destines her to become “the 
apostolate of women” (138), and it is through the prospect of her daughter’s commitment 
to her mother’s spirit of individualism and reform that Herminia finds fulfillment: “Her 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chapter 6 (“Eugenics, the Politics of Selective Breeding and Feminist Appropriation”) in Lucy Bland’s 
Banishing the Beast. Also see Linda Gordon’s article “Why Nineteenth Century-Feminists Did Not Support 
‘Birth Control’ and Twentieth-Century Feminists Do: Feminism, Reproduction, and the Family,” (1982) in 
which she illustrates that unlike the eugenicists, first-wave feminists advocated voluntary motherhood and 
abstinence, not the legalization of contraception, as a means of population control.  
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one wish now was to make Dolly press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling 
she herself by mere accident had missed so narrowly. Her own life was done; Alan’s 
death had made her task impossible; but if Dolly could fill her place for the sake of 
humanity, she would not regret it” (150-151).  
 Despite the narrator’s insistence that “every good woman is by nature a 
mother,”—that women should embrace their gendered duties—the text challenges the 
premise that this collective notion of maternal feminine identity also functions as a means 
of individual fulfillment and empowerment for the New Woman (Allen 138). Herminia 
looks to motherhood as a fresh start and as an opportunity to redirect her feminist 
mission, and thus the text entertains the possibility that feminists can create a new world 
by way of “old” motherly ideals—that motherhood can serve to “enhance rather than 
limit women’s freedom” (Taylor Allen 13). However, as Herminia discovers after about 
twelve years, motherhood is only partially fulfilling. The narrator explains, “And she was 
happy in her life; as far as a certain tranquil sense of duty done could make her, she was 
passively happy” (Allen 151). Post-motherhood, Herminia is certainly not the same 
“vigorous” and animated woman that she once was (10). Herminia’s sense of herself and 
the world around her is no longer dynamic; she acquiesces to a disconnected life in which 
duty is the only form of happiness and fulfillment that she knows. In embracing her 
‘natural’ role as a “devoted mother,” she must relinquish her identity as a free-thinking 
and autonomous New Woman and become “a machine for the production of articles and 
reviews” in order to support herself and her daughter (151).  Through these examples 
then, the text suggests that Herminia relinquishes her New Womanliness in order to 
become a good mother who is self-sacrificing, passive, and passionless.  However, the 
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text also reminds readers that Herminia is invested in motherhood for its feminist 
potential. Herminia is willing to sacrifice her happiness and her creative freedom and 
devote everything to her maternal duties not only because she is ‘naturally’ a selfless 
mother, but because Herminia believes that her sacrifices will yield personal triumph. She 
reasons that “if Dolly could fill her place for the sake of humanity,” then all her sacrifices 
and suffering would be worthwhile (151).  
 By depicting Herminia’s maternal duty as an agency for personal fulfillment, The 
Woman Who Did subverts the Victorian construct of the selfless mother, and it 
appropriates the first-wave feminist discourse of maternal empowerment through its 
examination of the competing interests between motherhood and individualism. For 
Herminia, ideal motherhood serves as a way for her to redirect her feminist vision: she 
must sacrifice herself so that her daughter can rise up in her place. However, Dolly has no 
desire to take up her mother’s mission. In fact, despite Herminia’s diligence in guiding 
Dolly toward “the freest and most rational ideas,” Dolly’s moral and social outlook is 
extremely commonplace (Allen 180). Dolly demonstrates none of her mother’s 
iconoclasm, free-spiritedness, or feminist energy; “she show[s] her individuality only by 
evolving for herself all the threadbare platitudes of ordinary convention” (180). As 
Herminia is confronted with the unsatisfying reality of her daughter’s character, the text 
asserts that her individualistic model of motherhood has failed:  
To Herminia this slow discovery, as it dawned bit by bit upon her, put the 
final thorn in her crown of martyrdom. The child on whose education she 
had spent so much pains, the child whose success in the deep things of life 
was to atone for her own failure, the child who was born to be the apostle 
of freedom to her sisters in darkness, had turned out in the most earnest 
essentials of character a complete disappointment, and had ruined the last 
hope that bound her to existence. (182) 
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 As indicated in this passage, Herminia’s inability to successfully mother Dolly in 
her New Womanly ways is too much for her to bear. Through references like the “final 
thorn” and “last hope,” the narrator foreshadows Herminia’s suicide as a direct result of 
Dolly’s atavism (Allen 182).  Herminia’s suicide occurs five years later shortly after 
Dolly, who is seventeen and “informally engaged to Walter Brydges,” learns of her 
illegitimacy and informs her mother that “no right-minded girl who respected herself” 
could continue to associate with a woman like Herminia (199, 218). Dolly, who is 
angered and ashamed that her mother had “cruelly” denied her the justice of “an 
honorable birthright,” seeks the guidance and protection of her paternal grandfather, Sir 
Anthony Merrick (214). Impressed that Dolly is “a sensible, modest, and healthy English 
maiden,” and sympathetic to the “sad history” that Herminia had imposed upon her, Sir 
Anthony Merrick offers to make Dolly his adopted daughter, give her his last name, and 
support her marriage to Walter (215). Dolly joyfully accepts her grandfather’s proposed 
arrangement, although she laments that she cannot go through with the marriage. Dolly 
informs her mother of her plans and explains why she regretfully cannot marry Walter: 
“For, of course, while you live, I couldn’t think of marrying him. I couldn’t think of 
burdening an honest man with such a mother-in-law as you are!” (218-219). That night, 
Herminia drinks a phial of prussic acid, and “like some saint of the middle ages,” she 
takes her own life (223). She leaves Dolly a letter in which she begins by describing her 
suicide as an act of maternal self-sacrifice: “I had but one task left in life—to make you 
happy. Now I find I only stand in the way of that object, no reason remains why I should 
endure any longer the misfortune of living” (220). Yet, the narrative foreshadows that 
Herminia’s suicide is motivated by other reasons—that Herminia is not easily codified as  
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a traditional fallen mother who must offer up her own life in order to redeem her 
wrongdoings. Because the text dismantles the typical pure/fallen construct of woman and 
recasts Herminia’s sexual freedom as ascension rather than a fall, The Woman Who Did 
insists that Herminia is “pure and good,” not fallen and sinful (33). Thus, if the text 
consistently rejects that Herminia is a fallen woman, then it would follow that we are not 
meant to read Herminia’s death as the inevitable fate of the fallen woman—as final 
sacrifice for her sexual transgressions.  
 Instead, the conclusion of the novel functions to reiterate what the narrator has 
insisted on all along—Herminia cannot thrive and facilitate social progress in a world 
that is unwilling to challenge the dominant cultural and moral codes. The remainder of 
Herminia’s letter revisits what the text had earlier foreshadowed—that Herminia’s 
“complete disappointment” in Dolly’s orthodoxy had finally run its course and “had 
ruined the last hope that bound her to existence” (Allen 182).  Even in her last moments, 
Herminia maintains that her cause was one “of truth and righteousness” and that her 
course was just (221). Herminia’s error was that she overestimated the power of her 
maternal individualism: “My darling, I thought you would grow up to feel as I did; I 
thought you would thank me for leading you to see such things as the blind world is 
incapable of seeing. There I made a mistake; and sorely am I punished for it” (221). Here, 
Herminia discloses that she is being “punished” for the “mistake” of misguided 
aspiration—for believing that she would be capable of making Dolly “feel” and “see” 
beyond the dictates of the “blind world” (220, 221). Yet in the concluding lines of the 
novel, the narrator reasserts Herminia’s blamelessness: her “soul” is “stainless” (223). 
Herminia dies because she is a social and moral visionary; she is stifled by the “ordinary 
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inhabitant” of society, who, like Dolly, is bound by an “ineffable slough of moral 
darkness” (182). 
 The conclusion of The Woman Who Did insists that even though Herminia is not 
successful, her contribution will serve as the foundation for future social progress: “Not 
for nothing does blind fate vouchsafe such martyrs to humanity. From their graves shall 
spring the glorious church of the future” (Allen 223)46. However, the text is never able to 
articulate exactly how this  “glorious church of the future”—how more free-thinking New 
Women will “spring” up from the efforts of martyred New Women like Herminia if, as 
the novel asserts, individual identities are naturally constituted, not culturally constructed. 
Through the example of Dolly, the text maintains that the belief systems of individuals 
are biologically determined—that nature bestows each human being with an essential 
nature, with a self uninfluenced and unaffected by social, cultural, or political forces: 
“There is no more silly and persistent error than the belief of parents that they can 
influence to any appreciable extent the moral ideas and impulses of their children. These 
things have their springs in the bases of character: they are the flower of individuality; 
and they cannot be altered or affected after birth by the foolishness of preaching” (183-
184).  The text also ‘naturalizes’ gendered identities, especially in regard to female 
identity, which, according to the text is ‘naturally’ maternal. Thus, these many essentialist 
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 Throughout The Woman Who Did the narrator employs religious rhetoric to describe Herminia’s 
character and her mission, and Herminia’s direct discourse also reiterates how she identifies herself as “a 
moral pioneer” and “a martyr” (44). Herminia specifies that her life’s goal is to “seek the Truth before all 
things” in order to “emancipate” the world from “social and moral slaveries” (25).  Early on in the 
narrative, when Herminia explains why she must reject Alan’s offer of marriage, she tells him, “Every great 
and good life can but end in a Calvary” (45).  This element of foreshadowing along with narrator’s frequent 
emphasis on Herminia’s purity and righteousness substantiates that Herminia’s death is not a shameful act 
of self-redemption for her falleness. Instead, as the Calvary reference suggests, Herminia’s martyrdom 
mirrors that of Jesus: her soul is “stainless,” her cause is just, and her admirable and heroic death will 
inspire future followers (“the church of the future”) (223). 
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assumptions foreground a narrative which ultimately asks readers to rethink the very 
essentialist notions that ‘naturalized’ feminine sexual purity.47 Through Herminia, this 
contradiction is manifested in her “unpractical utopianism:” she envisions a perfect world 
where women can become free individuals, but she herself is unable to imagine a new 
image of woman severed from her collective maternal identity and duties. 
 In “Grant Allen’s The Woman Who Did: Spencerian Individualism and Teaching 
New Women to Be Mothers,” Brooke Cameron argues that The Woman Who Did 
illustrates Grant Allen’s attempt to actualize the development of “self-regulating and 
independent” individuals through  “the Spencerian ideal of progressive evolution” (281). 
Cameron points out that “despite his firm commitment to nature’s absolute authority,” 
The Woman Who Did illustrates “Allen’s deeper struggle to balance the natural and the 
social individual” (284). As a result, Allen asserts that New Women must be properly 
guided toward liberation and “must be taught to recognize their individualism as bound 
up with service to social reproduction and evolutionary process” (Cameron 291).  In this 
model, the New Woman becomes an autonomous individual and joins “the glorious 
church of the future” because she has been culturally conditioned to naturalize 
motherhood into her identity (Allen 223). Her potential to become free and free-thinking 
is hinged with the condition that she must “freely” think of herself as a maternal 
individual. 
 That The Woman Who Did portrays some skepticism about a noninterventionalist 
model wherein “nature” is solely responsible for cultivating women’s maternal instincts 
                                                 
47In Chapter 1, I argue that The Woman Who Did develops a radical redefinition of purity by rejecting the 
notion that the ideal woman must adhere to traditional standards of sexual purity. 
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reiterates a cultural anxiety about the New Woman’s threatening potential to create a 
vision of womanhood in which woman is severed from her “natural” position. Similarly, 
this cultural anxiety about woman’s sexual function also pervaded and informed first-
wave feminist ideology at the turn of the century: like Herminia, feminists struggled to 
de-naturalize the arguments that sustained their oppression, but when liberal notions of 
individualism and self-fulfillment raised questions about women’s sexuality and sexual 
functions, feminists often reasserted an image of collective feminine identity wherein 
women were instinctively pure, moral, and maternal. Additionally, as evidenced by 
feminist campaigns at the turn of the century, feminists engaged in conversations about 
sexual issues in order to speak out against male sexual behavior, to raise awareness about 
the sexual dangers that women face, and to implement a new sexual code which 
encouraged both men and women to adhere to the standards of sexual and moral purity. 
 This approach to sexual issues served as a general framework for most feminists 
even throughout the sexology and sex reform movements of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. As Jeffreys explains, “the work of the sexologists and their 
popularisers introduced a whole new way of thinking and talking about sex”; however, 
“their ideas were directly at variance with those of feminists involved in the campaign to 
challenge the construction of male sexuality” and refute separate sphere ideology 
(Spinster 128).48 It was not until the 1920s that women began to exhibit new attitudes 
about their sexuality, but as Jeffreys illustrates, these campaigns arose in response to the 
                                                 
48
 See Chapter 7, “Antifeminism and Sex Reform before the First World War,” in Shelia Jeffrey’s The 
Spinster and Her Enemies. Jeffrey describes how historians tend to praise Havelock Ellis (and the 
contributions of other late-nineteenth and early-twentieth sexologists) for challenging “the puritan sexual 
morality of the nineteenth century” and for asserting that women could experience sexual pleasure and had 
a right to do so (129), but she asserts that “from a feminist prospective his contribution does not look 
positive” (129). Jeffreys analyzes how Ellis uses theories of innate difference to redefine sexual relations in 
a way that objectifies women and reasserts their submissiveness, and she therefore contends that “Ellis’s 
views can be recognized as staples of antifeminist ideology today” (129). 
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sexology movement: “Rather than being about the opening up to men and women the 
possibility of sexual choice, the 1920s sexual revolution was about narrowing women’s 
options to the role of complements to men in the act of sexual intercourse” (Spinster 192-
193). “New Feminism” of the early twentieth century promoted models of active female 
sexuality and pleasure and privileged women’s roles as mothers, but in doing so, it 
yielded to the demands of sexologists who “did not suddenly take a humanitarian interest 
in maximising women’s sexual response” (Spinster 185). As Jeffreys describes, “rather 
they took an interest in quelling feminism and women’s critique of men’s sexual behavior 
by eliciting from women a sexual response the sexologists believed to be intrinsically 
linked with total surrender to men’s power and dominance” (Spinster 185).  
 The trajectory of feminism and sexology from 1895 to the 1920s is certainly 
much more complex then the brief description that I have offered, but since this chapter 
focuses on how the New Woman novel contributes to an ongoing struggle to reconstruct 
female sexuality, it seems significant to point out how even this later projection of the 
feminist position on women’s sexuality exhibits women’s  inability to facilitate change 
on their own terms, to deconstruct the “natural” forces that restricted their feminist aims 
in some way or another. In the late nineteenth century, feminists clung to what was 
deemed to be “natural” and ideal womanly behavior: moral and sexual purity. In the early 
twentieth century, new feminists also gravitated toward what culture prescribed as 
“natural” womanly behavior, but by then male sexologists had developed a new 
perception of natural law. In this new model, women were no longer “naturally” asexual 
or sexually nonresponsive: they had sexual capacities and erotic desires, and within a 
heterosexual marriage, women had a right to sexual enjoyment. Both of these models 
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maintained that woman was “naturally” maternal; however, in opposition to the Victorian 
representation “in which woman was allowed to be reproductive but not sexual in her 
own right,” early-twentieth-century feminism eroticized reproduction: women received 
“physical gratification” for fulfilling their natural duties as wives and mothers (Jeffreys 
Spinster 139).  Nonetheless, feminist vision during both the pre and the post- First World 
War eras was regulated by woman’s commitment to her “natural” sexual functions, and 
because authoritative scientific, medical, and cultural influences were able to manipulate 
definitions of nature to serve their own purposes, feminist ideals were often constructed 
upon the very patriarchal foundations that women sought to dismantle. Feminist progress 
was incessantly thwarted by cultural interventions designed to socially condition women 
into their “natural” roles. As illustrated by The Woman Who Did, the New Woman’s 
notions of sexuality and individuality are potentially threatening; however, her 
“unpractical utopianism” is evidence of her struggle to control the means of her 
ideological reconditioning and develop a new self-awareness—a feminist consciousness 
that is pragmatic and effectual because it is no longer responsive to the culturally 
imposed injunctions of nature.  
 First-wave feminists realized that the first step toward gaining some control over 
the dominant discourses which defined their identities was to assert their right to voice 
their opinions in the public sphere and to confront the “chamber of horrors” that pervaded 
the public and private lives of women (Butler An Appeal 146). As I examined in the 
beginning of this chapter, traditionalists maintained that the “decent barriers” that 
separated the pure from the fallen and the clean from unclean must remain intact (Barr 
460). They reasserted the sanctity of separate spheres to argue that women pose risks to 
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their moral and sexual purity when they enter threatening public spaces or when they 
come in contact with any ideas capable of arousing “a prurient curiosity” (Barr 459).  Yet 
feminists recognized that they could not empower themselves or their cause without 
knowledge, and the New Woman novel became a vehicle for that knowledge—for 
naming the “unnamable things” and unveiling the veiled issues which, for too long, had 
been kept from women in the name of respectability (Barr 460).  
 Consequently, as illustrated by both the backlash against New Woman writers 
who tackled “instinctively shrouded” topics in their literature and the Secular party’s 
objections to the tasteful and respectful campaigns against the C.D. Acts, many members 
of society certainly did support a model of ignorance for young women and maintained 
that even for the beneficent purposes of education or philanthropy, women should not 
deal with such topics (Oliphant 145)49. This opposition to the emergence of a more open 
                                                 
49In the Ignorance versus Education debate, those in favor of “ignorance” opposed any form of sexual 
education for women.  However, it is worth noting that the arguments in favor of education were still 
highly conservative with regard to what content women should be exposed to and how that content should 
be delivered to them. Supporters of female sexual education believed that access to sexual knowledge 
would help to protect women’s sexual integrity. Thus, in contrast to other sex reform movements of the late 
nineteenth century, this feminist movement sought to reform public opinion about a woman’s access to 
knowledge, but it did little to challenge the dominant sexual attitudes and the standard of sexual behavior 
that defined womanhood. In other words, feminists may have sought to ‘reform’ the system of sexual 
education, but their purpose in supporting this change was to safeguard the traditional image of female 
sexuality; they argued that more women would be pure and angelic if they were not so ignorant of sexual 
matters. This is the approach used by The British Medical Journal in its 1896 reviews of Wolstenholme 
Elmy’s Baby Buds and Lucas Cleeve’s The Woman Who Wouldn’t, which are both identified as sexual 
education publications. Although Baby Buds is as a sexual education manual, and The Woman Who 
Wouldn’t is a work of fiction, The British Medical Journal notes that each of these texts are valid and 
worthwhile contributions to the field of sexual education because they tactfully discuss sexual matters for 
the purposes of prevention. Of Baby Buds, the critic writes, “The author considers that it is far better to 
teach children simply and seriously how life originates than to let curiosity become prurient and inquiry 
indecent. . . A very difficult and delicate matter is treated with considerable skill, although many will think 
that it had better have been left alone” (28). Of The Woman Who Wouldn’t, the critic writes, “In this story 
very risqué matters are treated with considerable deftness and delicacy. Though the light from within must 
in each individual be the guide to deliver from the pitfalls of sensuality, it may be well that the conscience 
of some be aroused on the possible prostitution of marriage” (28).  In contrast, Havelock Ellis’s Sexual 
Inversion (which was originally co-authored with John Addington Symonds and published in 1896), which 
is certainly a major contribution to the debate about sexual education, was not well-received or recognized 
as proper sexual education material. See Sean Brady’s John Addington Symonds and Homosexuality: A 
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dialogue about sexual issues as well as women’s involvement in it generated much public 
debate about the moral and sexual education of young girls. Following the publication of 
Barr’s “Conversational Immoralities” in 1890, The North American Review further 
developed the debate by publishing “Audacity in Women Novelists,” by influential 
literary critic George Parsons Lathrop. Although Lathrop is initially sympathetic to Barr’s 
concerns regarding the dangerous potential of sensual conversations, he refutes her 
position and asserts that in order to protect a young woman from “contamination,” the 
focus must be on building up her spirit, an outcome which is best achieved through “the 
right training” and “clear knowledge,” not through ignorance (610). Lathrop contends 
that women authors are vital to this task of education, and he applauds them for choosing 
“to deal frankly with sin and vice and crime as a part of the spectacle of life” (614). 
According to Lathrop, discussions of such topics are often “mortifying” and 
“unpleasant,” but much like feminists acknowledged the ill-effect of silence, Lathrop also 
acknowledges how progress begins with exposure: “But as we are all obliged to live 
under the shadow of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, it will be wise to make the 
best of our lot, and to throw as much light as possible into the shadow, in the hope of 
finally dispersing it” (614). He adds, “women can aid in doing this quite as well as men, 
and possibly, in the end, much more efficaciously than men” (614).  
 Lathrop proclaims that the field of literature as well as society benefits from a 
culture that values women’s free expression and access to knowledge; however, 
Lathrop’s support here seems to extend beyond his interest in women’s social function: 
“The instinctive and vigorous advance of women towards the free and open discussion of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Critical Edition of Sources (2012), in which he discusses the scandal of the text’s publication as well as the 
public’s resistance to sexual knowledge about homosexuality (31-32).   
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matters which are possibly of even more vital moment to them than to any one else 
appears to me most encouraging” (616). These open discussions of sexual issues are so 
important to women because exploration allows for possibility, for unregulated thought 
and ideas. Lathrop writes, “If women express themselves freely in books, they will learn 
to understand their own nature better than they do now, and men also will understand it 
better” (617). The problem with Lathrop’s reasoning here is that he assumes that there is 
but one “nature” to discover. Although Lathrop misconceives the outcome of women’s 
free expression, his argument in support of knowledge over ignorance and its potential to 
foster individual self-development for women is a notable contribution to feminist 
progress. For, once woman is granted the license to “freely” think, she will find, as Mona 
Caird describes, that “’Human nature’ has more variety of powers and is more responsive 
to conditions than we imagine. It is hard to believe in things for which we feel no 
capacity in ourselves, but fortunately such things exist in spite of our placid 
unconsciousness” (“Marriage” 197). 
 As a contribution to the late-nineteenth-century debate about women’s sexual 
ignorance, Lucas Cleeve’s The Woman Who Wouldn’t illustrates that through the very act 
of interrogating sexual topics, the New Woman novel is able to inscribe a new discursive 
direction which explores alternative representations of female sexuality. In doing so, The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t asserts the New Woman’s right to self-actualization and self-
definition and beckons her to harness these newfound rights in order to confront and 
dismantle the social and cultural forces that ‘naturalized’ her identity. In the preface to 
the first edition of the novel, Cleeve declares that her literary work is purposefully crafted 
to attack the notion that ignorance is the safeguard of women’s innocence. She defends 
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Allen’s The Woman Who Did against critics’ claims of indecency and impropriety, and 
also given that The Woman Who Wouldn’t explores the same subject matter as The 
Woman Who Did, it is evident that Cleeve positions herself as a proponent for women’s 
right to sexual knowledge. Cleeve explains that The Woman Who Wouldn’t serves as “an 
appeal to all those who have daughters”: “The age of ignorance (miscalled innocence) is 
over, and it behoves those who can influence our women to influence them rightly, and to 
give them some good reason for marriage” (v).  
 In the preface to the second edition of The Woman Who Wouldn’t, Cleeve defends 
herself against the “uncultivated” and “narrow-minded” reviews from critics who claimed 
that her novel is “indecent” (vii-viii). Once again, Cleeve affirms her position by 
reminding the public that “the question of marriage and the relations between husband 
and wife” is certainly not immoral or indecent (viii). Cleeve reports that the first edition 
of her novel sold out in under three weeks and that more are being printed to “meet the 
demand” (vii). She then reasons, “let us hope” that “the dear, pure-minded, Sunday-
loving, cleanly British public would not clamor for it [the novel] as they are doing now” 
if it was indeed an “an indecent book” (viii, vii). Cleeve points to the novel’s commercial 
success as proof that it was about time that a novel frankly examined the negative effects 
of women’s ignorance—that the public was receptive to a new tradition of privileging 
knowledge over naïveté. Cleeve also cites that “the greatest praise” that she has received 
is “the certainty of the spirit of bitter animosity it has aroused in men” [emphasis in 
original] (viii). Cleeve explains that she had “expected this” response from men and that 
she “rejoice[s] at the realization” of her expectations (viii). That the circulation and 
content of The Woman Who Wouldn’t provoked fierce opposition from traditionally 
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minded men suggests that they recognized how women’s access to knowledge and 
propensity for free thought potentially threatened to dismantle the underlying patriarchal 
forces that regulated the social and sexual interactions between men and men. The 
production and control of sexual knowledge was yet another way for men to maintain 
absolute power over the bodies and minds of women. 
 The lesson that The Woman Who Wouldn’t provides readers about the sexual 
education of young women is that it is the duty of good mothers to inform their daughters 
about the sexual requirements of marriage and guide them to understand marital sex as 
part of God’s plan. The narrative chronicles how Opalia’s confusion and misjudgment 
about the relations between the sexes could have been avoided if her mother had only 
been more open with her. Instead, Mrs. Woodgate belongs to the generation of ignorance; 
when Opalia seeks her sexual advice, Mrs. Woodgate responds by referencing past 
conventions: “In my day girls knew nothing of these things, still less spoke of them” 
(Cleeve 7). And because Mrs. Woodgate was accustomed to ignorance as a young girl, 
she maintains this tradition with Opalia. As a young woman, what Opalia learns about 
these intimate matters is by chance, and what she discovers is absolutely terrifying:  
Many years afterwards she told her husband what it was [that] had given 
her these thoughts. It was not the Girton teaching, but a conversation she 
had overheard without her wishing it between her brother and a man 
cousin the day of a wedding. Opalia had been a bridesmaid. Oh, how 
miserable she felt to be a woman at all. How she had crept to her room 
with tingling, flaming cheeks, to think that during the day and night that 
was what people thought about. The clergy, the verger, the guests, all 
knew the ordeal that was to come. Oh, to think that the end of their prayers 
in God’s House, the lovely music, the lovely flowers, the pure white robes, 
the lovely faces of the bridesmaids, all that was sweetest and purest was to 
end thus. And all the world knew it. (8-9)  
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 This incidental encounter with sexual knowledge forms the basis of Opalia’s 
outlook on marriage, and through “daily contact with passion in its lowest and most 
degrading forms,” Opalia becomes more and more convinced that her commitment to 
celibacy is the only sure way to escape the degradation and the horrors of wifedom 
(Cleeve 87). Throughout Opalia’s individual quest for sexual knowledge, she only 
encounters images and situations that portray sex as dangerous and destructive force: 
“Everywhere passion and its results were exhibited in the most horrible form” (47). As 
Opalia discovers through the example of Mrs. Kerr, even sexuality espoused in 
motherhood is appalling: Mrs. Kerr is a “pale wan little woman, expecting her eleventh 
baby,” yet she is married to a reverend who preaches celibacy to male purity leagues 
(47).  Given Opalia’s moral education which coincides with the ideal Victorian construct 
of “purity and modesty” and all the threatening images of sexuality that confront Opalia 
from day to day, her disgust and terror seem to be felicitous and judicious responses (11). 
How is Opalia to conceive of sex in any other way, and why, after all that she has seen, 
would she be willing to debase her purity and “sacrifice her principles” to engage in an 
act that devours and defiles everything and everyone around her?  The majority of the 
narrative is dedicated to exploring these dilemmas, and eventually, after Alan is seduced 
by Lady Morris, Opalia’s predicament consumes her: “The question now was whether 
she should submit for the sake of retaining her husband’s love, or whether she should 
leave him for ever. The problem was too great for her. Either way she could not see 
before her. In one moment to undo the cherished ideas of her life was as hard and 
repugnant to her as the idea of leaving Alan” (206).  
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 It is not until Opalia seeks comfort and advice from Lady Neath that she finds 
peace and answers to her many questions. Lady Neath is a stranger from Whitechapel, 
who prior to Opalia’s discovery of Alan’s unfaithfulness, sends Opalia a letter offering 
guidance. She writes to Opalia, “Forgive a stranger for addressing you, but your eyes 
speak from a world through which I have been. You, who preach, do you not need solace 
and comfort?” (180-181).   When Opalia is confronted with the reality of her husband’s 
affair, she is seized with “despair,” “deep sadness” and “degradation,” and in her moment 
of great agony, she recalls Lady Neath’s letter and decides “yes, it had been sent her by a 
kind providence” (196, 199). This plot element is certainly contrived to say the least, yet 
Lady Neath functions as the wise, spiritual mother who is able to conclude the 
precautionary tale of The Woman Who Wouldn’t by informing Opalia what she should 
have learned in the first place: “God has made woman the keeper of man’s soul. Till 
woman recognizes that her whole mission in life is the redemption of man’s soul either 
by the education of the sons or by the winning of her husband, there will be no peace, no 
happiness in the world” (218).   
 As Opalia learns life’s great lesson and finally finds peace and joy with Alan and 
her child, Cleeve also completes her “appeal” in support of a new model of sexual 
education for young women: mothers must provide their daughters with sexual 
knowledge because, left to their own devices, daughters may find that, like Opalia, their 
happiness may be thwarted by the “greatest curse”—the “power” of self-analysis (v, 43). 
Through her self-exploration, Opalia cannot articulate a way to meet the competing 
demands of purity and passion. Thus, much like Herminia, Opalia is a New Woman who 
must be redirected to nature. She must learn that “men [are] not built the same as women, 
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and that the only possible life between men and women [is] the recognized one” wherein 
woman must “submit for the sake of retaining her husband’s love” (Cleeve 205-206). 
Thus, the text seems to overturn its initial subversive potential because it looks to control 
the sexual ‘knowledges’ that women may acquire as a result of self-exploration. Much as 
The Woman Who Did aligns the New Woman’s individuality with her social function, 
The Woman Who Wouldn’t emphasizes a woman’s right to access sexual knowledge as a 
means to reposition her sexual identity within the confines of ideal femininity and to 
extol woman’s sexual sacrifice as the fulfillment of her ‘natural’ function to appease and 
redeem man. 
 In The Woman Who Wouldn’t, the ‘proper’ knowledge that Opalia receives from 
Lady Neath enables her to accept the ‘natural’ terms that have constructed female sexual 
identity. As a result of her education, she is rewarded with “the beautiful compensation” 
of motherhood, and once again, the text maintains that for a woman self-fulfillment and 
individual happiness can only be attained within the ‘natural’ order of things (Cleeve 
217). In the closing lines of the novel, the narrator proclaims that “for the horrors of 
womanhood, God [provides] a compensating joy, the exquisite, incomparable joy of 
maternity,” and the narrative concludes by referencing Opalia’s joy, which she has finally 
attained as a result of her compliance (225). Although The Woman Who Wouldn’t affirms 
that maternity has resolved all of Opalia’s dilemmas and that Lady Neath’s theories have 
adequately answered all her questions, this narrative solution fails to work out all of the 
complex theoretical concerns that Opalia unveils during her quest for self-knowledge. 
The novel attempts to warn readers about the follies of a young woman’s misguided 
inquisitiveness, yet in the very process of developing this lesson, Opalia’s interrogation 
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of female sexuality and the dynamics of sexual power cultivates a space for the New 
Woman to challenge the monolithic model of female sexuality on her own terms.  
 Through her commitment to celibacy, Opalia seeks to embody the feminine ideal 
of purity in both theory and practice; in other words, she attempts to actualize her identity 
within a prescribed collective construct. Yet, in her efforts to elevate sexual purity as the 
only means to emancipate women to and to engender a marital relationship that coincides 
with this theory, Opalia begins to experience sexual desire: “Passion, the all-absorbing 
passion, which she met and combated everywhere, was wearing away the hours of her 
life, and twixt her longing to be with Alan, and her fear of meeting him, her life became 
almost intolerable” (Cleeve 88). Given that Opalia has ever only conceived of “passion in 
its lowest and most degrading forms,” Opalia’s acknowledgement of sexual desire 
challenges the model of sexual purity that she has inscribed for herself (87). Additionally, 
Opalia’s “longing to be with Alan” depicts an image of female sexuality that does not 
correspond with proper feminine behavior (88). As indicated in this passage, Opalia is 
not pure in mind and in thought: she actively thinks about satisfying her fleshly desires 
and recognizes how unbearable life is without the prospect of sexual fulfillment. 
Furthermore, Opalia questions whether she will be able to sustain her mission of sexual 
purity because she is so overcome with sexual longing. She is filled with “fear” by the 
idea of meeting Alan because she experiences sexual desire that she may want to 
suppress.  
 The Woman Who Wouldn’t eventually reestablishes the tie between female 
sexuality and maternity and repositions Opalia’s sexual behavior within the realm of her 
‘natural’ reproductive function, yet this does not overwrite Opalia’s attempt to understand 
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her sexuality on her own terms—on the basis of her individual wants and desires rather 
than on the ideals that ‘nature’ has prescribed for her. Thus, the other lesson that The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t presents is how difficult it is for the New Woman to break free 
from the rigid binaries that structured ideological frameworks in both literature and in 
life. As depicted in Alan’s painting, Opalia has been culturally conditioned to see two 
competing visions of woman: one is a “figure of Purity,” and the other is a “portrait of 
Passion” (Cleeve 51). The pure woman exerts the “deepest love,” because she is 
‘naturally’ pure and good (51). In marriage, she becomes the angel of the house by 
maintaining her sexual innocence, and it is only she who can thrive as an ideal wife and 
mother. Conversely, the passionate woman is ‘unnaturally’ “wild” and “sensual,” and her 
sexual deviance leads her down a loveless path (42). In this model, “female nature” is 
regulated on a continuum of two extremes: on one end is the pure and passionless “good” 
woman and on the other is the unvirtuous and sexualized “bad” woman. Opalia 
suppresses her sexual desire because she constantly confronts the limits of this dichotomy 
and realizes that within this restrictive model there is no way to merge sexual passion 
with ideal love, even in heterosexual marriage. Thus, in exploring notions of proper 
female sexuality and women’s sexual education, The Woman Who Wouldn’t exposes how 
the cultural construct of ‘female nature’ does not truly define woman. As Opalia 
discovers that she cannot be codified within this fabricated design, she exposes its 
instability, and more importantly, she inscribes a path for possibility and plurality:  
But all her soul was crying out against that one sacrifice demanded of her. 
Oh, if some wonderful third way out could be discovered—neither love 
nor passion—would she not seize hold of it? Could it be that they were 
never to blend? Was she to lose love because she would have nought to do 
with passion? (42-43) 
195 
 
 
 In the dualistic model that regulates proper feminine behavior, love (by way of 
purity) is always separate and opposed to passion, but what Opalia desires is to have 
both—to establish a loving marriage with Alan and to embrace sexual passion. She is 
unable to imagine this “third way” because in marriage woman’s purity directly opposes 
her husband’s passion—her sexual identity is constructed on selflessness and sacrifice, 
and her sexuality is never self-defined, self-fulfilling, or self-motivated. She is only 
allowed sexual agency in terms of her duty to reproduce or to save a man from his own 
base sexual nature. Opalia embraces celibacy and rejects sexual activity not because she 
is ‘naturally’ pure and passionless but because it is the only way she can assert her right 
to sexual self-definition. She does not want “to succumb, in order to ‘keep Alan straight,’ 
as the vulgar expression has is,” nor does she want to “[succumb] for the sake of peace” 
(Cleeve 209). Opalia also seeks to reject the rationale that female sexuality is a tool of 
manipulation— a means to keep Alan “by her side by the common ties of passion, which 
keeps any man to any woman” (209). In this way, The Woman Who Wouldn’t creates new 
images of female sexuality and portrays how the free-thinking New Woman begins to 
cultivate a tradition that values women’s sexual consciousness and sexual awareness. In 
doing so, it rejects the old model of women’s sexual ignorance and instead of replacing it 
with a model of sexual knowledge to encourage women’s sexual innocence, it begins to 
imagine a third way whereby women are empowered to produce and control the sexual 
knowledge that defines them. As expressed by the narrator in The Woman Who Wouldn’t, 
“When women [begin] to know themselves, their position with men would be different” 
(43-44); it is only through new knowledge that woman will no longer “succumb” to the 
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cultural pressure to pit purity against passion and will finally be empowered to create a 
passionate definition of sexual identity on her own terms.  
 As The Woman Who Didn’t proposes, this project of cultivating a heterogeneous 
definition of womanhood and female sexuality entails not only the overthrow of the 
essentialist monologue that collectively inscribed women’s sexuality within her “natural” 
functions, but it also means waging an attack on the nation’s ubiquitous moral fabric—on 
escaping the moral and ethical codes that pervaded public politics and private lives and 
informed the structures of patriarchal control as well as the programs of first-wave 
feminist resistance. In order for the New Woman to harness her power, she needs to 
articulate a new identity that is not regulated by dichotomous terms that constructed 
female sexuality (purity/passion) or moral and sexual standards (virtue/vice). Much as 
The Woman Who Wouldn’t postulates that the New Woman requires a “third way” to self 
identify her sexuality and her future, The Woman Who Didn’t advances a similar 
possibility by interrogating virtue/vice, the dualistic model of ethics that standardized and 
gendered male and female sexual behavior. In this model, active sexual desire is always 
identified as vice, and it opposes virtue, or moral and sexual purity. Also implicated in 
this ethical ideology is that vice (active sexual desire) is ‘naturally’ male and virtue (all-
encompassing purity) is ‘naturally’ female. The relationship between a man and woman 
translates into a battle between vice/passion and virtue/purity, and as illustrated by The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t, woman is only able to articulate her sexual identity within the 
confines of this model: it is either manifested as vice like Lady Morris’s deviant and 
destructive sexual desire, or her sexual identity is completely desexualized and 
repurposed as virtue—as a selfless act designed to mitigate vice and purify man.  
197 
 
 
 As demonstrated by both Herminia’s and Opalia’s narratives, these either/or 
constructs restrict the New Woman’s transformative potential because neither her 
theories nor her actions can completely escape their pervading influences. Eurydice’s 
situation is no different: despite her confession that a relationship with Evelyn would 
complete her existence and create “the most satisfying sphere in which two love-inspired 
minds can move,” she must stifle her passion to retain her virtue (Cross 24). Although 
The Woman Who Didn’t concludes by reestablishing a model wherein female virtue 
remains diametrically opposed to male vice and by repositioning the sexual identity of 
New Woman within its proper bounds (Eurydice resists sexual temptation and returns to 
her marital duty), unlike The Woman Who Wouldn’t, Cross’s text does not glorify 
Eurydice’s compliance or suggest that she will be rewarded for her sacrifice. Instead, the 
text presents Eurydice’s unyielding virtue and sexual selflessness as “the whole tragedy 
of this woman’s life” (22). Eurydice is unable to escape “these laws of life” which 
confine women to virtue and purity because, there exists no “third way,” or as Evelyn 
identifies it, no “mixed existence” available to woman (22, 36). Eurydice cannot 
“transition from virtue to vice,” even for love and true self-fulfillment, because she has 
no way of conceptualizing her sexual identity on any other terms besides vice/virtue (37). 
 The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Wouldn’t, and the Woman Who Didn’t do 
not produce completely new representations of female sexuality, nor are their portrayals 
synonymous with one another, yet through various cultural interpretations and discursive 
interrogations, these three New Woman Novels inscribe a proto-feminist intertext by 
challenging the continuum of “truisms” that defined female sexuality at the end of the 
nineteenth century. If the New Woman was to escape the dualistic thinking that 
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constructed femininity on the dichotomous terms of purity/passion or pure/fallen, it was 
inevitable that she would also need to rethink the way these binaries had become 
indistinguishable from the ethical frameworks of good/evil or virtue/vice. Instead, the 
first-wave feminist campaigns that responded to the Contagious Diseases Acts worked 
within this traditional ethical framework in order to direct both men and women in the 
direction of purity, morality, and virtue. Undoubtedly, the repeal campaign and the 
dialogue that it prompted were game-changing moves for the women’s-rights movement 
because they positioned women as the central players in public debates about their own 
sexual oppression in the public and private spheres. Their initiative to seek equality for 
women through a program of equal sexual and moral standards was an insightful 
approach given the extent to which social, political, and medical discourses exploited 
notions of women’s inherent morality and purity in order to argue that the existence of 
unequal ethical standards adequately reflected women’s and men’s dissimilar ‘natural’ 
propensities for virtue and vice. Thus, the equalization of ethical standards was a 
potentially productive approach for feminists; however, rather than cultivating new codes 
of morality that could actually enable women to define their sexuality outside restrictions 
of purity/passion, it became a project of moralistic intervention and sexual control. As 
first-wave feminists battled against passion and vice in order to empower and liberate 
women, they failed realize that this continuum of thought based on the dichotomous 
terms of purity/passion and virtue/vice undermined their own goals. The Woman Who 
intertexts chronicle that failure through the “unpractical utopianism” of their New 
Woman heroines, but they also begin to anticipate a future feminist tradition in which 
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women will begin to deconstruct the cultural and social oppositions that constructed the 
angel and fictionalized the terms of her ‘natural’ collective identity.   
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 This dissertation provides an intertextual reading of Grant Allen’s The Woman Who 
Did (1895), Victoria Cross’s The Woman Who Didn’t (1895), and Lucas Cleeve’s The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t (1895) in order to historically and culturally contextualize these 
popular New Woman novels in social-purity feminism, the marriage debate, and reticent 
sexual politics of the late-nineteenth century. By examining the ways that The Woman 
Who heroines discursively and thematically engage with first-wave feminism and by 
focusing on this dialectical exchange of feminist ideas and practices as they were 
manifested in feminist publications and campaigns at the turn of the century, I argue that 
these texts confront the patriarchal ideologies that transcribed first-wave feminism. These 
intertextual encounters reveal the limitations of first-wave feminist ideals and call for a 
transformative feminism sundered from the influence of The Angel and from the old 
theories of purity and virtue that preserved this collective construct of womanhood. 
 The Introduction provides an overview of my argument and identifies the critical 
framework, research, and terminology that foreground my analysis. It closely examines 
the critical reception of the novels in the late nineteenth century in order to legitimize the 
216 
 
 
intertextuality of the novels. It is through intertextuality that we are able to trace the 
contradictory sexual politics in all three texts and see how these reflect the ambiguous 
cultural and social codes that constructed ideal femininity.  
 In the remainder of the dissertation, I take up three competing cultural narratives 
that the texts respond to on thematic, narrative, and discursive levels and trace how they 
use and/or attempt to dismantle these opposing voices. In Chapter 1, I examine the 
intertextual dialogue between The Woman Who series and social-purity feminism in order 
to argue that the textual encounters with social-purity theory and practice challenge the 
monolithic definition of the pure woman and undermine the transformative power of the 
angel in order to redirect feminist thought beyond the current purity politics. In Chapter 
2, I turn my attention to how The Woman Who Did, The Woman Who Didn’t, and The 
Woman Who Wouldn’t simultaneously enlarged nineteenth-century feminist arguments 
about marriage reform and subverted the dominant feminist ideologies that fueled such 
arguments by projecting  new romantic and marital situations. Chapter 3 follows up what 
the previous chapters have all alluded to: how the New Woman’s encounters with social-
purity politics and with the issues of the marriage debate threatened to unveil the reticent 
sexual politics that emerged into the public conversation as a result of feminist campaigns 
against the Contagious Diseases Acts. Here, I discuss how The Woman Who intertexts 
merge with the aftermath of first-wave feminist campaigns by appropriating prostitution 
and slavery phraseology, by uncovering the tension between liberal feminist values and 
maternity, and by exploring the idea of self-definition through alternative images of 
female sexuality and individualized approaches to sexual knowledge. Thus, as each text 
interrogates the social and cultural forces that regulate women’s access to sexual 
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knowledge and construct female sexual identity, they jointly produce an intertext wherein 
the “unpractical utopianism” of the New Woman heroine parallels the oppositional sexual 
politics of the first-wave feminism. 
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